Accountability in decentralization: A framework with South Asian and West African cases

Journal of Developing Areas

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 473-502

  Agrawal, Arun ^a   Ribot, Jesse ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; DECENTRALIZATION; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK;

AFRICA; ASIA;

EID: 0033363849     PISSN: 0022037X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (149)

1. This global pursuit of decentralization, even if it appears novel, is not the first time governments have attempted the decentralization of fiscal responsibilities or institutional powers. In Francophone West Africa, for example, beginning in 1917 at least four distinct waves can be discerned. In each case, decentralization accompanied and perhaps arose from fiscal crises of the state. See Jesse C. Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control," Africa 69 (August 1999): 51. In South Asia, at least three waves are visible since the mid-1800s. The first of these occurred as early as the 1860s according to Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System, 1764-1858 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991). The second wave of decentralization took place after independence in 1947 through efforts at community development. A third wave beginning in the early 1990s is currently under way.
2. This global pursuit of decentralization, even if it appears novel, is not the first time governments have attempted the decentralization of fiscal responsibilities or institutional powers. In Francophone West Africa, for example, beginning in 1917 at least four distinct waves can be discerned. In each case, decentralization accompanied and perhaps arose from fiscal crises of the state. See Jesse C. Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control," Africa 69 (August 1999): 51. In South Asia, at least three waves are visible since the mid-1800s. The first of these occurred as early as the 1860s according to Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System, 1764-1858 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991). The second wave of decentralization took place after independence in 1947 through efforts at community development. A third wave beginning in the early 1990s is currently under way.
3. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
4. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
5. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
6. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
7. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
8. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
9. William Dillinger, Decentralization and Its Implications for Urban Service Delivery, Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 8, cited in Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South-East Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 1. Norman T. Uphoff, wondering about how to think of the 1990s in the context of development, sees these years as possibly the "decade of deregulation, democratization, and decentralization," in his and Milton J. Esman's Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, RLG (Rural Local Government) No. 19, Rural Development Committee, Special Series on Rural Local Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1974), p. 607. Several other authors also speak of decentralization in the same breath as democratization. See Gerhard Totemeyer, "Challenges for Democracy, Decentralization, and Empowerment in Africa," Regional Development Dialogue 15, no. 1 (1994): 49-61; and Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1998). But clearly the two are quite different as seen in works by Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1996); and Xu Wang, "Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Grassroots Democracy in Rural China," World Development 25 (September 1997): 1431-42.
10. Arun Agrawal, with Charla Britt and Keshav Kanel, in Decentralization in Nepal: A Comparative Analysis (Oakland, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1999), presents a discussion examining the justifications advanced for recent attempts at decentralization around the world. See Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability," pp. 23-65, for a more historical discussion for Francophone West Africa.
11. Arun Agrawal, with Charla Britt and Keshav Kanel, in Decentralization in Nepal: A Comparative Analysis (Oakland, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1999), presents a discussion examining the justifications advanced for recent attempts at decentralization around the world. See Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability," pp. 23-65, for a more historical discussion for Francophone West Africa.
12. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; Richard Crook and James Manor, "Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa" (Report to the Overseas Development Administration, on Phase Two of a Two-Phase Research Project, January 1994), on file with author Jesse Ribot; Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); David K. Leonard, "Analyzing the Organizational Requirements for Serving the Rural Poor," chap. 1, in Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: Decentralization and Organizational Linkages, Research Series Paper No. 49, ed. David K. Leonard and Dale Rogers (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1982); and Stephen S. Cohen, John Dyckman, Erica Schoenberger, and Charles R. Downs, "Decentralization: A Framework for Policy Analysis" (Report to United States Agency for International Development by Project on Managing Decentralization, Berkeley, CA, February 1981), for references dating to the mid-1800s.
13. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; Richard Crook and James Manor, "Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa" (Report to the Overseas Development Administration, on Phase Two of a Two-Phase Research Project, January 1994), on file with author Jesse Ribot; Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); David K. Leonard, "Analyzing the Organizational Requirements for Serving the Rural Poor," chap. 1, in Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: Decentralization and Organizational Linkages, Research Series Paper No. 49, ed. David K. Leonard and Dale Rogers (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1982); and Stephen S. Cohen, John Dyckman, Erica Schoenberger, and Charles R. Downs, "Decentralization: A Framework for Policy Analysis" (Report to United States Agency for International Development by Project on Managing Decentralization, Berkeley, CA, February 1981), for references dating to the mid-1800s.
14. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; Richard Crook and James Manor, "Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa" (Report to the Overseas Development Administration, on Phase Two of a Two-Phase Research Project, January 1994), on file with author Jesse Ribot; Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); David K. Leonard, "Analyzing the Organizational Requirements for Serving the Rural Poor," chap. 1, in Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: Decentralization and Organizational Linkages, Research Series Paper No. 49, ed. David K. Leonard and Dale Rogers (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1982); and Stephen S. Cohen, John Dyckman, Erica Schoenberger, and Charles R. Downs, "Decentralization: A Framework for Policy Analysis" (Report to United States Agency for International Development by Project on Managing Decentralization, Berkeley, CA, February 1981), for references dating to the mid-1800s.
15. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; Richard Crook and James Manor, "Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa" (Report to the Overseas Development Administration, on Phase Two of a Two-Phase Research Project, January 1994), on file with author Jesse Ribot; Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); David K. Leonard, "Analyzing the Organizational Requirements for Serving the Rural Poor," chap. 1, in Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: Decentralization and Organizational Linkages, Research Series Paper No. 49, ed. David K. Leonard and Dale Rogers (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1982); and Stephen S. Cohen, John Dyckman, Erica Schoenberger, and Charles R. Downs, "Decentralization: A Framework for Policy Analysis" (Report to United States Agency for International Development by Project on Managing Decentralization, Berkeley, CA, February 1981), for references dating to the mid-1800s.
16. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; Richard Crook and James Manor, "Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa" (Report to the Overseas Development Administration, on Phase Two of a Two-Phase Research Project, January 1994), on file with author Jesse Ribot; Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); David K. Leonard, "Analyzing the Organizational Requirements for Serving the Rural Poor," chap. 1, in Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: Decentralization and Organizational Linkages, Research Series Paper No. 49, ed. David K. Leonard and Dale Rogers (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1982); and Stephen S. Cohen, John Dyckman, Erica Schoenberger, and Charles R. Downs, "Decentralization: A Framework for Policy Analysis" (Report to United States Agency for International Development by Project on Managing Decentralization, Berkeley, CA, February 1981), for references dating to the mid-1800s.
17. Decentralization strives to allocate decision-making powers to those who have the greatest information about a particular resource. But the availability of greater information does not necessarily lead to the use of that information in favor of the people on behalf of whom decisions are made. Information can also be used to favor the decisionmakers themselves or their friends and cronies.
18. Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).
19. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
20. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
21. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
22. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
23. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
24. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
25. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
26. In theory, decentralization can increase efficiency by helping internalize costs and reducing transactions costs. See World Development Report 1988, which asserts that "decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely" (World Bank, World Development Report 1988 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]), p. 1. The devolution of decision making to local actors can reduce administrative and management transaction costs via the proximity of local participants to decisionmakers and the access to local skills and information. See Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1894 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998), p. 1. See also Henry Bienen, Devesh Kapur, James Parks, and Jeffrey Riedlinger, "Decentralization in Nepal," World Development 18 (January 1990): 61-75, who argue that in Nepal decentralization worsened information flows, thereby increasing transactions costs. Decentralization is usually believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation. Decentralization is also seen to increase equity at the local level by greater local retention of revenues and more equal distribution of benefits from local activities. See David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change 20 (July 1989): 501-31, who emphasizes the role of decentralization in reducing inequalities; and the response by Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power, and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change 21 (July 1990): 491-500. See also R. Prud'homme, On the Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1252 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
27. Jesse C. Ribot, "From Exclusion to Participation: Turning Senegal's Forestry Policy Around?" World Development 23 (September 1995): 1587-89.
28. Pascale Delnooz, "Gestion des Ressources Forestières: La Communauté, l'État et le Marché: Etude de Projets d'Aménagement au Burkina Faso" (Ph.D. diss., Fondation Universitaire Luxembourgeoise, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, December 1999).
29. See Stephen Thomas, "The Legacy of Dualism and Decision-making: The Prospects for Local Institutional Development in 'CAMPFIRE,'" Branch of Terrestrial Ecology/CASS Joint Working Paper No. 1/1992 (Branch of Terrestrial Ecology/Center for Applied Social Sciences [CASS], Harare, Zimbabwe); and James Murombedzi, "The Implications for the Land-Tenure Commission for Rural Land-Tenure Systems, Renewable Resources, and Development in Zimbabwe," CASS Occasional Paper - NRM Series, CPN 90/1997 (CASS, Harare, Zimbabwe).
30. See Stephen Thomas, "The Legacy of Dualism and Decision-making: The Prospects for Local Institutional Development in 'CAMPFIRE,'" Branch of Terrestrial Ecology/CASS Joint Working Paper No. 1/1992 (Branch of Terrestrial Ecology/Center for Applied Social Sciences [CASS], Harare, Zimbabwe); and James Murombedzi, "The Implications for the Land-Tenure Commission for Rural Land-Tenure Systems, Renewable Resources, and Development in Zimbabwe," CASS Occasional Paper - NRM Series, CPN 90/1997 (CASS, Harare, Zimbabwe).
31. There are, of course, success stories. Decentralized healthcare provision in Ciera, Brazil, is argued by some to be a great success. See Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Local governments in South America have experienced successful fiscal decentralizations. See Ariel Fiszbein, "Decentralization and Local Capacity: Some Thoughts on a Controversial Relationship" (paper presented at the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]/UNCDF [United Nations Capital Development Fund]/World Bank Technical Consultation on Decentralization, Rome, 15-18 December 1997). Uganda instituted elected representatives at the village level in the mid-1990s. See Mikael Karlström, "Imagining Democracy: Political Culture and Democratization in Buganda," Africa 66 (May 1996). These successes, however, are usually partial: Uganda's new representatives lack powers; and in Brazil the efficiency of health-services provision has increased but central control has scarcely declined.
32. There are, of course, success stories. Decentralized healthcare provision in Ciera, Brazil, is argued by some to be a great success. See Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Local governments in South America have experienced successful fiscal decentralizations. See Ariel Fiszbein, "Decentralization and Local Capacity: Some Thoughts on a Controversial Relationship" (paper presented at the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]/UNCDF [United Nations Capital Development Fund]/World Bank Technical Consultation on Decentralization, Rome, 15-18 December 1997). Uganda instituted elected representatives at the village level in the mid-1990s. See Mikael Karlström, "Imagining Democracy: Political Culture and Democratization in Buganda," Africa 66 (May 1996). These successes, however, are usually partial: Uganda's new representatives lack powers; and in Brazil the efficiency of health-services provision has increased but central control has scarcely declined.
33. There are, of course, success stories. Decentralized healthcare provision in Ciera, Brazil, is argued by some to be a great success. See Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Local governments in South America have experienced successful fiscal decentralizations. See Ariel Fiszbein, "Decentralization and Local Capacity: Some Thoughts on a Controversial Relationship" (paper presented at the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]/UNCDF [United Nations Capital Development Fund]/World Bank Technical Consultation on Decentralization, Rome, 15-18 December 1997). Uganda instituted elected representatives at the village level in the mid-1990s. See Mikael Karlström, "Imagining Democracy: Political Culture and Democratization in Buganda," Africa 66 (May 1996). These successes, however, are usually partial: Uganda's new representatives lack powers; and in Brazil the efficiency of health-services provision has increased but central control has scarcely declined.
34. James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (World Bank: Washington, DC, 1999); and Hans Binswanger, "Technical Consultation on the Decentralization of Rural Development," proceedings of Development Conference, Rome, 16-18 December 1997 (FAO, Rome, 1999). In their recent book John Cohen and Stephen Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), pp. 69-70, propose a framework in which accountability figures centrally. However, they characterize it as an outcome rather than as an element of administrative design.
35. James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (World Bank: Washington, DC, 1999); and Hans Binswanger, "Technical Consultation on the Decentralization of Rural Development," proceedings of Development Conference, Rome, 16-18 December 1997 (FAO, Rome, 1999). In their recent book John Cohen and Stephen Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), pp. 69-70, propose a framework in which accountability figures centrally. However, they characterize it as an outcome rather than as an element of administrative design.
36. James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (World Bank: Washington, DC, 1999); and Hans Binswanger, "Technical Consultation on the Decentralization of Rural Development," proceedings of Development Conference, Rome, 16-18 December 1997 (FAO, Rome, 1999). In their recent book John Cohen and Stephen Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1999), pp. 69-70, propose a framework in which accountability figures centrally. However, they characterize it as an outcome rather than as an element of administrative design.
37. The comparative strategy we use is best classified as the "comparative case-oriented method" described by Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). See also Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22 (January 1980): 174-97; and Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, "Research Traditions and Theory in Comparative Politics: An Introduction," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 3-16.
38. The comparative strategy we use is best classified as the "comparative case-oriented method" described by Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). See also Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22 (January 1980): 174-97; and Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, "Research Traditions and Theory in Comparative Politics: An Introduction," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 3-16.
39. The comparative strategy we use is best classified as the "comparative case-oriented method" described by Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). See also Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22 (January 1980): 174-97; and Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, "Research Traditions and Theory in Comparative Politics: An Introduction," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 3-16.
40. The comparative strategy we use is best classified as the "comparative case-oriented method" described by Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). See also Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22 (January 1980): 174-97; and Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, "Research Traditions and Theory in Comparative Politics: An Introduction," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 3-16.
41. In their collection of essays on accountability, Fox and Brown simply state that accountability is the process of holding actors responsible for their actions. See Jonathan Fox and David Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 12. See also Samuel Paul, "Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice, and Control," World Development 20 (July 1992), for a discussion of problems of accountability in public agencies. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization, p. 2, see accountability as a "crucial link between enhanced participation and enhanced institutional performance."
42. In their collection of essays on accountability, Fox and Brown simply state that accountability is the process of holding actors responsible for their actions. See Jonathan Fox and David Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 12. See also Samuel Paul, "Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice, and Control," World Development 20 (July 1992), for a discussion of problems of accountability in public agencies. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization, p. 2, see accountability as a "crucial link between enhanced participation and enhanced institutional performance."
43. In their collection of essays on accountability, Fox and Brown simply state that accountability is the process of holding actors responsible for their actions. See Jonathan Fox and David Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 12. See also Samuel Paul, "Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice, and Control," World Development 20 (July 1992), for a discussion of problems of accountability in public agencies. Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization, p. 2, see accountability as a "crucial link between enhanced participation and enhanced institutional performance."
44. Philip Mawhood, Local Government in the Third World (Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 1983); Brian C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State (London: George Allen, 1985). We should note that the formal transfer of power to lower levels of government may sometimes be a centralizing act if the powers being devolved were earlier exercised informally by nonstate actors.
45. Philip Mawhood, Local Government in the Third World (Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 1983); Brian C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State (London: George Allen, 1985). We should note that the formal transfer of power to lower levels of government may sometimes be a centralizing act if the powers being devolved were earlier exercised informally by nonstate actors.
46. Booth's consideration of decentralization in France discusses how decentralization led to greater autonomy for local governments, but at the same time also prompted a struggle for the redefinition of the roles of different levels of government. Philip Booth, "Decentralization and Land-Use Planning in France: A 15-Year Review," Policy and Politics 26 (January 1995): 89-105. For a short statement on the degree of local autonomy in several developing countries, and the relationship of such autonomy to the colonial experience, see Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development 21 (June 1993): 901-2.
47. Booth's consideration of decentralization in France discusses how decentralization led to greater autonomy for local governments, but at the same time also prompted a struggle for the redefinition of the roles of different levels of government. Philip Booth, "Decentralization and Land-Use Planning in France: A 15-Year Review," Policy and Politics 26 (January 1995): 89-105. For a short statement on the degree of local autonomy in several developing countries, and the relationship of such autonomy to the colonial experience, see Paul Smoke, "Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from Kenya," World Development 21 (June 1993): 901-2.
48. "Bureaucratic decentralization" is another name given to deconcentration. See Giancarlo Rolla, "Autonomy: A Guiding Criterion for Decentralizing Public Administration," International Review of Administrative Sciences 64, no. 1 (1998): 27-39.
49. Ladipo Adamolekun, "Promoting African Decentralization," Public Administration and Development 11 (May-June 1991): 285-86, points out that deconcentration often takes place in the name of decentralization and that the two are confused.
50. Political decentralization is also called democratic decentralization by some authors. See Manor, Political Economy. Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (USAID, Washington, DC, 1998), p. 1, talks of democratic decentralization as "democratic local governance."
51. Political decentralization is also called democratic decentralization by some authors. See Manor, Political Economy. Harry Blair, "Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance," Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21 (USAID, Washington, DC, 1998), p. 1, talks of democratic decentralization as "democratic local governance."
52. When powers are ceded from the state to nonstate bodies such as private individuals or corporations, the process can be termed privatization, which we do not consider to be decentralization. When, under governmental supervision, powers and specific responsibilities are allocated to public corporations or any other special authorities outside of the regular political-administrative structure, it is called delegation. See Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development, p. 166. Devolution describes "the increased empowerment of local organizations with no direct government affiliation," such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private bodies, corporations, community groups, etc. See Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-Local Collaboration for Common Property Management" (paper presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 27-30 September 1990), p. 1.
53. When powers are ceded from the state to nonstate bodies such as private individuals or corporations, the process can be termed privatization, which we do not consider to be decentralization. When, under governmental supervision, powers and specific responsibilities are allocated to public corporations or any other special authorities outside of the regular political-administrative structure, it is called delegation. See Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development, p. 166. Devolution describes "the increased empowerment of local organizations with no direct government affiliation," such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private bodies, corporations, community groups, etc. See Michael Maniates, "Organizational Designs for Achieving Sustainability: The Opportunities, Limitations, and Dangers of State-Local Collaboration for Common Property Management" (paper presented at the First Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 27-30 September 1990), p. 1.
54. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority
55. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
56. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
57. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
58. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
59. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
60. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
61. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
62. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
63. Arguments defending decentralization on the basis of greater participation of citizens in democratic governance are given by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, [1835] 1945); and John Stuart Mill, cited in Philip Green, ed., Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 3; and more recently by Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. L. D. Feldman (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 47-49. Neil Webster, in "Panchayati Raj in West Bengal: Popular Participation for the People or the Party?" Development and Change 23 (October 1992): 129, is only one of the later figures to argue that decentralization is "seen as a means by which the state can be more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case with a concentration of administrative powers." See also Robert L. Bish and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); and Bernhard Weimer, "Challenges for Democratization and Regional Development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 49-50. For a counterview that does not see in decentralization any necessary benefits of responsiveness or freedom, see William H. Riker, who in Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), p. 142, says, "To one who believes in the majoritarian notion of freedom, it is impossible to interpret federalism as other than a device of minority tyranny." Ard Schilder and Bram Boeve, in "An Institutional Approach to Local Economic Development: The Case of Sublocational Initiatives in Three Districts in Kenya," Regional Development Dialogue 17, no. 2 (1996): 94-117, provide an argument favoring efficiency through decentralization. For efficiency arguments in the context of public choice see Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Readings in Urban Economics, ed. Matthew Edel and Jerome Rothenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1972); and William E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 11-12.
64. Fox and Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico, p. 1; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
65. Fox and Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico, p. 1; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
66. The relationship between decentralization and democracy is discussed by several authors. See Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu, "Decentralization and Democracy in Africa," International Review of Administrative Sciences 60 (June 1994): 214-15; and Celina Souza, "Redemocratization and Decentralization in Brazil: The Strength of Member States," Development and Change 27 (July 1996): 529-55.
67. The relationship between decentralization and democracy is discussed by several authors. See Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu, "Decentralization and Democracy in Africa," International Review of Administrative Sciences 60 (June 1994): 214-15; and Celina Souza, "Redemocratization and Decentralization in Brazil: The Strength of Member States," Development and Change 27 (July 1996): 529-55.
68. Manor, Political Economy, p. 7. He goes on to argue that decentralization, when it offers some promise, occurs in this tripartite mixture. He also suggests, against World Development Report 1997, that such tripartite mixtures are reasonably common.
69. Manor, Political Economy, p. 7. He goes on to argue that decentralization, when it offers some promise, occurs in this tripartite mixture. He also suggests, against World Development Report 1997, that such tripartite mixtures are reasonably common.
70. Binswanger, "Technical Consultation," p. 2.
71. Although accountability can be seen as dependent on the relationship between actors and the types of powers they exercise, we treat it as a separate dimension owing to its critical role in the politics of decentralization. It is through different mechanisms of accountability that those exercising powers are held to account for their actions.
72. Many analysts do not consider devolution of powers to NGOs to be decentralization. See World Bank, World Development Report 1997; Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Manor, Political Economy. We include NGOs in our list of possible actors since they are often recipients of public powers in the name of decentralization. They therefore deserve analytical attention. Whether a transfer of public powers to an NGO or any other nonstate body constitutes decentralization is an empirical question. Such actors are often neither representative nor downwardly accountable. See Jane Guyer, "The Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society in Africa: An Anthropologist Looks at Nigeria," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donals Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 215-29.
73. Many analysts do not consider devolution of powers to NGOs to be decentralization. See World Bank, World Development Report 1997; Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Manor, Political Economy. We include NGOs in our list of possible actors since they are often recipients of public powers in the name of decentralization. They therefore deserve analytical attention. Whether a transfer of public powers to an NGO or any other nonstate body constitutes decentralization is an empirical question. Such actors are often neither representative nor downwardly accountable. See Jane Guyer, "The Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society in Africa: An Anthropologist Looks at Nigeria," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donals Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 215-29.
74. Many analysts do not consider devolution of powers to NGOs to be decentralization. See World Bank, World Development Report 1997; Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Manor, Political Economy. We include NGOs in our list of possible actors since they are often recipients of public powers in the name of decentralization. They therefore deserve analytical attention. Whether a transfer of public powers to an NGO or any other nonstate body constitutes decentralization is an empirical question. Such actors are often neither representative nor downwardly accountable. See Jane Guyer, "The Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society in Africa: An Anthropologist Looks at Nigeria," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donals Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 215-29.
75. Many analysts do not consider devolution of powers to NGOs to be decentralization. See World Bank, World Development Report 1997; Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization; and Manor, Political Economy. We include NGOs in our list of possible actors since they are often recipients of public powers in the name of decentralization. They therefore deserve analytical attention. Whether a transfer of public powers to an NGO or any other nonstate body constitutes decentralization is an empirical question. Such actors are often neither representative nor downwardly accountable. See Jane Guyer, "The Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society in Africa: An Anthropologist Looks at Nigeria," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donals Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 215-29.
76. Interests of actors are always in the process of formation. The particular social, political, and economic contexts in which actors operate are instrumental in the formation and perception of interests and in constraining interest-based actions.
77. See Joe Oloka-Onyango, "Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda: A Historical Perspective," in Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements, and Constitutionalism, ed. Mahmood Mamdani and Joe Oloka-Onyango (Kampala: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik and Center for Basic Research, 1994), pp. 463-518; and Mahmood Mamdani, "Indirect Rule, Civil Society, and Ethnicity: The African Dilemma" Social Justice 23 (Spring-Summer 1996): 145-46, who attributes the failure of the rule of law in colonial Africa to the fact that "judicial and administrative activity was fused."
78. See Joe Oloka-Onyango, "Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda: A Historical Perspective," in Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements, and Constitutionalism, ed. Mahmood Mamdani and Joe Oloka-Onyango (Kampala: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik and Center for Basic Research, 1994), pp. 463-518; and Mahmood Mamdani, "Indirect Rule, Civil Society, and Ethnicity: The African Dilemma" Social Justice 23 (Spring-Summer 1996): 145-46, who attributes the failure of the rule of law in colonial Africa to the fact that "judicial and administrative activity was fused."
79. For a discussion of these categories in terms of property rights, see Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics 68, no. 3 (1992): 249-62.
80. See Ole Therkildsen and Joseph Semboja, "Short-Term Resource Mobilization for Recurrent Financing of Rural Local Governments in Tanzania," World Development 20 (August 1992): 1101-13.
81. Martin Doornbos of the Institute for Social Studies at The Hague (in an e-mail to Jesse C. Ribot, 30 November 1999) points out that decentralization may result in an increase of the power of the central state, as in the case where devolution of powers to tax is exchanged for central transfers of funds and the local tax base is limited.
82. John Lonsdale, "Political Accountability in African History," in Political Domination in Africa, ed. Patrick Chabal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 126-87 at p. 127.
83. See John Echeverri-Gent, "Public Participation and Poverty Alleviation: The Experience of Reform Communists in India's West Bengal," World Development 20 (October 1992): 1401-22, for a study of competitive local elections in West Bengal, India, that helped make policy more responsive to the poor. For a similar argument from Colombia about the importance of competitive elections at the local level, see Ariel Fiszbein, "The Emergence of Local Capacity: Lessons from Colombia," World Development 25 (July 1997): 1029-43.
84. See John Echeverri-Gent, "Public Participation and Poverty Alleviation: The Experience of Reform Communists in India's West Bengal," World Development 20 (October 1992): 1401-22, for a study of competitive local elections in West Bengal, India, that helped make policy more responsive to the poor. For a similar argument from Colombia about the importance of competitive elections at the local level, see Ariel Fiszbein, "The Emergence of Local Capacity: Lessons from Colombia," World Development 25 (July 1997): 1029-43.
85. For a more developed discussion of the means for achieving accountability, see Jesse C. Ribot, "Integral Local Development: Authority, Accountability, and Entrustment in Natural Resource Management," Regional Program for the Traditional Energy Sector Working Paper, Africa Region (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (1998): 112-26.
86. For a more developed discussion of the means for achieving accountability, see Jesse C. Ribot, "Integral Local Development: Authority, Accountability, and Entrustment in Natural Resource Management," Regional Program for the Traditional Energy Sector Working Paper, Africa Region (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (1998): 112-26.
87. E-mail to Jesse C. Ribot, from Doug Porter, Program Officer, United Nations Capital Development Fund, Kampala, Uganda, October 1999; cf. Doug Porter and Martin Onyach-Olaa, "Inclusive Planning and Allocation for Rural Services," Development in Practice 9 (February 1999); Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics.
88. E-mail to Jesse C. Ribot, from Doug Porter, Program Officer, United Nations Capital Development Fund, Kampala, Uganda, October 1999; cf. Doug Porter and Martin Onyach-Olaa, "Inclusive Planning and Allocation for Rural Services," Development in Practice 9 (February 1999); Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics.
89. A notable recent exception is the careful comparison carried out for the same two regions (but different countries and sectors) by Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization.
90. See Kalyankrishnan Sivaramakrishnan, "Forests, Politics, and Governance in Bengal: 1794-1994" (Ph.D. diss., vols. 1 and 2, Yale University, 1996).
91. K. Basnet, "Conservation Practice in Nepal: Past and Present," Ambio 21 (September 1992): 390-93; and Joel T. Heinen and B. Kattel, "A Review of Conservation Legislation in Nepal: Past Progress and Future Needs," Environmental Management 16 (November-December 1992): 723-33.
92. K. Basnet, "Conservation Practice in Nepal: Past and Present," Ambio 21 (September 1992): 390-93; and Joel T. Heinen and B. Kattel, "A Review of Conservation Legislation in Nepal: Past Progress and Future Needs," Environmental Management 16 (November-December 1992): 723-33.
93. R. B. Keiter, "Preserving Nepal's National Parks: Law and Conservation in the Developing World," Ecological Law Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1995): 591-675.
94. GGAOF (Gouvernement Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Françhise), "Réglementation forestière," Colonie du Sénégal, Service de l'agriculture et des forêts (Imprimerie du Gouvernement, Saint-Louis, Sénégal, 1916).
95. The allocation to urban merchants was required under colonial law, according to which licenses and permits could only go to French "citizens," defined as those living in one of the urban communes and fluent in French.
96. République du Sénégal (RDS), "Code Forestier, Loi No. 93-06 du 4 Février 1993" (Ministère de l'Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature, 1993); République du Mali (RDM), "Loi No. 95-004, Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestières" (Présidence de la République du Mali, Bamako, 18 January 1995).
97. See Vishwa Ballabh and Katar Singh, "Van (forest) Panchayats in Uttar Pradesh Hills: A Critical Analysis," Research Paper no. 2 (Institute of Rural Management, Anand, India, 1988); Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); and E. Somanathan, "Deforestation, Property Rights, and Incentives in Central Himalaya," Economic and Political Weekly 26 (1991): PE37-46.
98. See Vishwa Ballabh and Katar Singh, "Van (forest) Panchayats in Uttar Pradesh Hills: A Critical Analysis," Research Paper no. 2 (Institute of Rural Management, Anand, India, 1988); Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); and E. Somanathan, "Deforestation, Property Rights, and Incentives in Central Himalaya," Economic and Political Weekly 26 (1991): PE37-46.
99. See Vishwa Ballabh and Katar Singh, "Van (forest) Panchayats in Uttar Pradesh Hills: A Critical Analysis," Research Paper no. 2 (Institute of Rural Management, Anand, India, 1988); Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); and E. Somanathan, "Deforestation, Property Rights, and Incentives in Central Himalaya," Economic and Political Weekly 26 (1991): PE37-46.
100. Kumaon Forest Grievances Committee (KFGC), Report of the Forest Grievances Committee for Kumaon (Lucknow: Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1921).
101. Arun Agrawal and Gautam Yadama, "How Do Local Institutions Mediate the Impact of Market and Population Pressures on Resource Use?" Development and Change 28 (July 1997): 435-65.
102. Government of United Provinces, Van Panchayat Rules (Lucknow: Government of United Provinces, 1931).
103. The ensuing discussion on Nepal refers only to the decentralization of forest management under the Parks and People Program, not to Community Forestry in Nepal as a whole.
104. United Nations Development Program (hereafter UNDP), "Parks and People Project Document" (Kathmandu, Nepal: UNDP/His Majesty's Government [hereafter HMG], 1994).
105. HMG/UNDP, Parks and People Program Annual Report 1997, HMG/Nepal (N), Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation and UNDP (Kathmandu, Nepal: HMG/N, 1997).
106. HMG/UNDP, Parks and People Program Annual Report 1996, HMG/N, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation and UNDP (Kathmandu, Nepal: HMG/N, 1996).
107. A number of studies of parks and protected areas in Nepal point to the limited powers of use and management that local populations exercise in the Terai. See Joel T. Heinen, "Park-People Relations in Kosi Tappu Wildlife Reserve, Nepal: A Socio-economic Analysis," Environmental Conservation 20 (Fall 1993): 225-34; Sanjay K. Nepal and Karl Weber, "A Buffer Zone for Biodiversity Conservation: Viability of the Concept in Nepal's Royal Chitwan National Park," Environmental Conservation 21 (Winter 1994): 333-41.
108. A number of studies of parks and protected areas in Nepal point to the limited powers of use and management that local populations exercise in the Terai. See Joel T. Heinen, "Park-People Relations in Kosi Tappu Wildlife Reserve, Nepal: A Socio-economic Analysis," Environmental Conservation 20 (Fall 1993): 225-34; Sanjay K. Nepal and Karl Weber, "A Buffer Zone for Biodiversity Conservation: Viability of the Concept in Nepal's Royal Chitwan National Park," Environmental Conservation 21 (Winter 1994): 333-41.
109. One reason for such limited devolution of powers may be the very nature of protected areas. A large number of small-user groups making varying decisions about the part of the protected area under their control, it can be argued, will be unable to produce coherent rules to manage the withdrawal of benefits from the protected area. The argument depends in part on the assumption that protected areas constitute an identifiable ecological unit. For arguments defending ecologically based boundaries around protected areas, see Daniel M. Olsen and Eric Dinerstein, "The Global 200: A Representation Approach to Conserving the Earth's Most Biologically Valuable Ecoregions," Conservation Biology 12 (June 1998): 502-15.
110. This information has been gleaned from various issues of the Quarterly Bulletin of the Parks and People Program published between 1995 and 1997 by the Parks and People Program in Nepal.
111. Agrawal and Ostrom, "Property Rights."
112. RDS, "Code Forestier, Loi No. 93-06 du 4 Février 1993," p. 1.
113. RDS, "Projet de Décret Portant Code Forestier (Partie Réglementaire)" (Ministère de l'Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature, Dakar, 1994), p. 1.
114. The right to transport and sell wood products has not been granted to local populations or rural councils. It is in this upstream part of forest-product marketing that most of the profits are made. There has been no attempt to decentralize powers to grant access to distribution or retail outlets. Therefore, local producers are still obligated to sell to urban merchants at very low producers' prices. See Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability."
115. RDS, "Code Forestier, Loi No. 93-06 du 4 Février 1993," art. L. 3.
116. RDM, "Loi No. 95-003 Portant Organisation de l'Exploitation du Transport et du Commerce du Bois" (Présidence de la République du Mali, Bamako, 18 January 1995), art. D55, emphasis added.
117. RDS, "Décret no. 72-636 du 29 mai 1972 relatif aux attributions des chefs de circonscriptions administratives et chefs de village," Journal Officiel de la République du Sénégal, 17 June 1972; RDS, "Code Forestier, Loi No. 93-06 du 4 Février 1993," art. 185-95.
118. Cooperatives in Senegal are usually dominated by a few powerful notables. See Donald Cruise-O'Brien, Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Ribot, "From Exclusion to Participation."
119. Cooperatives in Senegal are usually dominated by a few powerful notables. See Donald Cruise-O'Brien, Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Ribot, "From Exclusion to Participation."
120. The role of political parties in local government needs to be examined in greater detail. At the end of the colonial period, the question of whether parties should be introduced into local government was already being contested. Those against party involvement argued "that the matters dealt with in local councils are essentially local in nature and that therefore the major parties whose differences may be on matters of national policy have no place in purely community problems" (L. Gray Cowan, Local Government in West Africa [New York: Columbia University Press, 1958], p. 221). Clearly, in French West Africa those against party involvement lost the debate.
121. Gerti Hesseling with M. Sypkens Smit, "Le droit foncier au Senégal; l'impact de la réforme foncière en Basse-Casamance" (N.D., mimeographed), p. 17.
122. Jesse C. Ribot, "Participation without Representation: Chiefs, Councils, and Rural Representation," Cultural Survival Quarterly, Special Issue on Participation edited by Pauline Peters (Fall 1996). Cf. Tor A. Benjaminsen, "Natural Resource Management, Paradigm Shifts, and the Decentralization Reform in Mali," Human Ecology 25 (June 1997): 131.
123. Jesse C. Ribot, "Participation without Representation: Chiefs, Councils, and Rural Representation," Cultural Survival Quarterly, Special Issue on Participation edited by Pauline Peters (Fall 1996). Cf. Tor A. Benjaminsen, "Natural Resource Management, Paradigm Shifts, and the Decentralization Reform in Mali," Human Ecology 25 (June 1997): 131.
124. Ribot, "Participation without Representation"; and Jesse C. Ribot, "Local Forest Control in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and The Gambia: A Review and Critique of New Participatory Policies" (World Bank, Africa Region, Washington, DC, 1995).
125. Ribot, "Participation without Representation"; and Jesse C. Ribot, "Local Forest Control in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and The Gambia: A Review and Critique of New Participatory Policies" (World Bank, Africa Region, Washington, DC, 1995).
126. RDM, "Loi No. 95-004 Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestierès."
127. We use the term "Ministry for Forests" since the legal texts speak of "the ministry responsible for forests," the exact name of which has changed several times over the past decade. During our research, the Ministry for Forestry was under the "Direction Nationale des Ressources Forestières, Fauniques et Halieutiques."
128. RDM, "Loi No. 95-002 Portant Création de la Direction Nationale des Ressources Forestières, Fauniques et Halietiques" (Présidence de la République du Mali, Bamako, 18 January 1995).
129. According to Yafong Berthe, the former director of Mali's Forest Service and currently in the Malian Ministry of Rural Development, new laws are about to be passed by means of which a simplified management plan can be developed by the local government or by a consultant hired by the local government (Yafong Berthe, interview by author Jesse Ribot, Kedougou, Burkina Faso, December 1999). The Forest Service will then play the role of verifying its legality. Its approval will require a signature by an appointee of the central state whose role will be to verify legal compliance.
130. RDM, "Loi No. 95-004 Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestières."
131. RDM, "Loi No. 95-004 Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestières." Again, according to Berthe (interview, December 1999), the Forest Service agent on this committee will be replaced in the new laws by someone from local government or someone with local expertise who is hired by the local government.
132. RDM, "Loi No. 95-004 Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestières."
133. RDM, "Loi No. 95-004 Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestières." This law is currently being revised (Berthe, interview, December 1999).
134. Benjaminsen, "Natural Resource Management," p. 135, notes that because the local-level forest agent will be an employee of the appointed local-government officials, "it is not entirely clear whether [the forester's] role will be advisory, or if he will also control permits for use and sanctions for misuse of natural resources." Benjaminsen continues that an attitude prevalent in today's Forest Service holds that "if the government decides to leave the management of the land to peasants, the trees will be finished off in short time" (p. 135). Whether the devolution of these decision-making powers to local elected authorities will occur with the implementation of the new laws is uncertain.
135. RDM, "Loi No. 96-050, Portant Principes de Constitution et de Gestion du Domaine des Collectivités Territoriales," adopted 16 October 1996, Bamako. Berthe suggests that categories have been changed to global, national, and local (Berthe, interview, December 1999). However, Ribot on a recent visit was unable to locate a decree or law stating such a change.
136. RDM, "Loi No. 95-004 Fixant les Conditions de Gestion des Ressources Forestières."
137. In a comparable vein, if state officials at lower levels receive new powers and are downwardly accountable to constituents over whom they exercise power, then it is possible to argue that the unfolding process is one of political decentralization, not deconcentration or bureaucratic decentralization.
138. Ribot, "Decentralization, Participation, and Accountability."
139. Paul Smoke and Blane Lewis, "Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia: A New Approach to an Old Idea," World Development 24 (August 1996): 1281-99; Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?; and Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization.
140. Paul Smoke and Blane Lewis, "Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia: A New Approach to an Old Idea," World Development 24 (August 1996): 1281-99; Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?; and Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization.
141. Paul Smoke and Blane Lewis, "Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia: A New Approach to an Old Idea," World Development 24 (August 1996): 1281-99; Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?; and Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralization.
142. In November 1999 the World Bank hosted the "International Conference on Upscaling and Mainstreaming Participation of Primary Stakeholder." Most of case discussion centered around the mobilization of participation in project design, monitoring, and assessment. See Maria Aycrigg, Participation and the World Bank: Success, Constraints, and Responses, Social Development Paper No. 29 (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 1998); and World Bank, The World Bank and Participation, Operations Policy Department (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994). The goal of "upscaling and mainstreaming" that the World Bank emphasizes is less about institutionalizing participation through representation or permanent institutions, and more about the adoption of temporary participatory interventions.
143. In November 1999 the World Bank hosted the "International Conference on Upscaling and Mainstreaming Participation of Primary Stakeholder." Most of case discussion centered around the mobilization of participation in project design, monitoring, and assessment. See Maria Aycrigg, Participation and the World Bank: Success, Constraints, and Responses, Social Development Paper No. 29 (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 1998); and World Bank, The World Bank and Participation, Operations Policy Department (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994). The goal of "upscaling and mainstreaming" that the World Bank emphasizes is less about institutionalizing participation through representation or permanent institutions, and more about the adoption of temporary participatory interventions.
144. In November 1999 the World Bank hosted the "International Conference on Upscaling and Mainstreaming Participation of Primary Stakeholder." Most of case discussion centered around the mobilization of participation in project design, monitoring, and assessment. See Maria Aycrigg, Participation and the World Bank: Success, Constraints, and Responses, Social Development Paper No. 29 (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 1998); and World Bank, The World Bank and Participation, Operations Policy Department (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994). The goal of "upscaling and mainstreaming" that the World Bank emphasizes is less about institutionalizing participation through representation or permanent institutions, and more about the adoption of temporary participatory interventions.
145. Fox and Butler, "Study of Membership Organizations"; Guyer, "Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society"; Isaac Ncube Mazonde, "The Basarwa of Botswana: Leadership, Legitimacy, and Participation in Development Sites," Cultural Survival Quarterly20 (Fall 1996): 54-56; Adil Najam, "NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework," Development Policy Review 14 (April 1996): 339-53; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997.
146. Fox and Butler, "Study of Membership Organizations"; Guyer, "Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society"; Isaac Ncube Mazonde, "The Basarwa of Botswana: Leadership, Legitimacy, and Participation in Development Sites," Cultural Survival Quarterly20 (Fall 1996): 54-56; Adil Najam, "NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework," Development Policy Review 14 (April 1996): 339-53; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997.
147. Fox and Butler, "Study of Membership Organizations"; Guyer, "Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society"; Isaac Ncube Mazonde, "The Basarwa of Botswana: Leadership, Legitimacy, and Participation in Development Sites," Cultural Survival Quarterly20 (Fall 1996): 54-56; Adil Najam, "NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework," Development Policy Review 14 (April 1996): 339-53; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997.
148. Fox and Butler, "Study of Membership Organizations"; Guyer, "Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society"; Isaac Ncube Mazonde, "The Basarwa of Botswana: Leadership, Legitimacy, and Participation in Development Sites," Cultural Survival Quarterly20 (Fall 1996): 54-56; Adil Najam, "NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework," Development Policy Review 14 (April 1996): 339-53; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997.
149. Fox and Butler, "Study of Membership Organizations"; Guyer, "Spatial Dimensions of Civil Society"; Isaac Ncube Mazonde, "The Basarwa of Botswana: Leadership, Legitimacy, and Participation in Development Sites," Cultural Survival Quarterly20 (Fall 1996): 54-56; Adil Najam, "NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework," Development Policy Review 14 (April 1996): 339-53; and World Bank, World Development Report 1997.