Turkish-Israeli relations through the lens of the Turkish identity debate

Journal of Palestine Studies

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 22-37

  Yavuz, M Hakan ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b School of Islamic and Social Sciences   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944480481     PISSN: 0377919X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2537807     Document Type: Short Survey

References (80)

1. During my dissertation fieldwork in Erzurum and Bayburt, I attended one of these "Jerusalem Day" all-night activities. After Qur'anic recitations, the speakers introduce the significance of the city within the framework of Islam and the Ottoman history. They then criticize the government's domestic and foreign policies and call for a just system. The meetings usually end with pledges "not to deal with Israel" and to work for those who would bring "justice within and without." After the pledge, the Ottoman military march plays to deepen religious emotions. These grass-roots networks made possible the mobilization in Turkey for the Bosnian cause.
2. See Zaman, 29 July 1997.
3. See, for example, Milliyet and Zaman, 16 August 1997.
4. At demonstrations against strategic ties with Israel, the Yugoslav flag is often burned along with the Israeli flag because of the alleged Israeli arms sales to Serbia during the genocide against the Bosnian Muslims.
5. See M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkey's Relations with Israel," Foreign Policy (Ankara) 25, nos. 3-4 (1991), pp. 41-68;
6. and M. Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb R Khan, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Duality and Development," Arab Studies Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1992), pp. 69-94.
7. Faik Ökte, The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
8. Soli Özel, "Of Not being a Lone Wolf: Geography, Domestic Plays, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in Powder Keg in the Middle East, ed, Geoffrey Kemp and Janice G. Stein (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), pp. 161-94. An egregious example of Turkey's efforts to prove its rupture with the Islamic world was Ankara's vote at the United Nations against Algeria's independence.
9. Frank Tachau, Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development (New York Praeger, 1984), pp. 165-66.
10. Ergün Özbudun, Political Change and Political Participation in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 52.
11. After Israel passed its Basic Law on Jerusalem declaring the city its "eternal capital," Erbakan's National Salvation Party accused Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen of being pro-Israeli because of his reluctance to sever diplomatic ties with Israel to protest the move, and introduced a no-confidence motion. On 4 September 1980, parliament passed the motion against Erkmen by 230 votes to 2, with 180 abstentions. Bulent Ecevit of the Republican Peoples' Party also supported the motion. See Cumhuriyet, 3 September 1980;
12. Milliyet, 4 September 1980.
13. The army's successive purges of "Islamic elements" - in April and December 1996 and May and August 1997 - indicates the degree in which Islamic voices have penetrated the army. These constant purges are a sign of internal opposition to the higher ranking officers' policies.
14. Sami Zubaida, "Islam, Cultural Nationalism and the Left," Review of Middle East Studies, no. 4 (1990), p. 6.
15. Mujeeb R. Khan, "External Threats and the Promotion of a Transnational Islamic Consciousness: The Case of the Late Ottoman Empire and Contemporary Turkey," Islamic World Report 1, no. 3 (1996), pp. 115-28.
16. Ihsan Gürkan, "Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process," Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, no. 7 (1993), p. 123.
17. Duygu Bazoǧlu-Sezer argues that "if there were no peace process between Israel and the PLO, the rapprochement with Israel could not even be conceived." See Şahin Alpay's interview with Sezer in Milliyet, 21 July 1997.
18. It has been alleged that the bulk of former Prime Minister Çiller's $6.5-million slush fund was used to form a "small intelligence circle" in Damascus to attack Syrian targets and intimidate Damascus to give up PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
19. For the text of the agreement, see Gürkan, "Turkish-Israeli Relations," pp. 133-36.
20. Newspot, November 18, 1993.
21. Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, 7 November 1994.
22. Jose Rosenfeld, "Free-trade Pact with Turkey Near," The Jerusalem Post, 6 November 1994.
23. Robert Olson, "The Turkey-Israel Agreement and the Kurdish Question," Middle East International, 24 May 1996, pp. 18-19.
24. Mehmet Ali Birand, "Türkiye, Israel ile Uzaklara Gidecek, Ancak," Sabah, 27 May 1997;
25. "Türkiye Israil'in Silah Pazarina Daldi," Sabah, 28 May 1997.
26. One of Turkey's goals in the alliance is to prevent Israeli support for Kurdish nationalism. Many Turks harbor deep suspicions, based on Israel's "periphery strategy" to encourage non-Arab minority independence movements, that Israel is the main supporter of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, Syria, and Iran.
27. The Jerusalem Post, 4 May 1997.
28. Also see "Türk Donanmasi Israil'de," Milliyet, 17 June 1997.
29. He has charged, for example, that "Zionists are seeking to assimilate Turkey and pull us from our historical Islamic roots through integrating it into the European Community" and has frequently presented Israel as a major world center of anti-Muslim activity. Following Israel's April 1996 attack on Lebanon, Refah followers distributed video tapes of the Qana bombing's devastation.
30. According to Çevik Bir, the deputy chief of staff, this agreement was concluded on 18 September 1995 and represented the first step toward military cooperation ("Çevik Bir 'Isbirligi'ni Savundu," Yeni Şafak, 5 June 1996). Confusion or discrepancies about what was "concluded" or "completed" or "signed," and when, is heightened by the secrecy of the agreements.
31. Steve Rodan, "Turkish PM Signs IAI $650 m. F-4 Deal," Jerusalem Post, 8 December 1996.
32. Arieh O'Sullivan, "Israel, Turkey to Make 'Popeye' Missiles," Jerusalem Post, 18 May 1997.
33. Konya already had an Islamist mayor, who was reelected.
34. "Black Turks" here designate Anatolians, "White Turks" Rumeli Turks from the Balkans or, more generally, the elite that has embraced the secular, Kemalist ethos. See Mehmet Ali Soydan, Dünden Bug̈ne ve Yarina Türkiye'nin Refah Gerceǧi (Erzurum: Birey Yayincilik, 1994).
35. "The Other Turkey Wins" (front cover)
36. and "Fatih Wins Against Harbiye" in Izlenim, 2-9 April 1994.
37. (Fatih and Harbiye are neighborhoods in Istanbul, Fatih being a large traditional and conservative neighborhood, and Harbiye a Westernized, cosmopolitan one.) For evaluation of the March 1994 election, see Abdurrahman Dilipak, "RP'nin Baş arisinda Gözardi Edilen Birkaç Nokta," Milliyet, 22 April 1994;
38. Saffet Solak, "Son Seçimler ve Bazi Gerçekler," Zaman, 23 April 1994.
39. For the December 1995 elections, see Eric Rouleau, "Refah Partisi'nin Başarisi Sürecek Mi?" Yeni Yüzyil, 5 January 1996;
40. Ümit Cizre Sakallioǧlu, "Alacakaranlik Kuşaǧi Seçimleri," Birikim, no. 81 (January 1996), pp. 26-30.
41. Yeni Yüzyil, 14 October 1996. This caused enough concern for Egyptian president Husni Mubarak to pay a short visit to Ankara asking Erbakan to stop "interfering" in Egyptian affairs.
42. Nicole Pope, "Turkey's Generals Behind the Israel Axis," Middle East International, 16 May 1997, p. 3.
43. While the Qur'anic schools teach only the Qur'an, the Imam Hatip schools have a mixed curriculum of secular and religious education and grant diplomas equivalent to those of the state-run lycées. Ironically, the schools were encouraged by the military following the 1980 coup as a counter to leftism, then seen as the main threat to the state.
44. Hugh Pope, "Turkish Military Tightens Noose on Pro-Islamic Regime," Wall Street Journal, 13 June 1997.
45. Michael Yudelman, "Erbakan to Meet Levy," Jerusalem Post, 8 April 1997.
46. Fikret Ertan, "David Levy're Birkaç Söz," Zaman, 8 April 1997;
47. Yeni Yüzyil, 9 April 1997.
48. The generals' tendency to amalgamate Islamism and the Kurds as threats was exacerbated by the heavy representation of Kurds within Refah: In the 1995 national elections, 26 of Refah's 158 deputies were Kurdish (Yeni Yüzyil, 22 July 1996), and the largest number of deputies from the Kurdish regions were Refah. Refah has been the dominant party in the Kurdish regions not because the Kurds are more "Islamist" than the Turks but because Refah is seen as an antisystem party.
49. Daniel J. Wakin, "Erbakan Chronology," Associated Press, Ankara, 18 June 1997.
50. Melik Aktas, "Israil'in Hedefi Arz-i Mev'ud Olabilir," Islam, June 1997, pp. 46-49.
51. See Fuat Atik's interview with Lütfullah Karaman in "Israil ile yakinlasma "Resmi Türkiyenin Tercihi," Islam (June 1997), p. 48.
52. See also Ahmet Davutoǧlu, "Islam Tehdit Deǧil, Bir Dinamizm Kaynaǧi," Altinoluk (August 1997), p. 15.
53. Sami Kohen, "Israil ile Stratejik Diyalog," Milliyet, 7 May 1997.
54. David Butler, "A Country Pulled in Two Directions," Middle East Economic Digest, 30 May 1997, p. 2.
55. Jonathan Lyons, "Growing Turkish-Israeli Ties Bury Islamic Dream," Reuters World Service, 11 May 1997.
56. "Çevik Bir." A number of Turkish writers, especially on the left, have objected to the growing Turkish-Israeli relations precisely because they are militarizing Turkish foreign and domestic policy. Ali Bayramoǧlu, for example, a social democratic analyst for the paper Yeni Yüzyil, laments that Turkey's foreign policies are being "directly produced by the military authority . . . and this represents military supervision over the decision-making process in Turkey."
57. ("Diş Politika ve Asker," Yeni Yüzyil, 25 April 1996).
58. See also Ergun Balçi, "Türkiye'ye Karşi Tehlikeli Cephe," Cumhuriyet, 30 June 1997.
59. Telephone interview with Abdullah Gül, 23 July 1997. In the Turkish system, the defense minister has no authority over the military. In state protocol, he is after the chief of staff.
60. The memorandum, contained in the assembly proceedings (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanaklati, 18 October 1996) reads as follows: "To the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In response to the question of deputy Yaşar Ünal on 13 August 1996 about the agreements signed with Israel, they are listed as follows. Respectfully yours, Prof. Dr. Tansu Çiller, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. 1. Agreement on Cooperation in Cultural, Educational, and Scientific Fields on 14 November 1993.
61. Memorandum on the Principles of Mutual Cooperation, 14 November 1993.
62. Agreement on the Protection of Environment and Nature, 11 April 1994.
63. Agreement on Cooperation in Telecommunication and Postal Service, 3 November 1994.
64. Agreement of Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs, 4 November 1994.
65. Agreement on Cooperation of Medical and Health Services, 14 March 1995.
66. Memorandum in Cooperation in Agriculture, 27 June 1995.
67. Agreement of Military Education and Cooperation, 22 February 1996.
68. Free Trade Pact Agreement, 14 March 1996.
69. Agreement for the Protection of Investment, 14 March 1996.
70. Agreement for the Examination of Dual Taxation, 14 March 1996.
71. Agreement on Cooperation in Economic, Scientific, and Technical Fields, 14 March 1996.
72. Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Industry, 28 August 1996."
73. Alan Makovsky, "Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish 'Periphery' Strategy?" in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 149.
74. In an interview on 12 August 1997, a high-ranking Turkish diplomat told the author in Chicago of the appearance of new slogans calling the army "Peygamber Ocaǧi deǧil artik, Yahudi Ocaǧi" [No longer the hearth of the prophet, but the hearth of the Jews].
75. Makovsky, "Israeli-Turkish Relations," pp. 166-67.
76. Interestingly, an Israeli daily reported during Çetin's November 1993 visit that Israeli officials were uncomfortable with Çetin's appeal for a joint battle against terrorism: "We are not interested in making enemies. The PKK has never hurt us. We also don't have any interest in antagonizing Syria" (Jerusalem Post International, 27 November 1993).
77. And during Israeli president Weizman's visit to Turkey the following January, the Israeli side refused to make an outright condemnation of the PKK (Jerusalem Post, 30 January 1994). The Turkish daily Cumhuriyet editorialized on 25 January 1994 that Israeli leaders refuse to sign agreements on antiterror cooperation where Turkey is concerned and only seek to get assistance for themselves.
78. Mehmet Ali Birand, "Türkiye, Israel ile Süriye Savasina Katildi," Sabah, 16 April 1996.
79. Cengiz Çandar, "Türkiye, Kudüs'ün Neresinde?" Sabah, 10 April 1997.
80. "Turkey's Refah Parry in Power: An Assessment: An Interview with Graham Fuller" in Middle East Affairs Journal 3, nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1997), p. 167.