Single-case probabilities and content-neutral norms: A reply to Gigerenzer

Cognition

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 105-111

  Vranas, Peter B M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Concepts of probability; Frequentism; Heuristics and biases; Judgment under uncertainty; Norms of reasoning; Reference classes

Indexed keywords

PROBABILISTIC LOGICS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

CONTENT-BLINDS;

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS;

CALIBRATION; NOTE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; REFERENCE VALUE; SAMPLING; STANDARD; THINKING;

EID: 0035041498     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00134-7     Document Type: Note

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