For victory? The crises and dilemmas of the communist party of the Russian Federation

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 263-290

  March, Luke ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNISM; ELECTION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0035076033     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668130020032299     Document Type: Article

References (257)

1. R. Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London, Routledge, 1993), pp. 137, 143.
2. For example see Novoe vremya, 1996, 35, pp. 16-17; and J. Barth Urban & V. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder, Westview, 1997), pp. 179-194.
3. For example see Novoe vremya, 1996, 35, pp. 16-17; and J. Barth Urban & V. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder, Westview, 1997), pp. 179-194.
4. G. Flikke, 'Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, March 1999, p. 275. For just some other views of the CPRF as predominately nationalist see C. Williams & S. Hanson, 'National-Socialism, Left Patriotism, or Superimperialism? The "Radical Right" in Russia', in S. P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 257-278 at p. 276, and J. Devlin, Slavophiles and Commissars (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 179-180.
5. G. Flikke, 'Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, March 1999, p. 275. For just some other views of the CPRF as predominately nationalist see C. Williams & S. Hanson, 'National-Socialism, Left Patriotism, or Superimperialism? The "Radical Right" in Russia', in S. P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 257-278 at p. 276, and J. Devlin, Slavophiles and Commissars (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 179-180.
6. G. Flikke, 'Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 51, 2, March 1999, p. 275. For just some other views of the CPRF as predominately nationalist see C. Williams & S. Hanson, 'National-Socialism, Left Patriotism, or Superimperialism? The "Radical Right" in Russia', in S. P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 257-278 at p. 276, and J. Devlin, Slavophiles and Commissars (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 179-180.
7. See Novoe vremya, 1996, 22, p. 10; J. T. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Politics', Party Politics, 2, 2, April 1996, pp. 147-175.
8. See Novoe vremya, 1996, 22, p. 10; J. T. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Politics', Party Politics, 2, 2, April 1996, pp. 147-175.
9. See Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, pp. 55-59; R. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 14, 1 and 2, March and June 1998, pp. 128-158 at p. 139; author's interview with Boris Slavin (Pravda 5 correspondent and ex-CPRF Central Committee member), 29 November 1997.
10. See Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, pp. 55-59; R. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 14, 1 and 2, March and June 1998, pp. 128-158 at p. 139; author's interview with Boris Slavin (Pravda 5 correspondent and ex-CPRF Central Committee member), 29 November 1997.
11. See Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, pp. 55-59; R. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 14, 1 and 2, March and June 1998, pp. 128-158 at p. 139; author's interview with Boris Slavin (Pravda 5 correspondent and ex-CPRF Central Committee member), 29 November 1997.
12. Author's interview with Nikolai Bindyukov (CPRF Central Committee secretary for connections with foreign parties and movements), 18 December 1997.
13. Sakwa, 'Left or Right?', p. 142.
14. G. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 30 July 1992; V. Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 4-11 November 1997.
15. G. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 30 July 1992; V. Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 4-11 November 1997.
16. In Valerii Solovei's apt phrase; conversation with the author, 18 September 2000.
17. Pravda, 13-17 February 1998.
18. M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 21.
19. P. Suvanto, Conservatism from the French Revolution to the 1990s (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997), p. 32.
20. See L. Byzov, 'What about the voters?', in M. McFaul, N. Petrov et al., Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Elections (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), pp. 11-24 at p. 20.
21. Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 2.
22. Author's interviews with Bindyukov, 18 December 1997, and with CPRF CC secretary for ideological work Aleksandr Kravets, 20 November 1997. The output of the party-affiliated society Russian Scholars of Socialist Orientation and its theoretical journal Dialog is still strongly Marxist-Leninist.
23. N. McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe (London, RIIA and Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 97.
24. C. Shore, Italian Communism: The Escape from Leninism (London, Pluto Press, 1990), p. 142.
25. Author's interview with deputy head of CPRF CC department for international affairs Andrei Filippov, 6 December 1997.
26. Shore, Italian Communism, pp. 17, 143.
27. J. Barth Urban & V. Solovei, 'Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie v postkommunisticheskom obshchestve', Svobodnaya mysl', 1997, 3, pp. 14-28 at p. 28.
28. Sakwa, 'Left or Right?', pp. 129, 145.
29. N. Harding, Leninism (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996), pp. 13, 53.
30. Rachel Walker sees Soviet ideology as an 'empty signifier', redefined by the party continuously as circumstances required. See R. Walker, 'Marxism-Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and the Double Bind', The British Journal of Political Science, 19, April 1989, pp. 161-189 at p. 176.
31. A. Tsipko, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 November 1995.
32. M. Lazar, 'Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s', The Journal of Communist Studies, 4, 3, September 1988, pp. 243-257; M. J. Bull, 'The West European Communist Movement: Past, Present and Future', in M.J. Bull & P. Heywood (eds), West European Communist Parties after the Revolutions of 1989 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1994), pp. 203-222.
33. M. Lazar, 'Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s', The Journal of Communist Studies, 4, 3, September 1988, pp. 243-257; M. J. Bull, 'The West European Communist Movement: Past, Present and Future', in M.J. Bull & P. Heywood (eds), West European Communist Parties after the Revolutions of 1989 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1994), pp. 203-222.
34. See T. Astrakhankina, Pravda 5, 29 October 1997 and Glasnost', 1997, 10.
35. See T. Astrakhankina, Pravda 5, 29 October 1997 and Glasnost', 1997, 10.
36. G. Sartori, Political Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 138-139.
37. M. Duverger, Political Parties: their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London, Methuen, 1964), p. 201; McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 161.
38. M. Duverger, Political Parties: their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London, Methuen, 1964), p. 201; McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 161.
39. Ibid., p. 166.
40. R. Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (Englewood Cliffs NJ, Philip Allan, 1991), p. 124.
41. J. Lester, Modern Tsars and Princes: the Struggle for Hegemony in Russia (London, Verso, 1995), pp. 1-21.
42. T. Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 2nd edn (Oxford, Blackwell, 1991), p. 180.
43. L. Holmes, Politics in the Communist World (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 20, 22.
44. Bull & Heywood (eds), West European Communist Parties, p. xviii.
45. A. Wright, 'Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism', in R. Eatwell & A. Wright, Contemporary Political Ideologies (London, Pinter, 1993), pp. 78-100 at p. 89; E. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (New York, Schocken, 1967), pp. 202-206.
46. A. Wright, 'Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism', in R. Eatwell & A. Wright, Contemporary Political Ideologies (London, Pinter, 1993), pp. 78-100 at p. 89; E. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (New York, Schocken, 1967), pp. 202-206.
47. M. J. Bull, 'Whatever Happened to Italian Communism?', West European Politics, 14, 4, October 1991, pp. 96-120 at pp. 103-104; C. Shore, Italian Communism.
48. M. J. Bull, 'Whatever Happened to Italian Communism?', West European Politics, 14, 4, October 1991, pp. 96-120 at pp. 103-104; C. Shore, Italian Communism.
49. Author's interview with Bindyukov, 18 December 1997.
50. M. Wyman, 'Developments in Russian Voting Behaviour: 1993 and 1995 Compared', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12, 3, September 1996, pp. 277-292 at p. 287.
51. S. White, R. Rose & I. McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham NJ, Chatham House, 1997), pp. 230-233.
52. The communist core vote in 1999 was 17.7%. See Byzov, 'What about the voters?', p. 14.
53. R. Rose & E. Tikhomirov, 'Russia's Forced-Choice Presidential Election', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 4, October-December 1996, pp. 351-379 at p. 353.
54. M. McFaul & N. Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition: Regional and National Assessments', Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 38, 9, November 1997, pp. 507-549.
55. Duverger, Political Parties, p. 175; McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 34.
56. Duverger, Political Parties, p. 175; McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 34.
57. Sakwa, 'Left or Right?', p. 145.
58. Author's interview with Bindyukov, 18 December 1997.
59. M. McFaul, 'Russia's 1996 Presidential Elections', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 4, 1996, pp. 318-350.
60. M. Wyman, 'Elections and Voting Behaviour', in S. White, A. Pravda & Z. Gitelman (eds), Developments in Russian Politics 4 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997), pp. 104-128 at p. 120.
61. A. Makarkin, Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii, 1996), p. 1; S. Chernyakovsky, The Communist Party of the Russian Federation', in McFaul, Petrov et al., Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Elections, pp. 77-84 at p. 84.
62. A. Makarkin, Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii, 1996), p. 1; S. Chernyakovsky, The Communist Party of the Russian Federation', in McFaul, Petrov et al., Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Elections, pp. 77-84 at p. 84.
63. There are many other such examples, including CPRF Duma deputies Yurii Severnard, Viktor Vid'manov, president of the Rosagrompromstroi corporation, and Valerii Vorotnikov, a former KGB general, who had ties to important Russian banking circles such as MOST Bank, and was 10th on the CPRF party list in 1995. See Zavtra, 1997, 50, p. 1; www.nns.ru/elects/izbobyed/finansy.html; and Makarkin, Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, p. 3.
64. There are many other such examples, including CPRF Duma deputies Yurii Severnard, Viktor Vid'manov, president of the Rosagrompromstroi corporation, and Valerii Vorotnikov, a former KGB general, who had ties to important Russian banking circles such as MOST Bank, and was 10th on the CPRF party list in 1995. See Zavtra, 1997, 50, p. 1; www.nns.ru/elects/izbobyed/finansy.html; and Makarkin, Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, p. 3.
65. T. J. Colton, 'Economics and Voting in Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 4, October-December 1996, pp. 289-314 at pp. 300-306; Wyman, 'Developments in Russian Voting Behaviour: 1993 and 1995 Compared', pp. 281-282.
66. T. J. Colton, 'Economics and Voting in Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 4, October-December 1996, pp. 289-314 at pp. 300-306; Wyman, 'Developments in Russian Voting Behaviour: 1993 and 1995 Compared', pp. 281-282.
67. Segodnya, 26 July 1996; S. Whitefield & G. Evans, 'Support for Democracy and Political Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, July-September 1996, pp. 218-242 at p. 228.
68. Segodnya, 26 July 1996; S. Whitefield & G. Evans, 'Support for Democracy and Political Opposition in Russia, 1993-1995', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, July-September 1996, pp. 218-242 at p. 228.
69. Party membership was 600 000 in 1996 (Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 59). The author was quoted 550-560 000 in 1998 (author's interview with A. Filippov, 31 January 1998). The 1999 figure is 530 000 (Chernyakovsky, 'The Communist Party of the Russian Federation', p. 79).
70. Party membership was 600 000 in 1996 (Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 59). The author was quoted 550-560 000 in 1998 (author's interview with A. Filippov, 31 January 1998). The 1999 figure is 530 000 (Chernyakovsky, 'The Communist Party of the Russian Federation', p. 79).
71. As party First Deputy Chairman Kuptsov admitted: 'we are aiming for a [vanguard party] but it is impossible in current conditions' (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 2 February 1995).
72. Z. Trofimova, 'Russia's Left Wing: Party Organization and Party Temperature', Russia, 1997, 7. For information on low membership recruitment see Zyuganov at the 8th CC CPRF plenum on 20 June 1998 (accessed from www.kprf.ru).
73. Z. Trofimova, 'Russia's Left Wing: Party Organization and Party Temperature', Russia, 1997, 7. For information on low membership recruitment see Zyuganov at the 8th CC CPRF plenum on 20 June 1998 (accessed from www.kprf.ru).
74. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 January 1996 and 20 November 1997: 'the CPRF in the Duma simply cannot be more radical than the moods of the people and people simply are not going onto the streets in sufficient numbers'.
75. J. Lester, Modern Tsars and Princes, pp. 187, 230.
76. See the comments of Andrei Isaev, head of FNPR's parliamentary wing, the Union of Labour, in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 April 2000, at www.ng.ru. Zyuganov has often talked about party organisations being unable to work with other social strata and concerned only with internal matters (e.g. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 February 1994).
77. See the comments of Andrei Isaev, head of FNPR's parliamentary wing, the Union of Labour, in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 April 2000, at www.ng.ru. Zyuganov has often talked about party organisations being unable to work with other social strata and concerned only with internal matters (e.g. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 February 1994).
78. Pravda 5, 18-25 April 1997 and 6-13 March 1998; Johnson's Russia List, 4113, 16 February 2000. The Komsomol split from the party because it thought the CPRF was too willing to compromise with the authorities and claimed that the CPRF was trying to curb its independence.
79. Pravda 5, 18-25 April 1997 and 6-13 March 1998; Johnson's Russia List, 4113, 16 February 2000. The Komsomol split from the party because it thought the CPRF was too willing to compromise with the authorities and claimed that the CPRF was trying to curb its independence.
80. On the use of fronts to manipulate bourgeois society without being absorbed by its values see McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, pp. 12, 34.
81. See S. Baburin, Pravda 5, 25 October 1997.
82. See most of the sources cited in note 2.
83. V. Kuptsov, Pravda, 13-17 February 1998; author's interviews with Bindyukov, 18 December 1997, and Kravets, 20 November 1997.
84. Author's interview with Bindyukov, 18 December 1997. For the statist-patriotic communists' views on the strategy see Yurii Belov, Ne tuzhi, Rossiya (Moscow, Znanie, 1997), pp. 64, 92; G. Zyuganov, Rossiya - rodina may a: ideologiya gosudarstvennogo patriotizma (Moscow, Informpechat', 1996), p. 52.
85. Author's interview with Bindyukov, 18 December 1997. For the statist-patriotic communists' views on the strategy see Yurii Belov, Ne tuzhi, Rossiya (Moscow, Znanie, 1997), pp. 64, 92; G. Zyuganov, Rossiya - rodina may a: ideologiya gosudarstvennogo patriotizma (Moscow, Informpechat', 1996), p. 52.
86. Marxist-Leninist moderniser R. Gabidullin asserted that state-patriotism was supported by only three or four party leaders (R. Gabidullin, 'O klassovom podkhode i gosudarstvennom patriotizme', Dialog, 1997, 10, p. 10). Even in the party's broader electorate a majority (54%) actually support 'communism', only 12% support 'Russian nationalism' and 9% 'centrism' (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 October 1997).
87. Marxist-Leninist moderniser R. Gabidullin asserted that state-patriotism was supported by only three or four party leaders (R. Gabidullin, 'O klassovom podkhode i gosudarstvennom patriotizme', Dialog, 1997, 10, p. 10). Even in the party's broader electorate a majority (54%) actually support 'communism', only 12% support 'Russian nationalism' and 9% 'centrism' (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 October 1997).
88. Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 73.
89. National bolshevism in the USSR was a state-sponsored 'official nationalism' which legitimised the institutions of the Soviet state from a national-imperialist point of view and grounded them in an emotional and patriotic sentiment absent from Marxist-Leninist discourse. See M. Agursky, The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR (Boulder, Westview, 1987), p. 248.
90. From the party statutes, IVs''ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 19-20 apre'lya 1997 goda (Materialy i dokumenty) (Moscow, 1997), p. 93.
91. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 March 1994; Yurii Belov, Russkaya sud'ba (Moscow, Soratnik, 1995), p. 38; also Pravda, 15 March 1994, p. 2.
92. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 March 1994; Yurii Belov, Russkaya sud'ba (Moscow, Soratnik, 1995), p. 38; also Pravda, 15 March 1994, p. 2.
93. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 March 1994; Yurii Belov, Russkaya sud'ba (Moscow, Soratnik, 1995), p. 38; also Pravda, 15 March 1994, p. 2.
94. R. Kosolapov, Pravda, 18 August 1993; P.Lopata, 'Na puti ideinogo obnovleniya', Dialog, 1997, 2, p. 20; Pravda, 21 September 1993.
95. R. Kosolapov, Pravda, 18 August 1993; P.Lopata, 'Na puti ideinogo obnovleniya', Dialog, 1997, 2, p. 20; Pravda, 21 September 1993.
96. R. Kosolapov, Pravda, 18 August 1993; P.Lopata, 'Na puti ideinogo obnovleniya', Dialog, 1997, 2, p. 20; Pravda, 21 September 1993.
97. Urban & Solovei's account of party ideological changes in 1993-95 is in the main convincing, although it focuses too much on internecine doctrinal disputes and ignores the moderate-radical split (see Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, pp. 121-145).
98. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 2 February 1995.
99. Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 162.
100. For Zyuganov's election platform see Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 March 1996. For the NPSR programme see Sovetskaya Rossiya, 10 August 1996.
101. For Zyuganov's election platform see Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 March 1996. For the NPSR programme see Sovetskaya Rossiya, 10 August 1996.
102. Zyuganov, Rossiya - rodina moya, pp. 14, 15, 72, 355. See also Zyuganov and Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 15 August 1996, Pravda Rossii, 19 December 1996.
103. Zyuganov, Rossiya - rodina moya, pp. 14, 15, 72, 355. See also Zyuganov and Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 15 August 1996, Pravda Rossii, 19 December 1996.
104. Zyuganov, Rossiya - rodina moya, pp. 14, 15, 72, 355. See also Zyuganov and Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 15 August 1996, Pravda Rossii, 19 December 1996.
105. IV s''ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, pp. 74, 83. The radical communist paper Glasnost called it a 'long-awaited step to the left' (Glasnost', 1997, 9, p. 3).
106. IV s''ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, pp. 74, 83. The radical communist paper Glasnost called it a 'long-awaited step to the left' (Glasnost', 1997, 9, p. 3).
107. Izm, 1995, 1 (6), p. 20. Such views are expressed by many. For just some examples see B. Slavin, Posle sotsializma … (Moscow, Flinta, 1996), p. 369; V. Trushkov, 'Russkaya ideya v rossiiskom politicheskom prostranstve', Dialog, 1997, 5, pp. 12-15.
108. Izm, 1995, 1 (6), p. 20. Such views are expressed by many. For just some examples see B. Slavin, Posle sotsializma … (Moscow, Flinta, 1996), p. 369; V. Trushkov, 'Russkaya ideya v rossiiskom politicheskom prostranstve', Dialog, 1997, 5, pp. 12-15.
109. Izm, 1995, 1 (6), p. 20. Such views are expressed by many. For just some examples see B. Slavin, Posle sotsializma … (Moscow, Flinta, 1996), p. 369; V. Trushkov, 'Russkaya ideya v rossiiskom politicheskom prostranstve', Dialog, 1997, 5, pp. 12-15.
110. For the CPU(r) see RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, 1, 3, 8 June 2000. For analysis of the Ukrainian and Czech Communist Parties respectively see J. Barth Urban, 'The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions', Demokratizatsiya, 7, 1, Winter 1999, pp. 111-134; and S. Hanley, 'From "Subcultural Party" to Neo-Communist Force? The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 1990-2000', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (forthcoming).
111. For the CPU(r) see RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, 1, 3, 8 June 2000. For analysis of the Ukrainian and Czech Communist Parties respectively see J. Barth Urban, 'The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions', Demokratizatsiya, 7, 1, Winter 1999, pp. 111-134; and S. Hanley, 'From "Subcultural Party" to Neo-Communist Force? The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 1990-2000', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (forthcoming).
112. For the CPU(r) see RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, 1, 3, 8 June 2000. For analysis of the Ukrainian and Czech Communist Parties respectively see J. Barth Urban, 'The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions', Demokratizatsiya, 7, 1, Winter 1999, pp. 111-134; and S. Hanley, 'From "Subcultural Party" to Neo-Communist Force? The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 1990-2000', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (forthcoming).
113. M. Urban & V. Gel'man, 'The Development of Political Parties in Russia', in K. Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 175-222 at p. 199.
114. T. F. Remington, 'Democratization and the New Political Order in Russia', in Dawisha & Parrott (eds), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, pp. 69-129 at pp. 85-87.
115. KPRF mezhdu umerennost'yu i radikalizmom (Moscow, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii, 1997), p. 4. For Lenin's approach to compromise see V. Lenin, 'On Compromises', Selected Works, Vol. 2 (Moscow, Progress, 1970), pp. 226-230.
116. KPRF mezhdu umerennost'yu i radikalizmom (Moscow, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii, 1997), p. 4. For Lenin's approach to compromise see V. Lenin, 'On Compromises', Selected Works, Vol. 2 (Moscow, Progress, 1970), pp. 226-230.
117. Yurii Maslyukov, Trud, 30 July 1998.
118. A. Kuvaev, Zavtra, 1997, 43; A. Makashov, Pravda Moskvy, 78, November 1997.
119. A. Kuvaev, Zavtra, 1997, 43; A. Makashov, Pravda Moskvy, 78, November 1997.
120. For example see A. Prokhanov, Zavtra, 1997, 43.
121. McFaul & Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition', p. 543.
122. A. Makarkin, KPRF i ee soyuzniki posle vyborov (Moscow, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii, 1996), pp. 1-3.
123. Zyuganov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 December 1996.
124. For example, Aleksandr Korzhakov told the CPRF that the regime would not give up power even if they won freely and fairly, and tried to cajole them into initiating an appeal to cancel the elections. See A. Korzhakov, Boris El'tsin: ot rassveta do zakata (Moscow, Interbuk, 1997), pp. 368-369, 375.
125. E.g. Zyuganov, Pravda Rossii, 15 August 1996.
126. See Izvestiya, 31 January 1997. Especially during the first few months of 1997, the CPRF floated the idea of a vice-presidency, with rumours that Zyuganov would be suggested as vice-president. The CPRF also renewed its attempts to remove El'tsin on the grounds of ill health with attempts to renew the constitution through a constitutional assembly.
127. See Podberezkin, Pravda 5, 11 February 1997; Zyuganov, Pravda, 6 July 1996.
128. See Podberezkin, Pravda 5, 11 February 1997; Zyuganov, Pravda, 6 July 1996.
129. See Pravda Rossii, 19 December 1996; Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 11 March 1997.
130. See Pravda Rossii, 19 December 1996; Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 11 March 1997.
131. See OMRI Russian Regional Report, Part II, 6, 2 October 1996; and S. Solnick, 'Gubernatorial Elections in Russia 1996-7', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14, 1, January-March 1998, pp. 48-80.
132. See OMRI Russian Regional Report, Part II, 6, 2 October 1996; and S. Solnick, 'Gubernatorial Elections in Russia 1996-7', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14, 1, January-March 1998, pp. 48-80.
133. Vladimir Rimskii, OMRI Russian Regional Report, Part I, 10, 30 October 1996; McFaul & Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition', pp. 514, 533.
134. Vladimir Rimskii, OMRI Russian Regional Report, Part I, 10, 30 October 1996; McFaul & Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition', pp. 514, 533.
135. Kommersant', 1 November 1996; McFaul & Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition', pp. 523-526.
136. Kommersant', 1 November 1996; McFaul & Petrov, 'Russian Electoral Politics After Transition', pp. 523-526.
137. C. Freeland, Financial Times, 30 August 1996, p. 2; Moscow News, 21-27 May 1998.
138. C. Freeland, Financial Times, 30 August 1996, p. 2; Moscow News, 21-27 May 1998.
139. Sakwa, 'Left or Right?', p. 137.
140. Those governors who eventually supported the CPRF in the 1999 election were Belogonov (Amur), Kondratenko (Krasnodar), Maksyuta (Volgograd), Ryabov (Tambov), Vinogradov (Vladimir), Chernogorov (Stavropol), Starodubtsev (Tula), Lodkin (Bryansk), Shabanov (Voronezh) and Surikov (Altai). Of these only the last five might be regarded as strongly ideologically conscious. See EWI Russian Regional Report, 4, 37, 7 October 1999; V. Tolz & I. Busygina, 'Regional Governors and the Kremlin: the Ongoing Battle for Power', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30, 4, 1997, pp. 401-426 at p. 412.
141. Those governors who eventually supported the CPRF in the 1999 election were Belogonov (Amur), Kondratenko (Krasnodar), Maksyuta (Volgograd), Ryabov (Tambov), Vinogradov (Vladimir), Chernogorov (Stavropol), Starodubtsev (Tula), Lodkin (Bryansk), Shabanov (Voronezh) and Surikov (Altai). Of these only the last five might be regarded as strongly ideologically conscious. See EWI Russian Regional Report, 4, 37, 7 October 1999; V. Tolz & I. Busygina, 'Regional Governors and the Kremlin: the Ongoing Battle for Power', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30, 4, 1997, pp. 401-426 at p. 412.
142. However, only the governors of Bryansk, Ryazan and Stavropol permitted the CPRF local organisation to control key positions in administration (Informatsionnyi byulleten', 7 (48), 15 April 1998, at www.kprf.ru).
143. See the speech of Zyuganov at the 20 June 1998 CC plenum (www.kprf.ru/news/buleten.htm).
144. The most vocal oppositionists were Teimuraz Avaliani, Albert Makashov, Richard Kosolapov and Tatyana Astrakhankina. For their complaints see Dialog, 1996, 11, pp. 33-34; Molniya, 1997, 9. For the text of the 'Leninist-Stalinist Platform' see Glasnost', 15 May 1998.
145. The most vocal oppositionists were Teimuraz Avaliani, Albert Makashov, Richard Kosolapov and Tatyana Astrakhankina. For their complaints see Dialog, 1996, 11, pp. 33-34; Molniya, 1997, 9. For the text of the 'Leninist-Stalinist Platform' see Glasnost', 15 May 1998.
146. The most vocal oppositionists were Teimuraz Avaliani, Albert Makashov, Richard Kosolapov and Tatyana Astrakhankina. For their complaints see Dialog, 1996, 11, pp. 33-34; Molniya, 1997, 9. For the text of the 'Leninist-Stalinist Platform' see Glasnost', 15 May 1998.
147. At the CPRFIV congress Moscow leader Kuvaev warned of a split if the CPRF did not harden its position towards the regime (from www.nns.ru/chronicle/sdkprf.htrnl).
148. KPRF mezhdu umerennost'yu i radikalizmom, p. 2.
149. N. Robinson, 'Classifying Russia's Party System: The Problem of 'Relevance' in a Time of Uncertainty', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 14, 1 and 2, March and June 1998, pp. 159-177 at pp. 168, 170.
150. Author's interviews with Filippov and Bindyukov, 6 and 18 December 1997.
151. Zyuganov claimed that a 'round table' agreement with the executive would deliver a change in the constitution, the forming of a government of people's trust and a change of socioeconomic course, none of which occurred (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 30 December 1997).
152. 'Hero of the Day' programme (NTV), 13 February 1998. On Ilyukhin see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 October 1997. On an attempt to explain Seleznev's actions to the party see V. Trushkov, Pravda Rossii, 21-28 October 1998.
153. 'Hero of the Day' programme (NTV), 13 February 1998. On Ilyukhin see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 October 1997. On an attempt to explain Seleznev's actions to the party see V. Trushkov, Pravda Rossii, 21-28 October 1998.
154. For defections such as those of Vladimir Semago, ex-party whip Oleg Shenkarev and others see Moskovskie novosti, 17-24 August 1997; Moscow News, 19-25 February 1998, p. 2. For the decline in Duma discipline see A. Frolov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 April 1998; and Kommersant', 25 April 1998.
155. For defections such as those of Vladimir Semago, ex-party whip Oleg Shenkarev and others see Moskovskie novosti, 17-24 August 1997; Moscow News, 19-25 February 1998, p. 2. For the decline in Duma discipline see A. Frolov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 April 1998; and Kommersant', 25 April 1998.
156. For defections such as those of Vladimir Semago, ex-party whip Oleg Shenkarev and others see Moskovskie novosti, 17-24 August 1997; Moscow News, 19-25 February 1998, p. 2. For the decline in Duma discipline see A. Frolov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 April 1998; and Kommersant', 25 April 1998.
157. For defections such as those of Vladimir Semago, ex-party whip Oleg Shenkarev and others see Moskovskie novosti, 17-24 August 1997; Moscow News, 19-25 February 1998, p. 2. For the decline in Duma discipline see A. Frolov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 April 1998; and Kommersant', 25 April 1998.
158. CPRF Central Committee presidium member A. Frolov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 April 1998.
159. As First Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. Gennadii Khodyrev, (a CPRF member) also entered government as minister for anti-monopoly policy and support of industry.
160. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 September 1998.
161. For Makashov's derogatory remarks about 'yids' at party rallies in Samara and Moscow see Zavtra, 1998, 42. For these and Ilyukhin's remarks see Kommersant', 12 November 1998; Segodnya, 16 December 1998; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1998.
162. For Makashov's derogatory remarks about 'yids' at party rallies in Samara and Moscow see Zavtra, 1998, 42. For these and Ilyukhin's remarks see Kommersant', 12 November 1998; Segodnya, 16 December 1998; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1998.
163. For Makashov's derogatory remarks about 'yids' at party rallies in Samara and Moscow see Zavtra, 1998, 42. For these and Ilyukhin's remarks see Kommersant', 12 November 1998; Segodnya, 16 December 1998; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1998.
164. For Makashov's derogatory remarks about 'yids' at party rallies in Samara and Moscow see Zavtra, 1998, 42. For these and Ilyukhin's remarks see Kommersant', 12 November 1998; Segodnya, 16 December 1998; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1998.
165. SWB, SU/3381 B/5, 11 November 1998; SWB, SU/3434 B/6, 16 January 1999.
166. SWB, SU/3381 B/5, 11 November 1998; SWB, SU/3434 B/6, 16 January 1999.
167. T. F. Remington, 'Political Conflict and Institutional Design: Paths of Party Development in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 14, 1 and 2, March and June 1998, pp. 201-223 at p. 211.
168. Although the CPRF leadership blamed the defeat on the other fractions, many rank-and-file communists were truly upset by the failure of impeachment (Vremya MN, 17 May 1999).
169. Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 164.
170. Following the attempt the long-standing dissident Avaliani was finally removed from the Central Committee, and other dissidents were silenced (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 June 1998).
171. For example, in early 1999 18% of party secretaries were changed as result of criticism (Sergei Potapov, CPRF CC Presidium member, Pravda, 27-28 April 1999).
172. Moskovskaya Pravda, 66, December 1999; Pravda 5, 23 May 1998.
173. Moskovskaya Pravda, 66, December 1999; Pravda 5, 23 May 1998.
174. The Agrarian Party, Derzhava and Spiritual Heritage wanted a loose coalition rather than the disciplined union the CPRF sought. They sought alliances with Luzhkov, the 'Union of Realists' and S. Federov's Party of Workers' Self-Management (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 July 1998).
175. See Agrarian leader Lapshin's comments to this effect in Kommersant', 6 January 1998.
176. Informatsionnyi byulleten', 30, 10-15 November 1998 at www.kprf.ru; SWB/SU/3375 B/5, 4 November 1998; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 August 1996.
177. Informatsionnyi byulleten', 30, 10-15 November 1998 at www.kprf.ru; SWB/SU/3375 B/5, 4 November 1998; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 August 1996.
178. Informatsionnyi byulleten', 30, 10-15 November 1998 at www.kprf.ru; SWB/SU/3375 B/5, 4 November 1998; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 August 1996.
179. Moscow Times, 14 January 1999 at www.moscowtimes.ru.
180. The CPRF supported only nine MSA candidates, and refused to give a party list place to the MSA's Albert Makashov, thereby forcing it to run independently. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 September 1999; Sergei Chernyakovsky, 'Kommunisticheskie obedineniya', in M. McFaul, N. Petrov et al., Rossiya nakanune dumskikh vyborov 1999 goda (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1999), pp. 99-119 at p. 102.
181. The CPRF supported only nine MSA candidates, and refused to give a party list place to the MSA's Albert Makashov, thereby forcing it to run independently. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 September 1999; Sergei Chernyakovsky, 'Kommunisticheskie obedineniya', in M. McFaul, N. Petrov et al., Rossiya nakanune dumskikh vyborov 1999 goda (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1999), pp. 99-119 at p. 102.
182. Ilyukhin said his aim was to pitch the MSA vote towards Cossacks and military personnel who were nationalists but who might object to the communist label (Ilyukhin at MSA website www.gull.ptt.ru/Asm; Moscow Times, 14 January 1999 at www.moscowtimes.ru).
183. Ilyukhin said his aim was to pitch the MSA vote towards Cossacks and military personnel who were nationalists but who might object to the communist label (Ilyukhin at MSA website www.gull.ptt.ru/Asm; Moscow Times, 14 January 1999 at www.moscowtimes.ru).
184. Zorkal'tsev, chairman of the NPSR's executive committee, said on 7 January 1999 that the opposition would run in four columns - the APR, CPRF, and the moderate and radical Patriots (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 8 January 1999). Kuptsov, however, insisted that Zyuganov and Seleznev would top a central CPRF candidate list. Many communists did not support the columns, fearing they would split the party (Pravda, 30 June-6 July 1999 at www.kprf.ru).
185. Zorkal'tsev, chairman of the NPSR's executive committee, said on 7 January 1999 that the opposition would run in four columns - the APR, CPRF, and the moderate and radical Patriots (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 8 January 1999). Kuptsov, however, insisted that Zyuganov and Seleznev would top a central CPRF candidate list. Many communists did not support the columns, fearing they would split the party (Pravda, 30 June-6 July 1999 at www.kprf.ru).
186. The timing of the formation of the For Victory! bloc was dictated by the pressure of party secretaries, who dashed chances of forming three columns when it had become clear that none apart from the CPRF would pass the 5% barrier (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 July 1999).
187. In Tula, Ulyanovsk, Rostov, St Petersburg and a number of other regions regional organisations of Spiritual Heritage joined the CPRF (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 September 1999). For the APR split and leader Lapshin's views see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1999.
188. In Tula, Ulyanovsk, Rostov, St Petersburg and a number of other regions regional organisations of Spiritual Heritage joined the CPRF (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 September 1999). For the APR split and leader Lapshin's views see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1999.
189. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 September 1999. Derzhava had already left the NPSR because Zyuganov insisted it leave Luzhkov's Fatherland movement (SWB SU/3443 B/7, 27 January 1999). Lapshin and Podberezkin, as well as Aman Tuleev, were finally expelled from the NPSR in June 2000.
190. For the platform: 'Rise up, Great Country!', see www.kprf.ru/zapobedu.htm and for the 75-page campaign booklet see RFE/RL Election Report, No. 2, 12 November 1999. For the 1995 platform see Pravda Rossii, 7 September 1995.
191. For the platform: 'Rise up, Great Country!', see www.kprf.ru/zapobedu.htm and for the 75-page campaign booklet see RFE/RL Election Report, No. 2, 12 November 1999. For the 1995 platform see Pravda Rossii, 7 September 1995.
192. For the platform: 'Rise up, Great Country!', see www.kprf.ru/zapobedu.htm and for the 75-page campaign booklet see RFE/RL Election Report, No. 2, 12 November 1999. For the 1995 platform see Pravda Rossii, 7 September 1995.
193. Dar'ya Mitina, Moskovskii Komsomolets, 30 September 1999.
194. For the economic programme 'By Means of Creation' see www.kprf.ru.
195. See www.rferl.org/elections/russian99report/speeches.html.
196. RFE/RL Newsline, 3, 186, Part I, 23 September 1999.
197. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 17 December 1999.
198. The party list even contained one ex-Our Home is Russia Duma deputy (Zhores Alferov, 10th place on list) and 37 Agrarians, as well as other groups (Pravda Rossii, 15-21 September 1999).
199. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 September 1999, from www.ng.ru.
200. See Sovetskaya Rossiya, 29 July 1999; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 June 1999; Pravda, 25-26 May 1999; Trud, 21 January 2000. Other governors losing their leanings towards the CPRF at this time were Petr Sumin (Chelyabinsk), Vyacheslav Lyubimov (Ryazan), Nikolai Vinogradov (Vladimir), Yurii Lodkin (Bryansk) and Aleksandr Ryabov (Tambov).
201. See Sovetskaya Rossiya, 29 July 1999; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 June 1999; Pravda, 25-26 May 1999; Trud, 21 January 2000. Other governors losing their leanings towards the CPRF at this time were Petr Sumin (Chelyabinsk), Vyacheslav Lyubimov (Ryazan), Nikolai Vinogradov (Vladimir), Yurii Lodkin (Bryansk) and Aleksandr Ryabov (Tambov).
202. See Sovetskaya Rossiya, 29 July 1999; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 June 1999; Pravda, 25-26 May 1999; Trud, 21 January 2000. Other governors losing their leanings towards the CPRF at this time were Petr Sumin (Chelyabinsk), Vyacheslav Lyubimov (Ryazan), Nikolai Vinogradov (Vladimir), Yurii Lodkin (Bryansk) and Aleksandr Ryabov (Tambov).
203. See Sovetskaya Rossiya, 29 July 1999; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 June 1999; Pravda, 25-26 May 1999; Trud, 21 January 2000. Other governors losing their leanings towards the CPRF at this time were Petr Sumin (Chelyabinsk), Vyacheslav Lyubimov (Ryazan), Nikolai Vinogradov (Vladimir), Yurii Lodkin (Bryansk) and Aleksandr Ryabov (Tambov).
204. S. Chernyakovsky in M. McFaul, A. Ryabov et al., Carnegie Bulletin No. 2: Parliamentary Elections in Russia, from www.ceip.org/programs/ruseuras/Elections/elections.htm.
205. The party's major 'red businessman', Vid'manov, helped establish connections with industrial companies in the MIC, energy and machine-building sectors, and the CPRF had access to the budgets of its controlled regions. Other financial support came from banks such as Agropromstroibank and Rosagropromstroi and the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences. See Delovye lyudi, 101, May 1999; Argumenty i fakty, 6 October 1999; and Novaya gazeta, 21-27 February 2000.
206. The party's major 'red businessman', Vid'manov, helped establish connections with industrial companies in the MIC, energy and machine-building sectors, and the CPRF had access to the budgets of its controlled regions. Other financial support came from banks such as Agropromstroibank and Rosagropromstroi and the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences. See Delovye lyudi, 101, May 1999; Argumenty i fakty, 6 October 1999; and Novaya gazeta, 21-27 February 2000.
207. The party's major 'red businessman', Vid'manov, helped establish connections with industrial companies in the MIC, energy and machine-building sectors, and the CPRF had access to the budgets of its controlled regions. Other financial support came from banks such as Agropromstroibank and Rosagropromstroi and the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences. See Delovye lyudi, 101, May 1999; Argumenty i fakty, 6 October 1999; and Novaya gazeta, 21-27 February 2000.
208. Kommersant'-vlast', 6 July 1999; Moskovskii Komsomolets, 30 September 1999.
209. Kommersant'-vlast', 6 July 1999; Moskovskii Komsomolets, 30 September 1999.
210. On 15 November 1999 this stood at 1.2 million dollars (RFE/RL Newsline, 3, 227, part 1, 22 November 1999).
211. Such as number eight on the list, 38-year old Gennadii Semigin. The recruitment of businessmen was apparently arranged by Kuptsov and his business manager (upravdelami) Evgenii Burchenko (Moskovskii Komsomolets, 30 September 1999).
212. Valentin Kuptsov at CPRF VI congress, 15 January 2000, from www.kprf.ru; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 July 1999.
213. Valentin Kuptsov at CPRF VI congress, 15 January 2000, from www.kprf.ru; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 July 1999.
214. Information from www.fci.ru.
215. Eleven were independents (most backed by the CPRF) and five nominated from other parties (information from www.fci.ru and www.duma.gov.ru).
216. Support for the CPRF among those aged 18-29 years dropped from 9% in 1995 to 6% in 1999. Compare Wyman, 'Elections and Voting Behaviour', p. 120 and New Russia Barometer VIII at www.russiavotes.org.
217. Support for the CPRF among those aged 18-29 years dropped from 9% in 1995 to 6% in 1999. Compare Wyman, 'Elections and Voting Behaviour', p. 120 and New Russia Barometer VIII at www.russiavotes.org.
218. Zyuganov's business support stood at 7% according to a ROMIR poll on 29 February 2000, at www.russiatoday.com.
219. Source: New Russia Barometer VIII. Information kindly supplied by Neil Munro. A large share of the CPRF electorate in Voronezh, Kalmykia and Volgograd shifted to Putin (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1999, at www.ng.ru; EWI Russian Regional Report, 5, 2, 19 January 2000).
220. Source: New Russia Barometer VIII. Information kindly supplied by Neil Munro. A large share of the CPRF electorate in Voronezh, Kalmykia and Volgograd shifted to Putin (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1999, at www.ng.ru; EWI Russian Regional Report, 5, 2, 19 January 2000).
221. Source: New Russia Barometer VIII. Information kindly supplied by Neil Munro. A large share of the CPRF electorate in Voronezh, Kalmykia and Volgograd shifted to Putin (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 December 1999, at www.ng.ru; EWI Russian Regional Report, 5, 2, 19 January 2000).
222. S. Chernyakovsky, 'Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie', in M. McFaul, N. Petrov & A. Ryabov (eds), Rossiya na dumskikh i prezidentskikh vyborakh (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000).
223. V. Kuptsov at CPRF VI Congress, www.kprf.ru.
224. These regions were Magadan and Kamchatka oblasti, Krasnodar krai and the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okruga. For further information on the electorate of the major parties see McFaul, Ryabov et al., Carnegie Bulletin No. 4: Itogi vyborov and Rossiya nakanune dumskikh vyborov 1999 goda, pp. 307-309; Chernyakovsky, 'Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie'.
225. These regions were Magadan and Kamchatka oblasti, Krasnodar krai and the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okruga. For further information on the electorate of the major parties see McFaul, Ryabov et al., Carnegie Bulletin No. 4: Itogi vyborov and Rossiya nakanune dumskikh vyborov 1999 goda, pp. 307-309; Chernyakovsky, 'Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie'.
226. EWI Russian Regional Report, 4, 48, 22 December 1999. In Kemerovo the communists won 29% as opposed to 45% in 1995, while Edinstvo took 34%. Kemerovo governor Tuleev appeared on the communist list and simultaneously supported Edinstvo.
227. M. McFaul, A. Ryabov et al., Carnegie Bulletin No. 4: Itogi vyborov, at www.ceip.org/programs/ ruseuras/Elections/elections.htm.
228. Zyuganov, Pravda, 23 December 1999, at www.kprf.ru.
229. On the CPRF's failure to anticipate Edinstvo at all see N. Bindyukov, Pravda, 27 January 2000. According to New Russia Barometer VIII, at www.russiavotes.org, 23% of the CPRF's 1999 Duma vote intended to support Putin and only 75% Zyuganov in a second round runoff.
230. On the CPRF's failure to anticipate Edinstvo at all see N. Bindyukov, Pravda, 27 January 2000. According to New Russia Barometer VIII, at www.russiavotes.org, 23% of the CPRF's 1999 Duma vote intended to support Putin and only 75% Zyuganov in a second round runoff.
231. Segodnya, 22 December 1999.
232. Figures on 2 March from www.duma.gov.ru.
233. From the Kremlin's point of view, if Edinstvo had a majority coalition with OVR, this would strengthen Primakov, but if it united with Yabloko and SPS this would have raised the possibility of an opposition OVR-CPRF alliance. An alliance with the communists at least promised stability as the party's discipline meant that they were easy to work with. Seleznev's ability to compromise got his support from the Kremlin, oligarchs such as Berezovsky and a number of regional leaders. See Harvard Election Watch, 2, 2000, p. 8. For the communist view see Pravda Rossii, 26 January-1 February 2000, at www.kprf.ru.
234. From the Kremlin's point of view, if Edinstvo had a majority coalition with OVR, this would strengthen Primakov, but if it united with Yabloko and SPS this would have raised the possibility of an opposition OVR-CPRF alliance. An alliance with the communists at least promised stability as the party's discipline meant that they were easy to work with. Seleznev's ability to compromise got his support from the Kremlin, oligarchs such as Berezovsky and a number of regional leaders. See Harvard Election Watch, 2, 2000, p. 8. For the communist view see Pravda Rossii, 26 January-1 February 2000, at www.kprf.ru.
235. Kuptsov, Pravda Rossii, 23-29 February 2000, at www.kprf.ru.
236. Segodnya, 21 January 2000.
237. Boris Nemtsov of SPS and Vladimir Lukin of Yabloko were confirmed as deputy speakers with most communists voting against (see Vremya MN, 17 February 2000).
238. On Rossiya, see for example Vremya MN, 15 June 2000, 27 June 2000. The movement claims 114 000 members in 77 Russian regions, which is roundly denied by the CPRF.
239. Lenin, 'On Compromises', p. 226.
240. A. Kravets, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 January 2000, at www.ng.ru.
241. For Putin's view see N. Gevorkyan, N. Timakova & A. Kolesnikov, Otpervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow, Vagrius, 2000). See also A. Kravets, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 January 2000, at www.ng.ru.
242. For Putin's view see N. Gevorkyan, N. Timakova & A. Kolesnikov, Otpervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow, Vagrius, 2000). See also A. Kravets, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 January 2000, at www.ng.ru.
243. Sakwa, 'Left or Right?', p. 154; Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 191.
244. Sakwa, 'Left or Right?', p. 154; Urban & Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads, p. 191.
245. Aleksei Ulyukaev, Union of Right Forces' member, Harvard Election Watch, 2, 2000, p. 8.
246. A tendency noted by L. Shevtsova, 'Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution or continuity?', in G. W. Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder, Westview, 1995), pp. 5-36 at pp. 30-31.
247. In the words of a party critic, Pravda, 11 May 2000.
248. See Vitalii Tretyakov, SWB SU/3382 B/6, 12 November 1998.
249. Author's interviews with CPRF Central Committee members N. Bindyukov and A. Kravets, 20 and 22 September 2000 respectively.
250. See Ocherednye zadachi KPRF: Tezisy dlya obsuzhdeniya v partiinykh organizatsiyakh k VII s''ezdu partii (Moscow, ITRK, 2000).
251. S. Levitsky, 'Crisis, Party Adaptation and Regime Stability in Argentina', Party Politics, 4, 4, October 1998, pp. 445-470 at p. 451.
252. One writer called for a CPRF-OVR alliance headed by Primakov on the basis of a renewed socialism (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 5 January 2000, from www.dol.ru/kremlin/kds/). According to Interfax, 20-25% of the party supported a change of leader (Johnson's Russia List, 3476, 31 August 1999).
253. One writer called for a CPRF-OVR alliance headed by Primakov on the basis of a renewed socialism (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 5 January 2000, from www.dol.ru/kremlin/kds/). According to Interfax, 20-25% of the party supported a change of leader (Johnson's Russia List, 3476, 31 August 1999).
254. Author's interview with Bindyukov, 20 September 2000.
255. For the traditional features of communist party leaders see McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 121.
256. This definition is adapted from S. Padgett & W. E. Paterson, A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe (London, Longman, 1991), p. 3.
257. Lazar, 'Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s', p. 256.