Implementable mechanisms to coordinate horizontal alliances

Management Science

Volumn 47, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 787-799

  Nault, Barrie R ^a,b,c   Tyagi, Rajeev K ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Economics of Interaction; Externalities; Horizontal Alliances; Incentive Mechanisms

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; INTERNET; MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

HORIZONTAL ALLIANCES; INCENTIVE MECHANISMS;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0035382007     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.6.787.9808     Document Type: Article

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