Hemmed in by circumstances: Turkey and Iraq since the Gulf War

Middle East Policy

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 110-126

  Barkey, Henri J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034357461     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2000.tb00182.x     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Turkish exports to Iran benefited from an even more spectacular gain; they increased from $85 million in 1980 to $1,079 million in 1985. For additional information on this period, please see Henri J. Barkey, "The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the Iran-Iraq War," in The Iran Iraq War: Strategic and Political Implications, ed. Efraim Karsh (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 133-153.
2. Some 60,000 refugees crossed into Turkey by August 1988. Some were forcibly repatriated after the Iraqi regime declared an amnesty even though no one believed in its sincerity. See David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 360-61.
3. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 119.
4. Necip Torumtay in his memoirs tells of Özal's preoccupation with northern Iraq and its possible benefits for Turkey. See his Orgeneral Torumtay 'in Anilari (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), pp. 115-16. Özal, in effect, was challenging the traditional cautious modus operandi of Turkish foreign policy. See Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign policy," Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 48-9.
5. Necip Torumtay in his memoirs tells of Özal's preoccupation with northern Iraq and its possible benefits for Turkey. See his Orgeneral Torumtay 'in Anilari (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), pp. 115-16. Özal, in effect, was challenging the traditional cautious modus operandi of Turkish foreign policy. See Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign policy," Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 48-9.
6. Baskin Oran, Kalkik Horoz: Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1996), pp. 50-53.
7. Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1991), p. 58.
8. Phebe Marr, "Turkey and Iraq," in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 67.
9. Quoted in Oran, op. cit., p. 115.
10. Ofra Bengio, "The Challenge to the Territorial Integrity of Iraq," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 91-92.
11. Bülent Ecevit, "The Middle East and the Mediterranean," address to the 45th IPI World Congress in Jerusalem (Ankara: Democratic Left Party, mimeograph, March 25, 1996), p. 6.
12. Ibid.
13. Hürriyet, April 19, 1994, quoted in Mideast Mirror, April 19, 1994.
14. Hürriyet, April 19, 1994, quoted in Mideast Mirror, April 19, 1994.
15. Milli Gazete, June 29, 1995.
16. Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Studies, Policy Paper #47, 1998), p. 112.
17. This was a very contentious debate because even the social democrats of the Republican People's party had announced they would vote against it despite their numerous affirmative votes when they were part of a governing coalition. Moreover, there was tremendous pressure on Erbakan to show that he was capable of standing up to the United States. Ironically, Erbakan's Welfare party was also the party most violently divided over the renewal because many of its Kurdish-origin deputies from the southeast were strongly in favor of maintaining OPC for fear that Saddam would quickly overrun the north.
18. See, for instance, Mehmet Kocaoglu, Uluslararasi Iliskiler Isiginda Ortadogu (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1995). Kocaoglu expresses his suspicions regarding the true motives and behavior of OPC forces by repeating the various allegations against the operation.
19. Yeni Yüzyil, August 8, 1996.
20. Metehan Demir, "Washington pressures Ankara on Iraqi crisis," Turkish Daily News, February 5, 1998. During the same crisis, then-Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit strongly opposed the possibility of U.S. military action to get Sadam to comply with UNSC resolutions and Foreign Minister Cem took a trip to Baghdad to convince the Iraqis to obey the United Nations.
21. Mehmet Ali Birand, the veteran columnist, argued in 1996 that it was wrong for Turkey to think that it could use OPC to bargain on a whole slew of issues, including Turkish-Greek relations, Cyprus and arms sales. In fact, U.S. and European silence on the continuous cross-border operations is a sufficient payback, "Hem Çekiç Güc'ü kov, hem harekat yap..." Sabah, June 15, 1996.
22. Turkey decided in retaliation to "upgrade" its diplomatic relations with Baghdad to full ambassadorial level. Deputy Premier Bulent Ecevit said the dramatic move was in response to the agreement between the two Kurdish factions which had "accelerated a process aimed at perpetuating the de facto partition of Iraq," Mideast Mirror, October 1, 1998.
23. Demirel refused to see him and what was perceived as a visit to create a wedge in Turkish-American relations ended up as a major setback for Iraq. Aziz was not helped by Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan's statement to the effect that Iraq might target the Incirlik base should ONW operations continue, Turkish Daily News, February 17, 1999.
24. This does not mean that the issue is free of controversies. Ankara's decision to raise the level of its representation in Baghdad not only caused consternation in Washington, but also got mired in the controversy on the U.S. House of Representatives attempt to pass a non-binding resolution on the Armenian genocide. As the proposal made progress through the first committee, the process of appointing a new ambassador to Baghdad was speeded up (Radikal, September 26, 2000).
25. Agence France Press, August 25, 1999.
26. Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1996.
27. After Öcalan's conviction, the PKK declared that it not only was going to adhere to a cease-fire, but would also pull its rebels out of Turkish territory, thereby ending a 16-year insurrection.
28. Radikal, March 23, 2000.
29. Al-Hayah, July 28, 2000, FBIS translated text. "Turkey's high-level reception of Talabani also signals Ankara's growing unease over the [I]KDP's activities. Ankara has been particularly disturbed by the [I]KDP's using titles which give the impression of an independent state," Turkish Daily News, July 27, 2000.
30. Ferai Tinç,"Kurt devleti mi?" Hürriyet, December 24, 1999. When Barzani included a Turcoman representative in his regional government, other Turcoman groups, on the basis of proportional representation, argued that they deserved half of the seats.
31. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 168-171.
32. Quoted in Mideast Mirror, May 10, 1995.
33. Milliyet, February 26, 2000.
34. Sükrü Elekdag, "Irak ambargosu," Milliyet, February 7, 2000.
35. Orya Sultan Halisdemir, "INC President Chalabi: Turkey should end its mediatory role," Turkish Daily News, November 7, 1997.
36. Marr, "Turkey and Iraq," op. cit., p. 64.
37. Ghassan al-Atiyah in al-Malaf al-Iraqi, June 1997, quoted in Mideast Mirror, June 2, 1997.
38. Ghassan al-Atiyah in al-Malaf al-Iraqi, June 1997, quoted in Mideast Mirror, June 2, 1997.
39. Süha Bölükbasi, "Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria: the Euphrates Dispute," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1993, p. 25.
40. Space considerations do not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish-Israeli connection, but numerous articles have been penned on this subject which highlight the complexity of the relationship, including the domestic ramifications especially in Turkey. For further analysis please see Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Turkish Identity Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Autumn 1997, pp. 22-37; Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie," Middle East Quarterly, June 1998, pp. 19-29; and Alan Makovsky, "Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish 'Periphery Strategy?'" in Reluctant Neighbor, pp. 147-174.
41. Space considerations do not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish-Israeli connection, but numerous articles have been penned on this subject which highlight the complexity of the relationship, including the domestic ramifications especially in Turkey. For further analysis please see Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Turkish Identity Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Autumn 1997, pp. 22-37; Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie," Middle East Quarterly, June 1998, pp. 19-29; and Alan Makovsky, "Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish 'Periphery Strategy?'" in Reluctant Neighbor, pp. 147-174.
42. Space considerations do not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish-Israeli connection, but numerous articles have been penned on this subject which highlight the complexity of the relationship, including the domestic ramifications especially in Turkey. For further analysis please see Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Turkish Identity Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Autumn 1997, pp. 22-37; Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie," Middle East Quarterly, June 1998, pp. 19-29; and Alan Makovsky, "Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish 'Periphery Strategy?'" in Reluctant Neighbor, pp. 147-174.
43. For an excellent discussion on this issue, see François Georgeon, "De Mossoul á Kirkouk," Maghreb-Marchek, No. 132, April-June 1991, pp. 38-49. Georgeon makes the point that at the height of these discussions in the mid 1980s, the issue did not catch the imagination of the Turkish public, which was more focused on economic concerns.