Laboratory incentive structure and control-test design in an experimental asset market

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-26

  Brandouy, Olivier ^a  

^a ESRG   (France)

Author keywords

Behavior; Design of Experiment; Double auction; Experimental Asset Market; Induced Value Theory; Test reference Protocol

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035255894     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(00)00034-9     Document Type: Article

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