Toward a multilateral competition policy regime?

Global Governance

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 319-338

  Devuyst, Youri ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034344474     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00603003     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. For an excellent introduction, see Robert Pitofsky, "The Political Content of Antitrust," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 127 (1979): 1051-1075; E. Thomas Sullivan, ed., The Political Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
2. For an excellent introduction, see Robert Pitofsky, "The Political Content of Antitrust," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 127 (1979): 1051-1075; E. Thomas Sullivan, ed., The Political Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
3. As an anonymous referee correctly pointed out, it might be useful to mention that even ardent neoclassicals see some benefits of monopolies in particular cases. Patent law, for instance, gives temporary monopolies to firms to provide them with incentives to innovate, whereas the time limit on exclusive rights gives others the incentive to compete with the patent holder in the future. On the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition policy, see Keith E. Mascus, "Intellectual Property Rights in the World Trade Organization: Progress and Prospects," in Jeffrey J. Schott, ed., Launching New Global Trade Talks: An Action Agenda (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998), pp. 133-148; Susan K. Sell, "Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion and Choice," International Organization 49 (1995): 315-349.
4. As an anonymous referee correctly pointed out, it might be useful to mention that even ardent neoclassicals see some benefits of monopolies in particular cases. Patent law, for instance, gives temporary monopolies to firms to provide them with incentives to innovate, whereas the time limit on exclusive rights gives others the incentive to compete with the patent holder in the future. On the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition policy, see Keith E. Mascus, "Intellectual Property Rights in the World Trade Organization: Progress and Prospects," in Jeffrey J. Schott, ed., Launching New Global Trade Talks: An Action Agenda (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998), pp. 133-148; Susan K. Sell, "Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion and Choice," International Organization 49 (1995): 315-349.
5. For current intellectual debates on competition policy, see country and issue studies in Edward M. Graham and J. David Richardson, eds., Global Competition Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997); for an assessment of the rationale and instruments for antitrust in the transition countries of Central Europe, see John Fingleton et al., Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996); for new perspectives on competition policy of vertical restraints and network industries, see Einar Hope and Per Maeleng, eds., Competition and Trade Policies: Coherence or Conflict? (London: Routledge, 1998); for the link between the various approaches to competition policy and the international discussion, see Graham, "Approaches to Competition Policy," in Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low, and Barbara Kotschwar, eds., Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States/Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 417-443.
6. For current intellectual debates on competition policy, see country and issue studies in Edward M. Graham and J. David Richardson, eds., Global Competition Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997); for an assessment of the rationale and instruments for antitrust in the transition countries of Central Europe, see John Fingleton et al., Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996); for new perspectives on competition policy of vertical restraints and network industries, see Einar Hope and Per Maeleng, eds., Competition and Trade Policies: Coherence or Conflict? (London: Routledge, 1998); for the link between the various approaches to competition policy and the international discussion, see Graham, "Approaches to Competition Policy," in Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low, and Barbara Kotschwar, eds., Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States/Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 417-443.
7. For current intellectual debates on competition policy, see country and issue studies in Edward M. Graham and J. David Richardson, eds., Global Competition Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997); for an assessment of the rationale and instruments for antitrust in the transition countries of Central Europe, see John Fingleton et al., Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996); for new perspectives on competition policy of vertical restraints and network industries, see Einar Hope and Per Maeleng, eds., Competition and Trade Policies: Coherence or Conflict? (London: Routledge, 1998); for the link between the various approaches to competition policy and the international discussion, see Graham, "Approaches to Competition Policy," in Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low, and Barbara Kotschwar, eds., Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States/Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 417-443.
8. For current intellectual debates on competition policy, see country and issue studies in Edward M. Graham and J. David Richardson, eds., Global Competition Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997); for an assessment of the rationale and instruments for antitrust in the transition countries of Central Europe, see John Fingleton et al., Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1996); for new perspectives on competition policy of vertical restraints and network industries, see Einar Hope and Per Maeleng, eds., Competition and Trade Policies: Coherence or Conflict? (London: Routledge, 1998); for the link between the various approaches to competition policy and the international discussion, see Graham, "Approaches to Competition Policy," in Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low, and Barbara Kotschwar, eds., Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States/Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 417-443.
9. Eleanor Fox and Robert Pitofsky, "United States," in Graham and Richardson, Global Competition Policy, pp. 235-270; Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan, "Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?" New York University Law Review 62 (1987): 936-988.
10. Eleanor Fox and Robert Pitofsky, "United States," in Graham and Richardson, Global Competition Policy, pp. 235-270; Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan, "Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?" New York University Law Review 62 (1987): 936-988.
11. Vivien Rose, ed., Bellamy and Child Common Market Law of Competition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, with 1996 supplement); Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (Oxford, England: Hart, 1997); Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, eds., The EC Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
12. Vivien Rose, ed., Bellamy and Child Common Market Law of Competition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, with 1996 supplement); Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (Oxford, England: Hart, 1997); Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, eds., The EC Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
13. Vivien Rose, ed., Bellamy and Child Common Market Law of Competition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, with 1996 supplement); Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (Oxford, England: Hart, 1997); Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, eds., The EC Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
14. Mitsuo Matsushita, "The Antimonopoly Law of Japan," in Graham and Richardson, Global Competition Policy, pp. 151-197.
15. See, for instance, Leonard Waverman, William S. Comanor, and Akira Goto, introduction to Waverman, Comanor, and Goto, eds., Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modalities for Cooperation (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-5.
16. Joseph P. Griffin, "Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement," Antitrust Law Journal 67 (1999): 159-199; Peter Torremans, "Extraterritorial Application of EC and U.S. Competition Law," European Law Review 26 (1996): 280-293.
17. Joseph P. Griffin, "Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement," Antitrust Law Journal 67 (1999): 159-199; Peter Torremans, "Extraterritorial Application of EC and U.S. Competition Law," European Law Review 26 (1996): 280-293.
18. For an excellent overview of this case law, see Elliott Sulcove, "The Extraterritorial Reach of the Criminal Provisions of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Impact of United States v. Nippon Paper Industries," University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 19 (1998): 1067-1099.
19. Robert Pitofsky, "Testimony Concerning International Antitrust Enforcement," Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2 October 1998; Michael H. Byowitz, "The Unilateral Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Achieve Foreign Market Access: A Pragmatic Assessment," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1996 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1997), pp. 21-36; Robert D. Shank, "The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward a 'Positive Comity' Solution to International Competition Problems?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 29 (1996): 155-189.
20. Robert Pitofsky, "Testimony Concerning International Antitrust Enforcement," Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2 October 1998; Michael H. Byowitz, "The Unilateral Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Achieve Foreign Market Access: A Pragmatic Assessment," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1996 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1997), pp. 21-36; Robert D. Shank, "The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward a 'Positive Comity' Solution to International Competition Problems?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 29 (1996): 155-189.
21. Robert Pitofsky, "Testimony Concerning International Antitrust Enforcement," Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2 October 1998; Michael H. Byowitz, "The Unilateral Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Achieve Foreign Market Access: A Pragmatic Assessment," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1996 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1997), pp. 21-36; Robert D. Shank, "The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward a 'Positive Comity' Solution to International Competition Problems?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 29 (1996): 155-189.
22. On the SII and other U.S. attempts to pressure Japan into competition enforcement, see Tony A. Freyer, "Regulatory Distinctiveness and Extraterritorial Competition Policy in Japanese-U.S. Trade," World Competition 21 (1998): 5-53; Gary R. Saxonhouse, "A Short Summary of the Long History of Unfair Trade Allegations Against Japan," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Economic Analysis, vol. 1 of Fair Trade and Harmonization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 471-513; Yoshio Ohara, "The New U.S. Policy on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, and Japan's Response," World Competition 17 (1994): 49-54.
23. On the SII and other U.S. attempts to pressure Japan into competition enforcement, see Tony A. Freyer, "Regulatory Distinctiveness and Extraterritorial Competition Policy in Japanese-U.S. Trade," World Competition 21 (1998): 5-53; Gary R. Saxonhouse, "A Short Summary of the Long History of Unfair Trade Allegations Against Japan," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Economic Analysis, vol. 1 of Fair Trade and Harmonization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 471-513; Yoshio Ohara, "The New U.S. Policy on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, and Japan's Response," World Competition 17 (1994): 49-54.
24. On the SII and other U.S. attempts to pressure Japan into competition enforcement, see Tony A. Freyer, "Regulatory Distinctiveness and Extraterritorial Competition Policy in Japanese-U.S. Trade," World Competition 21 (1998): 5-53; Gary R. Saxonhouse, "A Short Summary of the Long History of Unfair Trade Allegations Against Japan," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Economic Analysis, vol. 1 of Fair Trade and Harmonization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 471-513; Yoshio Ohara, "The New U.S. Policy on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, and Japan's Response," World Competition 17 (1994): 49-54.
25. Dieter Lange and John Byron Sandage, "The Wood Pulp Decision and Its Implications for the Scope of EC Competition Law," Common Market Law Review 26 (1989): 137-165; Walter Van Gerven, "EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgement," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1989 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1990), pp. 451-467.
26. Dieter Lange and John Byron Sandage, "The Wood Pulp Decision and Its Implications for the Scope of EC Competition Law," Common Market Law Review 26 (1989): 137-165; Walter Van Gerven, "EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgement," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1989 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1990), pp. 451-467.
27. Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber, Extended Composition) in Case T-102/96, 25 March 1999, par. 90. For a comment, see Antonio F. Bavasso, "Gencor: A Judicial Review of the Commission's Policy and Practice: Many Lights and Some Shadows," World Competition 22 (1999): 45-65.
28. Joseph P. Griffin, "Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction," European Competition Law Review 19 (1998): 64-73.
29. European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules," COM (96) 284 final, 18 June 1996, pp. 4-5; John J. Parisi, "Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities," European Competition Law Review 20 (1999): 133-142; Douglas A. Melamed, "International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What Can Be Achieved at the Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Levels," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 423-433.
30. European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules," COM (96) 284 final, 18 June 1996, pp. 4-5; John J. Parisi, "Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities," European Competition Law Review 20 (1999): 133-142; Douglas A. Melamed, "International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What Can Be Achieved at the Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Levels," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 423-433.
31. European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules," COM (96) 284 final, 18 June 1996, pp. 4-5; John J. Parisi, "Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities," European Competition Law Review 20 (1999): 133-142; Douglas A. Melamed, "International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What Can Be Achieved at the Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Levels," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 423-433.
32. For an update on the OECD's activities in the field of competition policy, see the OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, created in 1999 by the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy.
33. For a comment on the agreement, see Allard D. Ham, "International Co-operation in the Anti-Trust Field and in Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities," Common Market Law Review 30 (1993): 571-597. For the EU's internal institutional problems in getting the agreement approved, see Noreen Burrows, "No General External Competence for the Commission," European Law Review 20 (1995): 210-213; Gunnar Schuster, "European Communities: Agreement Between the Commission and the United States on Competition, Power of the Commission to Conclude the Agreement," American Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 136-142.
34. For a comment on the agreement, see Allard D. Ham, "International Co-operation in the Anti-Trust Field and in Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities," Common Market Law Review 30 (1993): 571-597. For the EU's internal institutional problems in getting the agreement approved, see Noreen Burrows, "No General External Competence for the Commission," European Law Review 20 (1995): 210-213; Gunnar Schuster, "European Communities: Agreement Between the Commission and the United States on Competition, Power of the Commission to Conclude the Agreement," American Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 136-142.
35. For a comment on the agreement, see Allard D. Ham, "International Co-operation in the Anti-Trust Field and in Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities," Common Market Law Review 30 (1993): 571-597. For the EU's internal institutional problems in getting the agreement approved, see Noreen Burrows, "No General External Competence for the Commission," European Law Review 20 (1995): 210-213; Gunnar Schuster, "European Communities: Agreement Between the Commission and the United States on Competition, Power of the Commission to Conclude the Agreement," American Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 136-142.
36. For a comment on the application of the agreement, see Alexander Schaub, "International Co-operation in Antitrust Matters: Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/MDD Proceedings," Competition Policy Newsletter (February 1998): 2-6; Youri Devuyst, "Transatlantic Competition Relations," in Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, eds., Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
37. For a comment on the application of the agreement, see Alexander Schaub, "International Co-operation in Antitrust Matters: Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/MDD Proceedings," Competition Policy Newsletter (February 1998): 2-6; Youri Devuyst, "Transatlantic Competition Relations," in Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, eds., Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
38. On the positive comity concept, see James R. Atwood, "Positive Comity: Is It a Positive Step?" in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 7992 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1993), pp. 79-89. For an introduction to the agreement, see Youri Devuyst, "Introductory Note: Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws," International Legal Materials 37 (1998): 1070-1075.
39. On the positive comity concept, see James R. Atwood, "Positive Comity: Is It a Positive Step?" in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 7992 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1993), pp. 79-89. For an introduction to the agreement, see Youri Devuyst, "Introductory Note: Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws," International Legal Materials 37 (1998): 1070-1075.
40. Based on figures in the European Commission reports to the council and the European Parliament on the agreement between the EU and the United States regarding the application of their competition laws, COM (96) 479 final (covering the period from 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996); COM (97) 346 final (from 1 July 1996 to 31 December 1996); COM (1998) 516 final (from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1997); COM (1999) 439 final (from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998).
41. See Parisi, "Enforcement Co-operation"; Melamed, "International Co-operation."
42. See Parisi, "Enforcement Co-operation"; Melamed, "International Co-operation."
43. See Youri Devuyst, "The International Dimension of the EC's Antitrust Policy: Extending the Level Playing Field," European Foreign Affairs Review 3 (1998): 459-479.
44. For an excellent overview of multilateral attempts to build a competition policy framework, see John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1995), pp. 1090-1107.
45. Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 103-113; William Adams Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of the ITO Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1950), pp. 125-131, 222-225.
46. Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 103-113; William Adams Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of the ITO Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1950), pp. 125-131, 222-225.
47. Phillipe Brusick, "UN Control of Restrictive Business Practices," Journal of World Trade Law 17 (1983): 337;
48. Debra L. Miller and Joel Davidow, "Antitrust at the UN: A Tale of Two Codes," Stanford Journal of International Law 18 (1982): 347.
49. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Proposals for Negotiating International Competition Rules in the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal System," Aussenwirtschaft 49 (1994): 231-277.
50. GATT Decision of 18 November 1960 on "Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations," Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 9th Supplement (1961), p. 28.
51. OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Overview of WTO Agreements, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, 28 January 1999.
52. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, "Trade and Competition Interlinkages: The Case of Telecom," address presented to the Conference on Trade and Competition in the WTO and Beyond, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, 4-5 December 1998; Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, "Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization," Journal of World Trade 31 (1997): 5-48.
53. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, "Trade and Competition Interlinkages: The Case of Telecom," address presented to the Conference on Trade and Competition in the WTO and Beyond, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, 4-5 December 1998; Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, "Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization," Journal of World Trade 31 (1997): 5-48.
54. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization Including a Guide to the Study of the Charter (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 3206, Commercial Policy Series 114, 24 March 1948), p. 8.
55. Karel Van Miert, "EU Competition Policy in a New Trade Order," in Hope and Maeleng, Competition and Trade Policies, p. 184.
56. Mark Furse, "Competition Law and the WTO Report: 'Japan: Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,'" European Competition Law Review 20 (1999): 9-13; W. Todd Miller, "Fuji Case Leaves Questions Unanswered," Global Competition Review (August-September 1998): 24-26.
57. Mark Furse, "Competition Law and the WTO Report: 'Japan: Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,'" European Competition Law Review 20 (1999): 9-13; W. Todd Miller, "Fuji Case Leaves Questions Unanswered," Global Competition Review (August-September 1998): 24-26.
58. On the position of developing countries in the competition policy debate, see Susan K. Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), especially chap. 5.
59. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (96)/DEC/W, 13 December 1996, p. 7.
60. On the EU's arguments for a WTO competition regime, see Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995); European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules"; Leon Brittan, "Competition Policy and the Trading System: Toward International Rules in the WTO," address presented to the Institute of International Economics, Washington, D.C., 20 November 1997; Karel Van Miert, "The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations," address presented to the WTO ambassadors, Geneva, 21 April 1998.
61. On the EU's arguments for a WTO competition regime, see Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995); European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules"; Leon Brittan, "Competition Policy and the Trading System: Toward International Rules in the WTO," address presented to the Institute of International Economics, Washington, D.C., 20 November 1997; Karel Van Miert, "The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations," address presented to the WTO ambassadors, Geneva, 21 April 1998.
62. On the EU's arguments for a WTO competition regime, see Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995); European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules"; Leon Brittan, "Competition Policy and the Trading System: Toward International Rules in the WTO," address presented to the Institute of International Economics, Washington, D.C., 20 November 1997; Karel Van Miert, "The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations," address presented to the WTO ambassadors, Geneva, 21 April 1998.
63. On the EU's arguments for a WTO competition regime, see Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995); European Commission, "Toward an International Framework of Competition Rules"; Leon Brittan, "Competition Policy and the Trading System: Toward International Rules in the WTO," address presented to the Institute of International Economics, Washington, D.C., 20 November 1997; Karel Van Miert, "The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations," address presented to the WTO ambassadors, Geneva, 21 April 1998.
64. World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy for the General Council, WT/ WGTCP/2, 8 December 1998.
65. Van Miert, "The WTO and Competition Policy," p. 2.
66. Pascal Lamy, "WTO Issues," address presented to the NGO Symposium, Seattle, 29 November 1999 (European Commission, Spokesman's Service Speech 99/194).
67. Common Working Paper of the EC, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and Turkey to the Seattle Ministerial Declaration, 29 November 1999, par. 26, online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/2000_round/friends.pdf.
68. Charlene Barshefsky, "America's View of the Trading System," address presented to the World Economic Forum, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1999; Barshefsky, "Remarks on the Global Trading System," address presented to the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 15 April 1998. See also David Aaron, "Remarks on Future WTO Issues," address presented to the conference organized by George Mason University, the Congressional Institute for the Future, and the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 19 March 1998.
69. Charlene Barshefsky, "America's View of the Trading System," address presented to the World Economic Forum, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1999; Barshefsky, "Remarks on the Global Trading System," address presented to the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 15 April 1998. See also David Aaron, "Remarks on Future WTO Issues," address presented to the conference organized by George Mason University, the Congressional Institute for the Future, and the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 19 March 1998.
70. Charlene Barshefsky, "America's View of the Trading System," address presented to the World Economic Forum, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1999; Barshefsky, "Remarks on the Global Trading System," address presented to the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 15 April 1998. See also David Aaron, "Remarks on Future WTO Issues," address presented to the conference organized by George Mason University, the Congressional Institute for the Future, and the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 19 March 1998.
71. Joel Klein, "No Monopoly on Antitrust," Financial Times, 14 February 1998; Klein, "Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1997 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1998), pp. 9-10. See also the skeptical viewpoint of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report, co-chairs James F. Rill and Paula Stern (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000).
72. Joel Klein, "No Monopoly on Antitrust," Financial Times, 14 February 1998; Klein, "Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1997 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1998), pp. 9-10. See also the skeptical viewpoint of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report, co-chairs James F. Rill and Paula Stern (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000).
73. Joel Klein, "No Monopoly on Antitrust," Financial Times, 14 February 1998; Klein, "Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century," in Barry E. Hawk, ed., 1997 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference (New York: Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1998), pp. 9-10. See also the skeptical viewpoint of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report, co-chairs James F. Rill and Paula Stern (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000).
74. Van Miert, "The WTO and Competition Policy," p. 5.
75. According to Eleanor M. Fox, "It is not a surprise that many Americans prefer things the way they are. Americans are not steeped in the postwar Western European tradition of community building. They have the tools of unilateralism, they fear the compromises of bargaining, and they abjure the 'relinquishment' of sovereignty." See Fox, "Toward World Antitrust and Market Access," American Journal of International Law 91 (1997): 12.
76. For a more detailed analysis of the EU and U.S. perspectives on the WTO's role in competition, see David J. Gerber, "The U.S.-European Conflict over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience Perspective," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 123-142.
77. For an overview of the other problems related to the development of a WTO competition framework, see Eleanor M. Fox, "Competition Law and the Millennium Round," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 665-679; Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, "Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT," World Economy 17 (1994): 121-150; Robert E. Hudec, "A WTO Perspective on Private Anti-Competitive Behavior in World Markets," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 79-100; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National and International Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO 'Linking Principles' for Trade and Competition," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 145-161.
78. For an overview of the other problems related to the development of a WTO competition framework, see Eleanor M. Fox, "Competition Law and the Millennium Round," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 665-679; Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, "Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT," World Economy 17 (1994): 121-150; Robert E. Hudec, "A WTO Perspective on Private Anti-Competitive Behavior in World Markets," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 79-100; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National and International Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO 'Linking Principles' for Trade and Competition," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 145-161.
79. For an overview of the other problems related to the development of a WTO competition framework, see Eleanor M. Fox, "Competition Law and the Millennium Round," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 665-679; Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, "Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT," World Economy 17 (1994): 121-150; Robert E. Hudec, "A WTO Perspective on Private Anti-Competitive Behavior in World Markets," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 79-100; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National and International Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO 'Linking Principles' for Trade and Competition," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 145-161.
80. For an overview of the other problems related to the development of a WTO competition framework, see Eleanor M. Fox, "Competition Law and the Millennium Round," Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999): 665-679; Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, "Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT," World Economy 17 (1994): 121-150; Robert E. Hudec, "A WTO Perspective on Private Anti-Competitive Behavior in World Markets," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 79-100; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Legal, Economic and Political Objectives of National and International Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO 'Linking Principles' for Trade and Competition," New England Law Review 34 (1999): 145-161.
81. "Preparation of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference," EU Council Conclusions, 25 October 1999, par. 11 (d).
82. Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998); Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-74; Paul Krugman, "The Myth of the Asian Miracle," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 62-78.
83. Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998); Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-74; Paul Krugman, "The Myth of the Asian Miracle," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 62-78.
84. Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998); Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-74; Paul Krugman, "The Myth of the Asian Miracle," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 62-78.
85. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade, p. 105.