A law of large numbers: Bidding and compulsory competitive tedering for refuse collection contracts

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 105-113

  Gömez Lobo, André S ^a   Szymanski, Stefan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

^b IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Econometrics of auctions; Refuse collection; Tendering

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVENESS; MARKET SYSTEM; SERVICE PROVISION; URBAN ECONOMY; URBAN SERVICE; WASTE MANAGEMENT;

UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 0035113132     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026545306923     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. The price effects of increased competition in auction markets
2. Competitive tendering and refuse collection: Identifying the source of efficiency gains
3. Competitive tendering and efficiency: The case of refuse collection
4. First-price sealed bid auctions with secret reservation prices
5. The winner's curse and bidder competition in acquisitions: Evidence from failed bank auctions
6. The competitive effect in bonus bidding: New evidence
7. A survey of recent empirical work concerning auctions
8. Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data
9. Auctions and bidding
10. A convergence theorem for competitive bidding with differential Information
11. Auctions and bidding: A primer
12. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
13. Optimal auctions
14. The impact of compulsory competitive tendering on refuse collection services
15. A bidding model of perfect competition