Herding and anti-herding: A model of reputational differentiation

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 385-403

  Effinger, Matthias R ^a,b   Polborn, Mattias K ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Career concerns; Herding; Strategic communication

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 0035046147     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00070-2     Document Type: Article

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9. Reputation, incentives and managerial decisions
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13. Social learning and rational expectations
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