Federal juvenile waiver practices: A contextual approach to the consideration of prior delinquency records

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 1329-1367

  Ullman, Randie P ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034418209     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (338)

1. TLW are the juvenile's initials, which are often used in federal juvenile court proceedings to protect the confidentiality of the juvenile defendant.
2. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
3. See id. at 1402.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1403-04.
8. See id. at 1404.
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).
10. See id.
11. See Jack Klempner & Rodger D. Parker, Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Justice 8-9 (1981).
12. See id. at 9. The mid-19th century also witnessed the creation of refuge houses that eventually gave way to the creation of reform schools. For a thorough discussion of the history of juvenile justice in America, see generally Clifford E. Simonsen and Marshall S. Gordon III, Juvenile Justice in America (1979).
13. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 474 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes]; David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive America 206-07 (1980).
14. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 474 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes]; David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive America 206-07 (1980).
15. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 474; Sarah M. Cotton, Comment, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 563, 565 (1999).
16. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 474; Sarah M. Cotton, Comment, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 563, 565 (1999).
17. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 475. Positivism was a departure from the classic perception that criminal behavior was the product of free will. See id.
18. See id. at 474. Progressives believed that juveniles were psychologically less developed than adults and that consequently they "needed to complete their cognitive, social, and moral development before being expected to shoulder the burdens of adulthood." Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 324 (1991). For an overview of the role of the Progressives in the juvenile justice system, see generally Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (2d ed. 1977).
19. See id. at 474. Progressives believed that juveniles were psychologically less developed than adults and that consequently they "needed to complete their cognitive, social, and moral development before being expected to shoulder the burdens of adulthood." Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323, 324 (1991). For an overview of the role of the Progressives in the juvenile justice system, see generally Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (2d ed. 1977).
20. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 68, 71-72 (1997) [hereinafter Feld, Youthfulness].
21. See id.
22. See Robert C. Trojanowicz & Merry Morash, Juvenile Delinquency Concepts and Control 140 (3d ed. 1983).
23. See Feld, Youthfulness, supra note 17, at 71-72.
24. See Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17 Whittier L. Rev. 713, 718 (1996); see also Jeffrey K. Day, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 399, 402 (1992) (stating that the Progressives saw the juvenile court as therapeutic); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 66 (1992) (discussing the view that society would benefit from the rehabilitation of juveniles who have committed delinquent acts).
25. See Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17 Whittier L. Rev. 713, 718 (1996); see also Jeffrey K. Day, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 399, 402 (1992) (stating that the Progressives saw the juvenile court as therapeutic); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 66 (1992) (discussing the view that society would benefit from the rehabilitation of juveniles who have committed delinquent acts).
26. See Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17 Whittier L. Rev. 713, 718 (1996); see also Jeffrey K. Day, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 399, 402 (1992) (stating that the Progressives saw the juvenile court as therapeutic); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 66 (1992) (discussing the view that society would benefit from the rehabilitation of juveniles who have committed delinquent acts).
27. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 821, 823-24 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment].
28. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 718.
29. See Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice and Law 308 (1981). "'Parens Patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under [a] legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane ... and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the origins of the parens patriae doctrine and its application to the juvenile justice system, see generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. Rev. 205 (1971).
30. See Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice and Law 308 (1981). "'Parens Patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under [a] legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane ... and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the origins of the parens patriae doctrine and its application to the juvenile justice system, see generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. Rev. 205 (1971).
31. See Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice and Law 308 (1981). "'Parens Patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under [a] legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane ... and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the origins of the parens patriae doctrine and its application to the juvenile justice system, see generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. Rev. 205 (1971).
32. See Siegel & Senna, supra note 24, at 310; Johnson, supra note 21, at 718.
33. See Klempner & Parker, supra note 11, at 25.
34. See Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report, 86 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Report].
35. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, Pub. L. No. 75-666, § 2, 52 Stat. 764, 765 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994)); Knut S. Johnson, Juvenile Cases in Federal Court, in Defending a Federal Criminal Case § 18.00 (1995).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
37. See William S. Sessions & Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 14 St. Mary's L.J. 509, 510 (1983).
38. See id. at 518-19; infra Part II.A for a discussion of federal juvenile waiver practices.
39. See Feld, Punishment, supra note 22, at 824.
40. See id. at 825.
41. See id.
42. See Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal Intervention in Juvenile Justice, 51 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 331, 335 (1997).
43. See id.
44. See Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 371, 376-77 (1998).
45. See id.
46. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 476-77.
47. See Klein, supra note 37, at 376-77.
48. See Siegel & Senna, supra note 24, at 315.
49. See id.
50. See Sessions & Bracey, supra note 30, at 511.
51. See Yeckel, supra note 35, at 341.
52. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
53. See id. at 554.
54. See id. at 544.
55. A prosecutorial waiver petition is a motion made by the prosecutor to transfer the juvenile defendant to adult status.
56. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 545; see infra Part II.A for a discussion of juvenile transfer proceedings.
57. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 554-56.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994)).
61. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
62. Id. at 555.
63. See id. at 554; 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 90.
64. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
65. See id. at 561-62.
66. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. See id. at 4.
68. See id. at 7.
69. See id. at 10.
70. Id. at 33 (citing National Crime Comm'n Report 87).
71. See id. at 36. To this end, the Court noted that "[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it." Id.
72. See id. at 55.
73. See id. at 56-57.
74. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 90.
75. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.
76. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 478.
77. See id. at 479; supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
78. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
79. See id. at 359-60.
80. See id. at 360.
81. See id. at 359.
82. See id. at 368.
83. See Yeckel, supra note 35, at 341-42.
84. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
85. See id. at 521-22.
86. See id. at 523-24.
87. Id. at 525-26. The double jeopardy clause states that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. Amend. V.
88. See Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
89. For a discussion of the breakdown of parens patriae, see supra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
90. See LaMar T. Empey, American Delinquency: Its Meaning and Construction 374-75 (1982).
91. See id. at 380.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.; see also Klempner and Parker, supra note 11, at 261 ("[A]s early as 1940, in the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, the clinical case-work approach to delinquency was shown to be unworkable."). But see Richard J. Lundman, Prevention and Control of Juvenile Delinquency 42 (1984) ("The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study was clearly compromised by teachers who refused to single out juveniles headed for trouble with the law and by World War II.").
95. See Empey, supra note 83, at 380.
96. See id. at 383.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 101.
100. See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1997 Update on Violence 29 (1997) [hereinafter, 1997 Update].
101. Feld, Punishment, supra note 22, at 841 (citing Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 37, 701-02 (Smith-Hurd 1972)).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 842.
104. See id.
105. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.02(3) (West Supp. 1999).
106. See also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202 (West 1997-98) ("The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. . . .").
107. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 89. The 1999 Report stated that as of 1997, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Rhode Island emphasize punishment as the philosophical goal behind their juvenile justice systems. See id. at 87.
108. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
109. See id. at 545.
110. See id. at 543.
111. See Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Fall 1995, at 135, 139 ("Rehabilitation has not been shown to have any predictably beneficial effect."); Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 397 (1996) ("[R]eformers who advocate the abolition of a separate system for juveniles . . . regard the promise of the juvenile court to rehabilitate as an empty one, never fulfilled in the past and unattainable in the future . . . .").
112. See Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Fall 1995, at 135, 139 ("Rehabilitation has not been shown to have any predictably beneficial effect."); Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 397 (1996) ("[R]eformers who advocate the abolition of a separate system for juveniles . . . regard the promise of the juvenile court to rehabilitate as an empty one, never fulfilled in the past and unattainable in the future . . . .").
113. See Melli, supra note 104, at 397.
114. See Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 479, 492 (1995).
115. See Melli, supra note 104, at 397.
116. See Feld, Punishment, supra note 22, at 833.
117. See id.
118. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 493.
119. See id. at 493-94.
120. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. Professor Feld has implied, however, that the common law infancy defense would serve as a protective vehicle for juveniles prosecuted in criminal court. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 724 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]. The common law infancy defense states that children between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumably incapable of committing criminal offenses. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 505 (1984). Professor Walkover points to the Washington criminal code to illustrate the age variations associated with the defense. The Washington Code codifies the infancy defense but reduces the maximum applicable age limit to twelve. See id. at 505 n.8. The code states that "[c]hildren under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime. Children of eight and under twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime, but this presumption may be removed by proof that they have sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it was wrong." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.04.050 (1975).
121. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. Professor Feld has implied, however, that the common law infancy defense would serve as a protective vehicle for juveniles prosecuted in criminal court. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 724 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]. The common law infancy defense states that children between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumably incapable of committing criminal offenses. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 505 (1984). Professor Walkover points to the Washington criminal code to illustrate the age variations associated with the defense. The Washington Code codifies the infancy defense but reduces the maximum applicable age limit to twelve. See id. at 505 n.8. The code states that "[c]hildren under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime. Children of eight and under twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime, but this presumption may be removed by proof that they have sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it was wrong." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.04.050 (1975).
122. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. Professor Feld has implied, however, that the common law infancy defense would serve as a protective vehicle for juveniles prosecuted in criminal court. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 724 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]. The common law infancy defense states that children between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumably incapable of committing criminal offenses. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 505 (1984). Professor Walkover points to the Washington criminal code to illustrate the age variations associated with the defense. The Washington Code codifies the infancy defense but reduces the maximum applicable age limit to twelve. See id. at 505 n.8. The code states that "[c]hildren under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime. Children of eight and under twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime, but this presumption may be removed by proof that they have sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it was wrong." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.04.050 (1975).
123. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. Professor Feld has implied, however, that the common law infancy defense would serve as a protective vehicle for juveniles prosecuted in criminal court. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 724 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]. The common law infancy defense states that children between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumably incapable of committing criminal offenses. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 505 (1984). Professor Walkover points to the Washington criminal code to illustrate the age variations associated with the defense. The Washington Code codifies the infancy defense but reduces the maximum applicable age limit to twelve. See id. at 505 n.8. The code states that "[c]hildren under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime. Children of eight and under twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime, but this presumption may be removed by proof that they have sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it was wrong." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.04.050 (1975).
124. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court - Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 327, 381 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, Race].
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 383.
128. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
129. See id. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
130. 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
131. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 506-10.
132. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 16, at 361-63.
133. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 481. For an explanation of the "get tough" punitive approach, see Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Note, Rethinking the Tough Sentencing of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3109, 3120-23 (1999).
134. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 481. For an explanation of the "get tough" punitive approach, see Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Note, Rethinking the Tough Sentencing of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3109, 3120-23 (1999).
135. See Feld, Punishment, supra note 22, at 836.
136. Id.
137. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 519.
138. See Lundman, supra note 87, at 84-86.
139. See id. at 86.
140. See id. at 89.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 90. Follow-up programs, however, were unsuccessful. Lundman points out an evaluation flaw in the study: "Most of the experimental subjects involved in the Sacramento County Diversion Project were exposed to a multiple- treatment package consisting of three distinct elements: (1) no overnight detention; (2) no referral to juvenile court; and (3) crisis intervention and family crisis counseling." Id. at 95. Lundman indicates that the multi-treatment package makes it impossible to determine whether the modest success rate was the result of the lack of overnight detention, less contact with the juvenile court, short-term crisis intervention, or any combination of these factors. Consequently, he points out that while follow-up programs failed, there is good reason to probe deeper into the preventive philosophies. See id at 95-96.
143. See Sheffer, supra note 106, at 510.
144. See id.
145. See Irene Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 163, 165-66 (1993).
146. See id. at 173.
147. See id. at 175-85.
148. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 523-24. (citing J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research 347 (D. Goslin ed., 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds., 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
149. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 523-24. (citing J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research 347 (D. Goslin ed., 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds., 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
150. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 523-24. (citing J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research 347 (D. Goslin ed., 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds., 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
151. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 523-24. (citing J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research 347 (D. Goslin ed., 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds., 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
152. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 523-24. (citing J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932); Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research 347 (D. Goslin ed., 1969); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society 90 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds., 1977); Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
153. See id. at 523-24. (citing Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6 Vita Humana 11, 16 (1963)).
154. See id. at 524 (citing J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 212-22 (2d ed. 1960)).
155. See id. at 525.
156. See id.
157. See id. (citing Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 56 (1978)).
158. See id. (citing Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 56 (1978)). Professor Feld notes: [T]he crimes of juveniles are seldom their fault alone; society shares at least some of the blame for their offenses as a result of juveniles' limited opportunities to learn to make correct choices. Indeed, even though the ability to make responsible choices is learned behavior, the dependent status of juveniles systematically deprives them of opportunities to learn to be responsible. Finally, even if a youth is aware of the abstract criminal prohibition, juveniles are more susceptible to peer group influences and group process dynamics than are their older counterparts. Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
159. See id. at 525.
160. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 144. "Juvenile court caseloads increased 49% between 1987 and 1996. The juvenile population increased only 11% in that time." Id. Additionally, there was a 100% increase in person offenses within the same time span. See id.
161. See Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 59-60 (1992); Rosenberg, supra note 133, at 165-66.
162. See Rosenberg, supra note 134, at 165-66.
163. Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 Law & Ineq. J. 73, 82-83 (1995).
164. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 29.
165. See id.
166. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 487.
167. See id. at 487-88.
168. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Rush to Waive Children to Adult Court, 10 Criminal Justice 39, 41 (1995).
169. See id.
170. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 178.
171. See id.
172. See Shepherd, supra note 152, at 42.
173. See id.
174. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 182.
175. See Siegal & Senna, supra note 24, at 450.
176. See id. at 448.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 450.
179. There are a small number of states, however, that continue to incarcerate juveniles in isolated sections of adult prisons. See id. at 448. Other types of juvenile sentences include probation, restitution, group homes, and foster care. See id. at 418-34.
180. See Brenda Gordon, Note, A Criminal's Justice or a Child's Injustice? Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 193, 204-05 (1999). There are three methods that states use to transfer juveniles to adult status: (1) judicial waiver; (2) prosecutorial waiver or concurrent jurisdiction; and (3) statutory or legislative exclusion. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 102. Judicial waiver gives the judge discretionary authority to determine the juvenile's amenability to treatment. See id. at 103. Prosecutorial waiver permits the prosecutor to file the case in either criminal or juvenile court. See id. at 102. The practice of statutory exclusion excludes certain juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See id.
181. See Brenda Gordon, Note, A Criminal's Justice or a Child's Injustice? Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 193, 204-05 (1999). There are three methods that states use to transfer juveniles to adult status: (1) judicial waiver; (2) prosecutorial waiver or concurrent jurisdiction; and (3) statutory or legislative exclusion. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 102. Judicial waiver gives the judge discretionary authority to determine the juvenile's amenability to treatment. See id. at 103. Prosecutorial waiver permits the prosecutor to file the case in either criminal or juvenile court. See id. at 102. The practice of statutory exclusion excludes certain juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See id.
182. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 147, at 83.
183. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Texas, 983 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (stating that the government moved to transfer the juvenile defendant to adult status); State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 816 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994) (same); In re Ralph M., 559 A.2d 179, 183 (Conn. 1989) (same); In re E.H., 276 S.E.2d 557, 561 (W. Va. 1981) (same).
184. 383 U.S. 541 (1966); see also supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
185. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 147, at 83. The District of Columbia statute, for example, provides that a judge should consider: (1) the child's age; (2) the nature of the present offense and the extent and nature of the child's prior delinquency record; (3) the child's mental condition; (4) the child's response to past treatment efforts including whether the child has absconded from the legal custody of the Mayor or a juvenile institution; (5) the techniques, facilities, and personnel for rehabilitation available to the Division and to the court that would have jurisdiction after transfer; and (6) [t]he potential rehabilitative effect on the child of providing parenting classes or family counseling for one or more member's of the child's family or for the child's caregiver or guardian. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(e) (1981).
186. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 170.
187. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 31. During the same time period, delinquency cases increased 41 %. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 30.
190. See id.
191. See Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y & L. 3, 5 (1997).
192. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 30.
193. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 103.
194. See 1997 Update, supra note 93, at 30; see also supra note 164 for a discussion of the three forms of waiver provisions.
195. See 18 U.S.C § 5032 (1994).
196. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
197. See Johnson, supra note 28, § 18.01. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has no distinct juvenile facilities. See United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (D.N.M. 1998). The federal government is forced to contract with state and private juvenile facilities that provide counseling and rehabilitation services. See id. Unfortunately, "juveniles are often assigned depending on where space is then available" and there is no guarantee that they will be incarcerated conveniently for family members. Id.
198. See supra notes 46-81 and accompanying text.
199. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976)).
200. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994); Yeckel, supra note 35, at 339. The purpose of the JJDPA is to prevent juvenile offenders from suffering the stigma of adult criminal prosecution and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation. See United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990). Congress later amended the JJDPA when it passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 764 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Responding to the growing number of violent crimes committed by juveniles, the Act increased the number of offenses for which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. See id. Additionally, the Act imposes mandatory adult status under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 5602 (1994).
203. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1991).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The purpose of the federal juvenile delinquency proceeding is to . . . encourage treatment and rehabilitation."); United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (D.N.M. 1998) ("The purpose of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is to remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation." (citations omitted)).
205. See United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
206. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1401; United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924, 932 (D. Or. 1979).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the purpose of the juvenile justice system is to encourage the treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile defendants); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
208. See Doe, 871 F.2d at 1253; Alexander, 695 F.2d at 401.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994). The statute provides for three situations in which a prosecutor may invoke federal jurisdiction over a juvenile: (1) a state lacks or refuses to assert jurisdiction over the juvenile offender; (2) state programs do not meet the needs of the juvenile; or (3) certain specified offenses are charged and there is a substantial federal interest in the case. See id.
210. See id. A juvenile might request transfer because he believes that he will receive a lighter sentence under adult criminal standards. This is especially true in a case where the juvenile believes he will benefit from a jury trial, as there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in juvenile court. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1971).
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Paragraph four of section 5032 mandates transfer when a juvenile 16 years of age or older commits a violent act that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult, and the juvenile has previously been convicted of a delinquent act that would be considered a felony if the juvenile had reached the age of majority. See id.
212. See id. Paragraph four of section 5032 states that a juvenile 15 years of age or older who has committed a violent act that would be deemed a felony if committed by an adult, or committed an act that falls under the umbrella of specified sections of the Controlled Substances Act, may be proceeded against in a criminal prosecution initiated by the Attorney General in a motion to transfer the juvenile to adult status in the interest of justice. See id. The federal system does not dramatically differ from many of the state systems. Most states, like the federal legislation, have a combination of transfer provisions. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 102. Fourteen states have mandatory transfer provisions and 46 have discretionary waiver statutes. See id. A growing number of states, however, have no minimum age requirement for waiver. See id. at 104.
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
214. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that section 5032's legislative history "is scant and capable of differing interpretations"). Attacks on section 5032's constitutional validity have proven fruitless, see, e.g., United States v. J.D., 525 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that section 5032 is not unconstitutionally vague), leaving courts with a federal statutory provision that is far from precise and is open to varying degrees of interpretation. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1982); TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1400.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (emphasis added).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that the decision to transfer a juvenile to adult status is often a difficult one); TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404 ("[S]triking the balance between rehabilitation, protection, and punishment is not easy. . . .").
219. 925 F. Supp. 1398 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see also supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of the case.
220. See id. at 1403.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1402.
224. See id. at 1403.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 1404.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 514 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The decision whether to transfer a juvenile to trial as an adult under section 5032 is within the sound discretion of the trial court provided the court makes findings as to the criteria outlined in the Act.").
234. See United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1999).
235. See United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998).
236. See United States v. Leon, 132 F.3d 583, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that "the court may assume the truth of the government's allegations regarding the defendant's commission of [the] crime" for purposes of a transfer hearing).
237. See Survey of Recent Cases, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 937, 971 (1999) (stating that the right to present a defense is fundamental).
238. 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1998).
239. See id. at 1182-83.
240. See id. at 1180-81.
241. See id. at 1181.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 1180.
246. See id. at 1184. The other factors that the court referred to were: (1) "the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity," (2) "the age and social background of the juvenile," and (3) "the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts." Id. at 1183.
247. Id. at 1183 (emphasis in original).
248. See id.
249. 133 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998).
250. See id. at 537.
251. See id. at 527.
252. See id. at 537.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1998).
257. See United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. John Doe #1, No. 98 CR 438, 1999 WL 642828, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999); United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
258. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 611-13; John Doe #1, 1999 WL 642828 at *4 n.5.
259. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404.
260. 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
261. 925 F. Supp 1398 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text for a more complete description of the facts of the case.
262. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 611.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 611-12.
266. See TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1403.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 612; TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1404.
271. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 612.
272. See id. at 614.
273. See 17B A.R.S. Juv. Court. Rules of Proc., Rule 14(c) (1970).
274. See id. (emphasis added). The Virginia provision instructs judges to consider "the record and previous history of the juvenile in this or other jurisdictions, including . . . the number and nature of previous contacts with juvenile or circuit courts . . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.1 (1999) (emphasis added). Florida's statute similarly instructs juvenile courts to consider previous "contacts" with governmental departments and judicial institutions. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.226 (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Az. St. Juv. Ct. Rule 14 ("[T]he record and previous history of the child, including previous contacts with juvenile courts and law enforcement agencies."). But see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 1010 (1999) (stating that the juvenile court is directed to consider "[w]hether the child has been convicted of any prior criminal offense . . . or . . . [w]hether the child has previously been subjected to any form of correctional treatment by the Family Court").
275. The Eighth Circuit's argument that Congress's intent was unambiguous in United States v. Juvenile LWO was unpersuasive. Comparing 18 U.S.C. § 5032 to Arizona's juvenile transfer provision signifies that the federal provision is far from determinative.
276. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3228-29.
277. See id.
278. 133 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998); supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
279. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 537.
280. 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); supra notes 241-55 and accompanying text.
281. See Wilson, 149 F.3d at 612-13.
282. See id. at 611-12; United States v. John Doe #1, No. 98 CR 438, 1999 WL 642828, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999).
283. 925 F. Supp. 1398 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
284. See id. at 1403.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 1404.
287. 172 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 228 (1999).
288. Id. at 1253 (citation omitted).
289. The District of Oregon followed the Anthony Y. approach in United States v. One Juvenile Male, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (D. Or. 1999). The court stated that the statutory factors are broad enough to cover any of the juvenile's relevant previous conduct. See id. at 1097.
290. 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
291. See LWO, 160 F.3d at 1184.
292. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
293. See United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (CD. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
294. It would be equally inappropriate to consider prior delinquency under "present intellectual development" or "nature of past treatment" prongs.
295. See supra Part II.A.
296. See Shephard, supra note 152, at 39.
297. See id.
298. The Juvenile homicide arrest rates come from the FBI. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1991 tbl. 4.4 (Timothy Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1992).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report (Aug. 1995).
302. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence (Feb. 1996).
303. See supra Part I.
304. See Eric Lotke, National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, An Analysis of Juvenile Homicides: Where they Occur and the Effectiveness of Adult Court Intervention 1 (1996); Grisso, supra note 174, at 5. This increase is placing a strain on an already overcrowded criminal court system. See Lotke, supra, at 1.
305. Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1037, 1044 (1995).
306. See Shepherd, supra note 152, at 40.
307. See id. at 41-42.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 42.
310. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 89.
311. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 16, at 324, 361-62.
312. Congressional revision should not stop here. The entire juvenile justice waiver provision should be revamped to provided district court judges with more detailed criteria for determining jurisdiction.
313. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Defining a juvenile's prior delinquency record to include all prior police contacts will also make the juvenile justice system more effective. Transcripts of waiver hearings will include more accurate information on the juvenile defendant because district court judges will conduct a thorough review of past conduct. Though proceedings are often confidential, a defendant's name and any other identifying criteria can be redacted. If there is more accurate information on juvenile delinquents available for review, legislatures, and juvenile justice organizations will have more comprehensive materials with which to develop and implement new programs. Agencies will be more effective in pinpointing where, why, and how juveniles become delinquent.
314. See United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. John Doe #1, No. 98 CR 438, 1999 WL 642828, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999); United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The purpose of the federal juvenile delinquency proceeding is to . . . encourage treatment and rehabilitation."); United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (D.N.M. 1998) ("The purpose of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act . . . is to remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.").
316. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 115-16.
317. See William P. Barr, Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice as it Relates to Juveniles (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
318. Id.
319. See United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1996).
320. See Violent and Repeat Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, H.R. 1501, 106th Cong.
321. See 1999 Report, supra note 27, at 102.
322. See H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999).
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. Mark. W. Lipsey, Can Rehabilitation Programs Reduce the Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders? An Inquiry into the Effectiveness of Practical Programs, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 611, 613 (1999).
326. See id. at 632-34. Lipsey's study reveals: (1) The most effective service types included probation in the form of supervision, counseling and restitution programs; aftercare in the form of intensive supervision; community-based, school-sponsored, counseling, academic, and service brokerage programs. (2) The most effective role of the juvenile justice system embodied three or more of the following characteristics: Services were generally not delivered from a law enforcement facility; juveniles participating in the program were referred by a juvenile law enforcement agency and attendance was mandatory; services were administered by juvenile justice personnel instead of teachers, school administrators, psychiatrists or lay person; the program was sponsored by a juvenile justice agency. (3) The most effective programs had at least three of the following characteristics: a minimum of 18 weeks in duration; distinct periodic treatment sessions; a minimum of five hours per week of treatment; no uncontrolled variation in treatment delivery. (4) Juveniles with two of the following characteristics were more amenable to treatment: over 15 years of age; predominantly not a status offender; predominantly not a property offender. See id.
327. See Jeffrey A. Butts, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Fact Sheet #52, Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal Court (Feb. 1997).
328. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 447, 486 (1996).
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See Jennifer L. White et. al., How Early Can We Tell?: Predictors of Childhood Conduct Disorder and Adolescent Delinquency, 28 Criminology 507 (1990).
333. See id.
334. See Richard E. Tremblay & Wendy M. Craig, Developmental Crime Prevention, 19 Crime & Just. 151, 158 (1995); Jane Watson, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency: Time for Early Childhood Intervention, 2 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 245, 248 (1995).
335. See Richard E. Tremblay & Wendy M. Craig, Developmental Crime Prevention, 19 Crime & Just. 151, 158 (1995); Jane Watson, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency: Time for Early Childhood Intervention, 2 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 245, 248 (1995).
336. See id.
337. See Peter W. Greenwood, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Fact Sheet #94, Costs and Benefits of Early Childhood Intervention (Feb. 1999).
338. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 13, at 485-86.