An experimental evaluation of strategic preemption

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 107-135

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Phillips, Owen R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

C91; C92; Experiments; L12; L13; Raising rivals'costs; Subgame perfection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034582402     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00036-3     Document Type: Article

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