Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

Public Choice

Volumn 102, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 247-269

  Beetsma, Roel M W J ^a   Bovenberg, A Lans ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034398794     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005016001877     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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