Bicameralism and party politics in Germany: An empirical social choice analysis

Political Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 411-437

  König, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035430039     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00319     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Aldrich, J. H. (1995) Why Parties? The Origins and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago IL: University Press of Chicago.
2. Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. (1995) Partisan Politics. Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Alt, I. and Lowry, R. C. (1994) 'Divided government, fiscal institutions, and budget deficits: evidence from the States', American Political Science Review, 88, 811-28.
4. Baron, D. P. (1995) 'A sequential theory perspective on legislative organization', in K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (eds), Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
5. Baron, D. P. and Ferejohn, J. A. (1989) 'Bargaining in legislatures', American Political Science Review, 89, 1181-1206.
6. Binder, S. A. (1999) 'The dynamics of legislative gridlocks', American Political Science Review, 93, 519-33.
7. Black, D. (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Boldt, H. (1990) 'Federalism within the Reichsverfassungen of 1849 and 1871', in Hermann and Claudia Schnurmann (eds), German and American Constitutional Thought: Contexts, Interaction, and Historical Realities. New York: St. Martin's Press.
9. Bräuninger, T. and König, T. (1999) 'The checks and balances of party federalism. German federal government in a divided legislature'. European Journal of Political Research, 2, 207-34.
10. Braun, D. (1996) 'Der bundesdeutsche Föderalismus an der Wegscheide. Interessenkonstellationen, Akteurskonflikte und instilutionelle Lösungen', Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 7, 101-35.
11. Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
12. Coleman, J. J. (2000) 'Unified government, divided government, and party responsiveness', American Political Science Review, 93, 821-35.
13. Cox, G. W. (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Cox, G. w. and MacCubbins, M. D. (1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
15. Cox, G. W. and McKelvey, R. D. (1984) 'A ham sandwich theorem for general measures', Social Choice and Welfare, 1, 75-83.
16. Cox, G. W. and Kernell, S. (1991) The Politics of Divided Government. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
17. Edwards, G., Barrett, A. and Peak, J. (1997) The legislative impact of divided government'. American Journal of Political Science. 41, 545-63.
18. Fiorina, M. P. (1992) Divided Government. New York: Macmillan.
19. Fiorina, M. (1994) 'Divided government in the American states: a byproduct of legislative professionalism?', American Political Science Review, 88, 304-16.
20. Fiorina, M. P. (1996) Divided Government 2nd edition. Boston MA: Allyn and Bacon.
21. Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J. (1787) The Federalist, or the New Constitution.
22. Hammond, T. and Miller, G. (1987) 'The core of the constitution', American Political Science Review. 81, 1155-74.
23. Jacobson, G. (1990) The Electoral Origins of Divided Government. Boulder CO: Westview.
24. Knoke, D., Pappi, F. U., Broadbent, J. and Tsujinaka, Y. (1996) Comparing Policy Networks. Labor Politics in the US, Germany, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. Koehler, D. H. (1992) 'Limiting median lines frequently determine the yolk. A rejoinder', Social Choice and Welfare, 9, 37-41.
26. Koehler, D. H. (1996) 'Committee choice and the core under supermajority rule: results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space', Public Choice, 87, 281-301.
27. König, T. (1999) 'Regieren im Föderalismus', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 13/35, 24-36.
28. König, T. and Bräuninger, T. (1996) 'Power and political co-ordination in American and German multichamber legislation', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3, 331-60.
29. Kramer, G. H. (1972) 'Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces', Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 2, 165-80.
30. Krehbiel, K. (1996) 'Institutional and partisan sources of gridlock. A theory of divided and unified government', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 7-40.
31. Laumann, E. O. and Knoke, D. (1987) The Organizational State. Madison WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
32. Lehmbruch, G. (1976). Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
33. Lehmbruch, G. (1998) Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat: Regelsysteme und Spannungslagen im Institutionengefüge der Bundesrespublik Deutschland. Opladen: Westdt.
34. Levmore, S. (1992) 'Bicameralism: when are two decisions better than one?', International Review of Law and Economics, 12, 145-62.
35. Lohmann, S., Brady, D. W. and Rivers, D. (1997) 'Party identification, retrospective voting, and moderating elections in a federal system: West Germany, 1961-89', Comparative Political Studies, 30, 420-49.
36. Mayhew, D. R. (1991) Divided We Govern. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
37. McKelvey, R. D. (1976) Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control', Journal of Economic Theory, 12, 472-82.
38. McKelvey, R. (1979) 'General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models', Econometrica, 5, 1085-1112.
39. Miller, N. R., Grofman, B. and Feld, S. L. (1989) 'The geometry of majority rule', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 379-406.
40. Ordeshook, P. C. (1986) Game Theory and Political Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41. Ordeshook, P. C. (1992) A Political Theory Primer. New York: Routledge.
42. Pappi, F. U., König, T. and Knoke, D. (1995) Entscheidungsprozesse in der Arbeits-und Sozialpolitik. Der Zugang der Interessengruppen zum Regierungssystem über Politikfeldnetze. Ein deutsch-amerikanischer Vergleich. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.
43. Plott, C. R. (1967) 'A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule', American Economic Review, 57, 787-806.
44. Reindt, M. and Saffert, H. (1968) Das Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: Geschichte Gestalt-Aufgaben, Berlin: Erich Schmidt Press.
45. Riker, W. H. (1992) 'The justification of bicameralism', International Political Science Review, 13, 101-16.
46. Scharpf, F. W. (1988) 'The joint decision trap: lessons from German federalism and European integration', Public Administration, 66, 239-87.
47. Scharpf, F. W. (1994) Optionen des Föderalismus in Deutschland. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.
48. Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
49. Schindler, P. (1994) Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
50. Schönhoven, K. (1987) Die deutschen Gewerkschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
51. Shepsle, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (1987) 'The institutional foundations of committee power', American Political Science Review, 1, 85-104.
52. Sigelman, L., Wahlbeck, P. J. and Buell, E. H. (1997) 'Vote choice and the preference for divided government: lessons of 1992', American Political Science Review, 41, 879-94.
53. Sundquist, J. L. (1988) 'Needed: a political theory for the new era of coalition government in the United States', Political Science Quarterly, 103, 613-35.
54. Tsebelis, G. (1995) 'Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism'. British Journal of Political Science, 25, 289-325.
55. Tsebelis, G. and Money, J. (1997) Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
56. Tsebelis, G. (1999) 'Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: an empirical analysis', American Political Science Review, 93: 591-608.