Research note: Price discrimination as an adverse signal: Why an offer to spread payments may hurt demand

Marketing Science

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 315-327

  Anderson, Eric T ^a   Simester, Duncan I ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Installment billing; Price discrimination; Promotions; Quality perceptions; Retailing; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035537334     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.20.3.315.9763     Document Type: Article

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