Patriotic left-centrism: The zigzags of the communist party of the Russian Federation

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 275-298

  Flikke, Geir ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNISM; NATIONAL IDENTITY; NATIONAL POLITICS; PARTY POLITICS;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0032994322     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139999038     Document Type: Article

References (138)

1. The metaphor is used by, among others, John T. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Politics', Party Politics, 2, 2, 1996, pp. 147-175 and Jeremy Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadii Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', New Left Review, January 1997, pp. 34-53.
2. The metaphor is used by, among others, John T. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Politics', Party Politics, 2, 2, 1996, pp. 147-175 and Jeremy Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadii Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', New Left Review, January 1997, pp. 34-53.
3. Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...', p. 34.
4. The dismemberment of the CPSU is analysed in Stephen White & Ian McAllister, 'The CPSU and Its Members: Between Communism and Postcommunism', British Journal of Political Science, 26, 1, 1996, pp. 105-122.
5. Interview with Mikhail Karpov, Moscow, 5 March 1997. Karpov was one of the initiators of the Democratic platform of CPSU, now deputy editor of Nezavisimaya gazeta.
6. The phrase is from Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party systems. A framework for analysis (Cambridge, 1976), p. 39.
7. It is common to divide the CPRF into three distinct factions: the left-wing nationalists, the Marxist reformers and the Marxist-Leninist revivalists. See Joan B. Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Oxford, 1997). The term 'left-wing nationalist' could be disputed, since, as Sakwa points out, the left-wing nationalists underline the statist identity of multinational Russia (rossiiskii) rather than the ethnic identity (russkii). Sec Richard Sakwa, 'Left or Right? CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, January-June 1998, pp. 128-158. Indeed, the left-wing nationalists argue in terms of what Anthony Smith called the 'symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnic identity'. They hold that multinational Russia is the creation of an ethno-genesis, the moulding of various ethnic identities into one single Russian (rossiiskoe) identity. This implies that they do not necessarily give the Russian (russkoe) ethnic identity a primordial quality. Anthony Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), p. 20. By presenting the term 'cultural nationalist' I indicate how the Zyuganov faction represents a would-be nation in terms of intra-cultural arguments centred around a common history, mentality and countering civilisations. The 'state' is but an clement in this approach, a reflection of the popular spirit of Russian culture. See below for a more detailed discussion.
8. It is common to divide the CPRF into three distinct factions: the left-wing nationalists, the Marxist reformers and the Marxist-Leninist revivalists. See Joan B. Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Oxford, 1997). The term 'left-wing nationalist' could be disputed, since, as Sakwa points out, the left-wing nationalists underline the statist identity of multinational Russia (rossiiskii) rather than the ethnic identity (russkii). Sec Richard Sakwa, 'Left or Right? CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, January-June 1998, pp. 128-158. Indeed, the left-wing nationalists argue in terms of what Anthony Smith called the 'symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnic identity'. They hold that multinational Russia is the creation of an ethno-genesis, the moulding of various ethnic identities into one single Russian (rossiiskoe) identity. This implies that they do not necessarily give the Russian (russkoe) ethnic identity a primordial quality. Anthony Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), p. 20. By presenting the term 'cultural nationalist' I indicate how the Zyuganov faction represents a would-be nation in terms of intra-cultural arguments centred around a common history, mentality and countering civilisations. The 'state' is but an clement in this approach, a reflection of the popular spirit of Russian culture. See below for a more detailed discussion.
9. It is common to divide the CPRF into three distinct factions: the left-wing nationalists, the Marxist reformers and the Marxist-Leninist revivalists. See Joan B. Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Oxford, 1997). The term 'left-wing nationalist' could be disputed, since, as Sakwa points out, the left-wing nationalists underline the statist identity of multinational Russia (rossiiskii) rather than the ethnic identity (russkii). Sec Richard Sakwa, 'Left or Right? CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, January-June 1998, pp. 128-158. Indeed, the left-wing nationalists argue in terms of what Anthony Smith called the 'symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnic identity'. They hold that multinational Russia is the creation of an ethno-genesis, the moulding of various ethnic identities into one single Russian (rossiiskoe) identity. This implies that they do not necessarily give the Russian (russkoe) ethnic identity a primordial quality. Anthony Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), p. 20. By presenting the term 'cultural nationalist' I indicate how the Zyuganov faction represents a would-be nation in terms of intra-cultural arguments centred around a common history, mentality and countering civilisations. The 'state' is but an clement in this approach, a reflection of the popular spirit of Russian culture. See below for a more detailed discussion.
10. This approach is taken by among others, Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...' and Jeremy Lester, Modern Tsars and Princes (London, 1995), pp. 212-243, Michail A. Molchanov, 'Russian Neo-Communism: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality', The Harriman Review, Summer 1996, pp. 69-79 and Sven G. Simonsen, 'Gennadiy Zyuganov: Hankering for the Good Old Days', Politics and Personalities, PRIO Report, 2, 1996, pp. 197-217.
11. This approach is taken by among others, Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...' and Jeremy Lester, Modern Tsars and Princes (London, 1995), pp. 212-243, Michail A. Molchanov, 'Russian Neo-Communism: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality', The Harriman Review, Summer 1996, pp. 69-79 and Sven G. Simonsen, 'Gennadiy Zyuganov: Hankering for the Good Old Days', Politics and Personalities, PRIO Report, 2, 1996, pp. 197-217.
12. This approach is taken by among others, Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...' and Jeremy Lester, Modern Tsars and Princes (London, 1995), pp. 212-243, Michail A. Molchanov, 'Russian Neo-Communism: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality', The Harriman Review, Summer 1996, pp. 69-79 and Sven G. Simonsen, 'Gennadiy Zyuganov: Hankering for the Good Old Days', Politics and Personalities, PRIO Report, 2, 1996, pp. 197-217.
13. This approach is taken by among others, Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...' and Jeremy Lester, Modern Tsars and Princes (London, 1995), pp. 212-243, Michail A. Molchanov, 'Russian Neo-Communism: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality', The Harriman Review, Summer 1996, pp. 69-79 and Sven G. Simonsen, 'Gennadiy Zyuganov: Hankering for the Good Old Days', Politics and Personalities, PRIO Report, 2, 1996, pp. 197-217.
14. The united right and left-wing patriotic opposition has had several names since 1992, but the organisational core has all this time been the CPRF. In 1992 it emerged as the National Salvation Front (NSF), in the spring of 1994 it called itself Accord in the Name of Russia, in the autumn of 1994 Russian Border (Russkii rubezh), in the presidential race of 1996 the Bloc of Popular Patriotic Forces and since August 1996 People's Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR).
15. Zyuganov often underlines that the October 1917 revolution preserved the territorial integrity of Russia, and thus directly employs a major argument of the 'white' forces in the Civil War in defence of Bolshevik actions. See Gennadii Zyuganov, Rossiya - rodina moya (Moscow, 1996), p. 219.
16. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? ...', pp. 152-153, 169-170.
17. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', pp. 130, 147-148.
18. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? ...', p. 151.
19. Angelo Panebianco, Political parties: organization and power (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 3-6.
20. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', p. 151.
21. For a profile on the various political parties, see Peter Lentini, 'Post-CPSU Communist Political Formations', The Journal of Communist Studies, 8, 2, December 1992, pp. 280-292.
22. For a confirmation of these numbers, ses Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', p. 131.
23. For a further introduction to the religious imagery of the cultural nationalist neo-communism, see Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...', pp. 51-53.
24. Urban & Solovei, p. 55. The NSF was to be banned almost immediately after it was launched, but there was apparently strong opposition to the presidential decree within the presidential apparatus. Moreover, El'tsin delayed signing the decree while awaiting the outcome of the December congress - probably owing to protests from his 'centrist' allies in the Civic Union - and the decree was withdrawn in early 1993. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 January, 1993.
25. Urban & Solovei, p. 51.
26. Anna Ostapchuk, 'Levye vsekh ottenkov ob"edinyaites'!', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 December 1992.
27. 'Slovo lidera', Den', 27 September-3 October 1992.
28. As Rose has suggested, values might outlive institutional arrangements. The dual organisation of the CPRF and the 'outer coalition' is a special case in the study of how values are 'transported' into a changed political environment. See Richard Rose, 'Ex-Communists in Post-Communist Societies', The Political Quarterly, 67, 1, 1996, pp. 14-25.
29. 'My - russkoe soprotivlenie', Den', 27 Scptember-3 October 1992.
30. Urban & Solovei, pp. 73-75.
31. Urban & Solovei, p. 75. Urban & Solovei emphasise the 'legal' strategy of the CPRF position in the October 1993 events. However, Zyuganov gave a peculiar interpretation of the May declaration on political extremism, referring to it as a declaration directed against the 'state extremism' of the executive. Gennadii Zyuganov, 'V blizhaishee vremya my sformiruem komandu upravlentsev, obnaroduem ee sostav i programmu', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 November 1994.
32. Urban & Solovei, p. 75. Urban & Solovei emphasise the 'legal' strategy of the CPRF position in the October 1993 events. However, Zyuganov gave a peculiar interpretation of the May declaration on political extremism, referring to it as a declaration directed against the 'state extremism' of the executive. Gennadii Zyuganov, 'V blizhaishee vremya my sformiruem komandu upravlentsev, obnaroduem ee sostav i programmu', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 November 1994.
33. Zyuganov, 'V blizhaishee vremya ...'.
34. Joan B. Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, 'Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie v postsovetskoi Rossii', Svobodnaya mysl', 1997, 3, pp. 14-28.
35. 'Soglasie vo imya Rossii', Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 March 1994.
36. A. Alekseeva et al., Tsentristskii proekt dlya Rossii', Svobodnaya mysl', 1994, 4, pp. 3-15.
37. Ibid., p. 23.
38. Ibid., p. 13.
39. Gosudarstennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii (Moscow, 1994), p. 192.
40. I. Rybkin, My obrecheny na soglasie (Moscow, 1994), p. 96.
41. Ibid., p. 96.
42. Ibid., p. 129.
43. Segodnya, 18 March 1994.
44. In the winter of 1994 specialists discussed the Chernomyrdin government in a seminar held at the Gorbachev foundation. Aleksandr Tsipko, signatory of the Accord in the Name of Russia document, stated explicitly that Zyuganov and Lapshin supported the formation of a stable government under the leadership of Chernomyrdin. 'Uspekh Chernomyrdina: kontrrevolyutsiya ili stabilizatsiya?', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 February 1994.
45. Segodnya, 8 February 1994.
46. As shown by Rose, the Eastern European post-communist states formed 'big parties' of a reformed social-democratic direction. This implied that the leadership was dominantly 'non-programmatic' in political tactics and values. In Russia, events took a different course, as the CPRF seemed to have all the characteristics of a 'programme party'. Rose, 'Ex-Communists in Post-Communist Societies', pp. 14-15.
47. Segodnya, 26 April 1994.
48. III s"ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow, 1995), p. 16.
49. The expulsion of Kovalev had something ritual about it, since he never formally was a member of the CPRF, but was an independent (bespartiinyi). Federal'noe sobranie Rossii (Moscow, 1995), p. 366.
50. 'Dvublokovaya terapiya', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 May 1995.
51. Ibid.
52. Zavtra, 19 May 1995.
53. Zyuganov, 'V blizhaishee vremya ...'.
54. III s"ezd ..., p. 115.
55. Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix ...', pp. 164-167.
56. The Russian State Duma has a complex organisation. Deputies are allowed to form fractions based on parties which crossed the 5% threshold and or 'deputy groups' of at least 35 deputies. According to the Duma regulations, fractions and deputy groups have an equal status. When the State Duma assembled in 1996 the APR had 20 deputies from single mandate constituencies. By 'borrowing' 8 deputies from the CPRF and securing the support of 7 independent deputies, the APR formed a 'deputy group'. For more on the organisation of the Duma, see Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20, 4, 1995, pp. 457-489 and Joel M. Ostrow, 'Procedural Breakdown and Deadlock in the Russian State Duma: The Problems of an Unlinked Dual-channel Institutional Design', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 5, 1998, pp. 793-816.
57. The Russian State Duma has a complex organisation. Deputies are allowed to form fractions based on parties which crossed the 5% threshold and or 'deputy groups' of at least 35 deputies. According to the Duma regulations, fractions and deputy groups have an equal status. When the State Duma assembled in 1996 the APR had 20 deputies from single mandate constituencies. By 'borrowing' 8 deputies from the CPRF and securing the support of 7 independent deputies, the APR formed a 'deputy group'. For more on the organisation of the Duma, see Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20, 4, 1995, pp. 457-489 and Joel M. Ostrow, 'Procedural Breakdown and Deadlock in the Russian State Duma: The Problems of an Unlinked Dual-channel Institutional Design', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 5, 1998, pp. 793-816.
58. Zyuganov, 'V blizhaishee vremya ...'.
59. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', pp. 144-145.
60. III s"ezd ..., p. 17.
61. Ibid.
62. The Bloc of Popular Patriotic Forces was supported by representatives of 25 patriotic left-wing groups, including Agrarian Party leader Mikhail Lapshin and Power to the People head Nikolai Ryzhkov. Other patriotic groups, such as Viktor Anpilov's Toiling Moscow, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, and Sergei Baburin's Russian Public Union joined later. OMRI Daily Digest, 6 March 1996.
63. III s"ezd ..., p. 15.
64. OMRI Daily Digest, 6 March 1996.
65. III s"ezd ..., p. 112 and Segodnya, 26 April 1994.
66. III s"ezd ..., p. 112 and Segodnya, 26 April 1994.
67. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 February 1996.
68. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 1996.
69. Ibid.
70. 'Mnogie kommunisty nedovol'ny svoim liderom', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 February 1995.
71. III s"ezd ..., p. 66.
72. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., p. 125.
73. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 1996.
74. Among the works of the RAU corporation are the volumes Rossiya segodnya, real'nyi shans (Moscow, 1994) and Sovremennaya Russkaya Ideya i Gosudarstvo (Moscow, 1995). The so-called 'research' of this corporation is imbued with anti-Western sentiments and conspiracy theories, such as the suggestion that 'Harvard intellectuals' supported the belligerent atheists Trotsky and Bukharin in their destruction of Russian spirituality. See Rossiya segodnya ..., p. 100.
75. Among the works of the RAU corporation are the volumes Rossiya segodnya, real'nyi shans (Moscow, 1994) and Sovremennaya Russkaya Ideya i Gosudarstvo (Moscow, 1995). The so-called 'research' of this corporation is imbued with anti-Western sentiments and conspiracy theories, such as the suggestion that 'Harvard intellectuals' supported the belligerent atheists Trotsky and Bukharin in their destruction of Russian spirituality. See Rossiya segodnya ..., p. 100.
76. Among the works of the RAU corporation are the volumes Rossiya segodnya, real'nyi shans (Moscow, 1994) and Sovremennaya Russkaya Ideya i Gosudarstvo (Moscow, 1995). The so-called 'research' of this corporation is imbued with anti-Western sentiments and conspiracy theories, such as the suggestion that 'Harvard intellectuals' supported the belligerent atheists Trotsky and Bukharin in their destruction of Russian spirituality. See Rossiya segodnya ..., p. 100.
77. Solovei & Urban, p. 168.
78. The RAU corporation was offered the opportunity to put seven names on the CPRF list in the 1995 parliamentary elections. For an assessment of the role and ideas of Podberezkin, see 'Podberyozkin: Communist and/or Nationalist', Moscow News, 1997, 30.
79. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 February 1996. Indeed, Zyuganov was vague whenever speaking about capitalism and class interests and spoke only about some non-capitalist 'socioeconomic and political system' close to the 'national spirit of the people' of which class struggle was no part. Sec G. Zyuganov, Rossiya i sovremennyi mir (Moscow, 1995), p. 54.
80. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 February 1996. Indeed, Zyuganov was vague whenever speaking about capitalism and class interests and spoke only about some non-capitalist 'socioeconomic and political system' close to the 'national spirit of the people' of which class struggle was no part. Sec G. Zyuganov, Rossiya i sovremennyi mir (Moscow, 1995), p. 54.
81. III s"ezd ..., p. 96.
82. 'Ekonomicheskaya programma Zyuganova do sikh por ne obnarodovana', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 May 1996.
83. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 May 1996 and 'Ot razrusheniya k sozidaniyu. Put' Rossii v XXI vek', Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 May 1996.
84. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 May 1996 and 'Ot razrusheniya k sozidaniyu. Put' Rossii v XXI vek', Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 May 1996.
85. Lester suggests that the economic programme of the CPRF in 'tone and essence' was not all that different from El'tsin's, but does not specify which of the two drafts he has in mind. What is sure is that the 'populist' version certainly did not in any way resemble the El'tsin programme. Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...', p. 46.
86. 'Ot razrusheniya ...'.
87. Ibid.
88. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 November 1995.
89. III s"ezd ..., p. 111.
90. Ibid., p. 95.
91. 'Ekonomicheskaya programma Zyuganova ...'.
92. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', p. 148.
93. Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...', p. 48.
94. G. Zyuganov, 'V Rossii vsegda byla, est' i budet sil'naya levaya partiya', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 August 1996.
95. Ibid.
96. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., p. 15.
97. Ibid., p. 9.
98. I. Korotchenko, 'NPSR nameren sozdat' analog "Nezavisimoi gazety" ', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 August 1996.
99. A. Podberezkin, 'Levaya oppozitsiya i vlast' ', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 December 1996.
100. Ibid.
101. S. Baburin, 'Oppozitsiyu ne dolzhny vozglavlyat' kommunisty', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 August 1996.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', p. 146.
105. A. Podberezkin, 'Cherez dukhovnost' - k vozrozhdeniyu otechestva', Svobodnaya mysl', 1995, 5, p. 96.
106. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., p. 140.
107. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', p. 139.
108. Podberezkin, 'Cherez dukhovnost' - ...', p. 92.
109. Ibid., p. 89.
110. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., p. 212.
111. Podberezkin, 'Cherez dukhovnost' - ...', p. 91.
112. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., p. 212.
113. Ibid., p. 143.
114. Ibid., p. 50.
115. Ibid., p. 223.
116. G. Zyuganov, 'Smuta', NG-Stsenarii, 17 October 1996.
117. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., pp. 76-92.
118. Ibid., p. 77.
119. A. Podberezkin, 'Geostrategicheskoe polozhenie i bezopasnost' Rossii', Svobodnaya mysl', 1996, 7, pp. 86-101.
120. Ibid., p. 95.
121. Ibid.
122. Podberezkin, 'Vyzovy bezopasnosti Rossii', Svobodnaya mysl', 1996, 12.
123. The proposed parliamentary controlled alternative to the Security Council has not materialised, but the CPRF and the cultural nationalist opposition have access to an Expert Council for National Security which meets under the chairman of the State Duma, Seleznev. Apparently, the main focus for this body is problems related to foreign investments in Russian industrial enterprises. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 July 1998.
124. Podberezkin, 'Vyzovy bezopasnosti ...', p. 64.
125. G. Zyuganov, 'Uroki istorii i sovremennost' ', NG-stsenarii, November 1997.
126. Zyuganov, Rossiya - ..., p. 127.
127. Podberezkin, 'Cherez dukhovnost' - ...', p. 92.
128. Panebianco, Political parties ..., pp. 49-52.
129. Ilyukhin belongs to the radical wing of the CPRF structure and is a driving force behind the attempts to impeach president El'tsin for 'high treason' in dissolving the USSR. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 July 1998.
130. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 July 1998.
131. Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism ...', p. 50.
132. For a comprehensive description of the 'zigzags' of El'tsin, see M. Skak, From Empire to Anarchy (London, 1995), pp. 144-170. The 'muddling through' on the concept of national identity continued through 1996-97. Presidential adviser on national security Yurii Baturin left office in June 1996 to make way for Aleksandr Lebed, in the midst of his work on the concept, and Lebed was too short a time in office to produce any material of substantial meaning. The El'tsin administration tried to compensate for this by inviting scholars, ordinary people and politicians to debate the 'Russian idea' in the government newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta. A winner was chosen in 1996, and the official doctrine of national security was adopted in December 1997. There is, however, no consensus on the 'national idea'; see 'Strategiya Rossii v XXI veke: analiz situatsii i nekotorye predlozheniya (strategiya-3)', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 June 1998.
133. For a comprehensive description of the 'zigzags' of El'tsin, see M. Skak, From Empire to Anarchy (London, 1995), pp. 144-170. The 'muddling through' on the concept of national identity continued through 1996-97. Presidential adviser on national security Yurii Baturin left office in June 1996 to make way for Aleksandr Lebed, in the midst of his work on the concept, and Lebed was too short a time in office to produce any material of substantial meaning. The El'tsin administration tried to compensate for this by inviting scholars, ordinary people and politicians to debate the 'Russian idea' in the government newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta. A winner was chosen in 1996, and the official doctrine of national security was adopted in December 1997. There is, however, no consensus on the 'national idea'; see 'Strategiya Rossii v XXI veke: analiz situatsii i nekotorye predlozheniya (strategiya-3)', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 June 1998.
134. For a comprehensive description of the 'zigzags' of El'tsin, see M. Skak, From Empire to Anarchy (London, 1995), pp. 144-170. The 'muddling through' on the concept of national identity continued through 1996-97. Presidential adviser on national security Yurii Baturin left office in June 1996 to make way for Aleksandr Lebed, in the midst of his work on the concept, and Lebed was too short a time in office to produce any material of substantial meaning. The El'tsin administration tried to compensate for this by inviting scholars, ordinary people and politicians to debate the 'Russian idea' in the government newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta. A winner was chosen in 1996, and the official doctrine of national security was adopted in December 1997. There is, however, no consensus on the 'national idea'; see 'Strategiya Rossii v XXI veke: analiz situatsii i nekotorye predlozheniya (strategiya-3)', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 June 1998.
135. 'A. Podberezkin: V nashem bloke net partiinoii ideologii', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 September 1997.
136. Ibid.
137. Sakwa, 'Left or Right? ...', p. 150.
138. Urban & Solovei underline the differences between the Zyuganov and the Kuptsov strategies following the presidential election. However, it is clear that Kuptsov has shared the frontist approach of Zyuganov, and that no major confrontation is in prospect. Sec Urban & Solovei, pp. 180-181.