Individual risk preferences and collective outcomes in the evolution of exchange networks

Rationality and Society

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 304-348

  Flache, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Computer simulation; Exchange networks; Micro macro link; Social dilemmas; Social risk preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035535580     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/104346301773166945     Document Type: Article

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