Rational choice and dysfunctional institutions

Governance

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 535-547

  Miller, Gary ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034355850     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0952-1895.00145     Document Type: Article

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