Bush-Mosteller learning for a zero-sum repeated game with random pay-offs

International Journal of Systems Science

Volumn 32, Issue 10, 2001, Pages 1251-1260

  Poznyak, Alexander S ^a   Najim, Kaddour ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATA THEORY; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RANDOM PROCESSES;

BUSH-MOSTELLER LEARNING; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; ZERO SUM REPEATED GAME;

LEARNING SYSTEMS;

EID: 0035496949     PISSN: 00207721     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00207720110042347     Document Type: Article

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