Outcomes-adjusted reimbursement in a health-care delivery system

Management Science

Volumn 47, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 735-751

  Fuloria, Prashant C ^a,b   Zenios, Stefanos A ^a,b  

^a Closed Loop Solutions Inc   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capitation; Dynamic Incentives; End Stage Renal Disease; Fee for Service; Health Care Financing; Principal Agent Models

Indexed keywords

COSTS; FEES AND CHARGES; NUMERICAL ANALYSIS; PATIENT TREATMENT; THEOREM PROVING;

HEALTH-CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS; MEDICAL EXPENDITURES; OUTCOMES-ADJUSTED PAYMENT SYSTEMS;

HEALTH CARE;

EID: 0035381984     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.6.735.9816     Document Type: Article

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