Flexible integration, EMU and relative voting power in the EU

Public Choice

Volumn 104, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 41-62

  Sutter, Matthias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034374830     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005054731693     Document Type: Article

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