Markets as information gathering tools

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-15

  Plott, Charles R ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034375737     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061610     Document Type: Article

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