Honesty in a regulatory context - good thing or bad?

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 215-232

  Heyes, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Honesty; Incentives; Pollution control

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRY; POLLUTION CONTROL; POLLUTION POLICY; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0035109298     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00076-8     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Monitoring the emission of pollutants by the inspector leadership method
2. Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game
3. Pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics
4. The tax compliance game: Towards an interactive theory of law enforcement
5. Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in the US steel industry
6. Responders versus nonresponders: A new perspective on heterogeneity
7. The role of altruism in economic interaction
8. Self-reporting of pollution under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
9. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted
10. Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment
11. Making things stick: The economics of enforcement and compliance
12. The effectiveness of EPA's regulatory enforcement: The case of industrial effluent standards
13. Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation
14. Cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement
15. Observability and choise of instrument mix in the control of externalities