GAins, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences

Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 263-302

  Raub, Werner ^a   Snijders, Chris ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Collective action; Conditional cooperation; Gains; Losses; Repeated games; Risk preferences; S shaped utility; Social dilemmas

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040515512     PISSN: 0022250X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.1997.9990204     Document Type: Article

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