Innovation and reciprocal externalities: Information transmission via job mobility

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 403-425

  Cooper, David P ^a  

^a Arthur Andersen LLP   (United States)

Author keywords

Intellectual property; Mobility; R D; Turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035430002     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00154-8     Document Type: Article

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