Promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in Austria

Public Choice

Volumn 102, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 229-246

  Salhofer, Klaus ^a   Hofreither, Markus F ^a   Sinabell, Franz ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND LIFE SCIENCES   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034412948     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005024920319     Document Type: Article

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