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Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 223-238

Management turnover and executive compensation in synergistic takeovers

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Management turnover; Synergistic takeover

Indexed keywords


EID: 0035374104     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1062-9769(00)00070-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (3)

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