Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU antitrust enforcement

Antitrust Law Journal

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 159-198

  Griffin, Joseph P ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033448838     PISSN: 00036056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (242)

1. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit practices in interstate commerce and in trade or commerce "with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which deals with unfair methods of competition, uses the language activity "affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
2. The Supreme Court could not achieve a quorum because too many Justices were disqualified. See 1 JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.05, at 147 (2d ed. 1981).
3. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F. 2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
4. Id. at 443-44.
5. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Holophane Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); ALAN D. NEALE & DANIEL G. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (3d ed. 1980).
7. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, Ch. 11, 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982). For background, see Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 840 (1982); G.R. Sunderland, Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of U.S. Laws Regulating International Trade: A British Response, 28 FED. B. NEWS 235 (1981); A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Lawrence Collins, Blocking and Clawback Statutes: The U.K. Approach, 1986 J. BUS. L., Part 1, at 372, Part 2, at 452.
8. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, Ch. 11, 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982). For background, see Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 840 (1982); G.R. Sunderland, Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of U.S. Laws Regulating International Trade: A British Response, 28 FED. B. NEWS 235 (1981); A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Lawrence Collins, Blocking and Clawback Statutes: The U.K. Approach, 1986 J. BUS. L., Part 1, at 372, Part 2, at 452.
9. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, Ch. 11, 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982). For background, see Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 840 (1982); G.R. Sunderland, Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of U.S. Laws Regulating International Trade: A British Response, 28 FED. B. NEWS 235 (1981); A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Lawrence Collins, Blocking and Clawback Statutes: The U.K. Approach, 1986 J. BUS. L., Part 1, at 372, Part 2, at 452.
10. See Diplomatic Notes, reprinted in A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983); G.W. Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, etc., in REPORT OF THE 51ST INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE 565-92 (1964). Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L., 500, 508 (1981); Michael L. Weiner, Remedies in International Transactions: A Case for Flexibility, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 261 (1996).
11. See Diplomatic Notes, reprinted in A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983); G.W. Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, etc., in REPORT OF THE 51ST INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE 565-92 (1964). Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L., 500, 508 (1981); Michael L. Weiner, Remedies in International Transactions: A Case for Flexibility, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 261 (1996).
12. See Diplomatic Notes, reprinted in A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983); G.W. Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, etc., in REPORT OF THE 51ST INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE 565-92 (1964). Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L., 500, 508 (1981); Michael L. Weiner, Remedies in International Transactions: A Case for Flexibility, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 261 (1996).
13. See Diplomatic Notes, reprinted in A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983); G.W. Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, etc., in REPORT OF THE 51ST INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE 565-92 (1964). Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L., 500, 508 (1981); Michael L. Weiner, Remedies in International Transactions: A Case for Flexibility, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 261 (1996).
14. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., (1953) 1 Ch. 19 (Eng. C.A. 1952). See also O. Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Antitrust Law: The Nylon Patent Case, 18 MOD. L. REV. 65 (1955).
15. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976) (Timberlane I) (citation omitted), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (Timberlane II).
16. Kingman Brewster is generally credited with coining the phrase "jurisdictional rule of reason" in his ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958). For background, see Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251 (1995).
17. Kingman Brewster is generally credited with coining the phrase "jurisdictional rule of reason" in his ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958). For background, see Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251 (1995).
18. 549 F.2d at 614. It is not entirely clear whether the balancing test is to determine whether jurisdiction exists, or to assist the court in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction after it is found to exist.
19. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981).
20. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Timberlane factors "are not useful in resolving the controversy"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (failure to consider Timberlane test did not constitute an abuse of discretion).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3).
23. The legislative history of the FTAIA indicates that Congress intended "reasonably foreseeable" to be an objective practical standard: "The test is whether the effects would have been evident to a reasonable person making practical business judgments, not whether actual knowledge or intent can be shown." H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (1982).
24. "[T]he bill is intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special international characteristics of transactions. If a court determines that the requirements for the subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of comity . . . or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transaction." Id. at 10.
25. The Restatement notes that "all relevant factors" may be considered, but specifically lists eight factors relevant to a jurisdictional analysis: (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state might have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. See also id. § 415.
26. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
27. 723 F. Supp. at 468, 470-71.
28. Id. at 484-85.
29. Id. at 484.
30. Id. at 486.
31. Under the tripartite Timberlane II inquiry, a court examines "(1) the effect or intended effect on the foreign commerce of the United States; (2) the type and magnitude of the alleged illegal behavior; and (3) the appropriateness of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considerations of international comity and fairness." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
32. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 490.
33. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
34. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 779 n.9.
35. Id. at 797 n.24.
36. Id. at 797.
37. Id. at 795 n.21.
38. Id. at 796.
39. Id. at 798 (citing H.R. REP. 97-686 at 13 (1982)).
40. Id. at 798.
41. Id. at 798-99.
42. Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 27-29.
43. See supra note 19.
44. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 821.
46. Id. at 820.
47. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
48. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
49. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
50. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
51. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
52. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
53. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
54. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
55. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
56. Id. For analyses of the Supreme Court's decision, see Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1996); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); P.M. Roth, Jurisdiction, British Public Policy and the U.S. Supreme Court, 110 L.Q. REV. 194 (1994); Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetrious, "But that was in Another Country". . . . The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417 (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity, ANTITRUST REP. 3 (Oct. 1993); Donald I. Baker, Insurance, Internationalism and Irony, the U.S. Supreme Court Speaks Ambiguously in Hartford Fire Insurance, 10 INT'L INS. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 361-68 (1994);
57. 1 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 148 (Supp. 1993).
58. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 51 (1995).
59. Metro Indus. Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 846 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996).
60. See, e.g., Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("true conflict" with French law which requires France Telecom not to supply competitor), vacated and remanded, 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998) (it was error for the district court to accept the mere allegations of the complaint as a basis for finding subject matter jurisdiction); Trugman-Nash Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Board, 954 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("actual and material conflict" between American antitrust law and New Zealand law that prevented price competition among cheese exporters).
61. See, e.g., Caribbean Broad. Sys. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,209 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Betterware PLC v. Tupperware Corp., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,158 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
62. For a discussion, see James S. McNeil, Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction: Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law and Jurisdiction, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 425 (1998).
63. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'g 944 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1996).
64. 944 F. Supp. 55, 66.
65. 109 F.3d at 9.
66. Id. at 8.
67. 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Cerestar Bioproducts BV, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,098 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (Case No. 4354) ($40,000 fine after guilty plea); United States v. Showa Denko Carbon Inc., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,098, (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Case No. 4327) ($29 million fine after guilty plea); United States v. UCAR International Inc., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,098 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Case No. 4338) ($110 million fine after guilty plea); United States v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,098 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (Case No. 4328) ($20 million corporate fine after guilty plea); United States v. Heeremac, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097, at 45,343 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1997) (Case Nos. 4323-4324) ($64 million fine on foreign corporate defendants after guilty pleas); United States v. Akzo Nobel Chems. BV, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097, Case Nos. 4305-4307 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ($10 million in corporate fines after guilty pleas); United States v. Clement Izzi, [Transfer Binder, U.S. Antitrust Cases 1988-1996] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,094, Cases Nos. 4070, 4071, 4072, 4073 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ($8.824 million corporate fines after guilty plea); United States v. Haarmann & Reimer Co., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097, Case No. 4267 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (corporate fine of $50 million after guilty plea); United States v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097, Cases Nos. 4277-4278 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ($25 million corporate fines). For background, see Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Address to ABA National Institute on White Collar Crime: Are the Recent Titantic Fines in Antitrust Cases Just the Tip of the Iceberg? (Mar. 6, 1998); Joseph P. Griffin & Donald C. Klawiter, U.S. Court of Appeals Endorses Criminal Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Price Fixing Outside the United States, 5 METROP. CORP. COUNSEL 25J (1997).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 18a; 16 C.F.R. §§ 801.1(a), 802.50, 802.51, 802.52 (1995). See generally STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT (2d ed. 1988).
72. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,107. For an analysis of the Guidelines, see JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE AGENCIES' GUIDELINES, 53-2nd CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1997); Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). For the 1988 Guidelines, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,109. The 1988 Guidelines were analyzed in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, 53 CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1989).
73. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,107. For an analysis of the Guidelines, see JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE AGENCIES' GUIDELINES, 53-2nd CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1997); Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). For the 1988 Guidelines, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,109. The 1988 Guidelines were analyzed in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, 53 CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1989).
74. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,107. For an analysis of the Guidelines, see JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE AGENCIES' GUIDELINES, 53-2nd CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1997); Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). For the 1988 Guidelines, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,109. The 1988 Guidelines were analyzed in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, 53 CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1989).
75. See, e.g., United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree) (merger of two foreign firms permitted on the condition that certain U.S. assets be divested to eliminate anticompetitive effects in the United States).
76. See, e.g., Roche Holding Ltd., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,393 (FTC May 22, 1998); In re Degussa, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,406 (FTC June 10, 1998) (settlement requires FTC notification of acquisitions by Degussa, a German company, in Canada not reportable under Hart-Scott because of "North American" market); Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,182 (FTC Mar. 24, 1997) (merger of two Swiss firms); Glaxo plc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,784 (FTC June 14, 1995) (jurisdiction existed over acquisition of one British firm by another because both had substantial sales in the United States); Oerlikon-Buhrle Holding A.G., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,697 (FTC Feb. 1, 1995) (consent order) (challenge to Swiss firm's acquisition of German firm settled by divestiture of product line); Hanson plc, [Transfer Binder, FTC Complaints and Orders 1987-1993] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,107 (FTC Mar. 9, 1992) (consent agreement) (challenge of tender offer by an English company for the shares of another English firm settled by divestment of some of their California assets); Institut Merieux, S.A., [Transfer Binder, FTC Complaints and Orders 1987-1993] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,779 (FTC Aug. 6, 1990) (consent agreement) (acquisition of Canadian firm by French competitor permitted after Canadian firm agreed to lease business in Toronto for at least 25 years to an FTC-approved acquiror); United States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ (65,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (consent decree) (acquisition by U.S. stapler company of British stapler company with a U.S. subsidiary permitted, but U.S. company ordered to divest one of its two lines); United States v. Merck & Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 63,682 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (consent decree) (acquisition permitted on condition that U.S. acquired company divest a Canadian subsidiary); United States v. Gillette Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,691 (D. Mass. 1975) (consent decree) (acquisition permitted on condition that new company be created with the German company to sell in the United States).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bell Resources, Ltd., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (consent decree) ($450,000 penalty for failure to notify); United States v. Lonrho, PLC, [Transfer Binder, U.S. Antitrust Cases 1988-1996] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,088 (Case 3535) (D.D.C. July 8, 1988); 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,232 (D.D.C. 1988) (consent decree) ($122,000 civil penalty for failure to notify); United States v. Tengelmann, WHG, [Transfer Binder, U.S. Antitrust Cases 1988-1996] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,089 (Case 3624) (D.D.C. June 7, 1989); 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,623 (D.D.C. 1989) (consent decree) ($3 million civil penalty for failure to notify); United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,976 (D.D.C. 1990) (consent decree) ($275,000 civil penalty for failure to file important document with premerger notification form); United States v. Beazer, PLC, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,923 (D.D.C. 1992) (consent decree) ($760,000 civil penalty for failure to notify).
78. United States v. Anova Holding AG, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,383 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 1993) (consent decree) ($414,650 civil penalty for failure to notify).
79. Mahle GmbH & Metal Leve SA, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,291 (D.D.C. 1997) ($5.6 million civil penalty).
80. 1988 International Guidelines, supra note 56, at 20,611; see, e.g., United States v. Standard Tallow Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67,913 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (consent decree prohibiting suppliers of tallow from fixing prices for sales financed by U.S. Government).
81. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 56, at § 3.13.
82. Japanese Court Freezes Assets of Firm that Didn't Settle U.S. Bid Rigging Claim, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1468, at 853 (May 31, 1990). Another alleged member of the cartel settled for $34,000. See Japanese Construction Company Settles U.S. Accusations of Bid Rigging Cartel, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1475, at 95 (July 19, 1990). For background, see Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yakota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821 (1994).
83. Japanese Court Freezes Assets of Firm that Didn't Settle U.S. Bid Rigging Claim, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1468, at 853 (May 31, 1990). Another alleged member of the cartel settled for $34,000. See Japanese Construction Company Settles U.S. Accusations of Bid Rigging Cartel, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1475, at 95 (July 19, 1990). For background, see Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yakota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821 (1994).
84. Japanese Court Freezes Assets of Firm that Didn't Settle U.S. Bid Rigging Claim, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1468, at 853 (May 31, 1990). Another alleged member of the cartel settled for $34,000. See Japanese Construction Company Settles U.S. Accusations of Bid Rigging Cartel, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1475, at 95 (July 19, 1990). For background, see Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yakota, and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821 (1994).
85. Japanese Communications Contractors Settle U.S. Price Fixing Accusations, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1554, at 269 (Feb. 27, 1992); see also U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, U.S. Files Bid Rigging Complaint in Germany over Work on Military Bases (Nov. 9, 1993).
86. Japanese Communications Contractors Settle U.S. Price Fixing Accusations, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1554, at 269 (Feb. 27, 1992); see also U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, U.S. Files Bid Rigging Complaint in Germany over Work on Military Bases (Nov. 9, 1993).
87. Japanese Companies Settle U.S. Navy Bid Rigging Claims, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629, at 311 (Aug. 26, 1993).
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212. For background, see Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust Cooperation in NAFTA: The IAEAA, 4 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 169 (1996); John H. Chung, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1996); Laurie N. Freeman, U.S. Canadian Information-Sharing and the IAEAA, 84 GEO. L.J. 339 (1995).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212. For background, see Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust Cooperation in NAFTA: The IAEAA, 4 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 169 (1996); John H. Chung, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1996); Laurie N. Freeman, U.S. Canadian Information-Sharing and the IAEAA, 84 GEO. L.J. 339 (1995).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212. For background, see Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust Cooperation in NAFTA: The IAEAA, 4 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 169 (1996); John H. Chung, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1996); Laurie N. Freeman, U.S. Canadian Information-Sharing and the IAEAA, 84 GEO. L.J. 339 (1995).
91. United States Department of Justice, Press Release, International Enforcement to be Boosted by New Agreement with Australia (Apr. 17, 1997).
92. See supra note 56.
93. U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Closes Investigation into the Way AC Nielsen Co. Contracts its Services for Tracking Retail Sales (Dec. 3, 1996).
94. Article 85(1) provides in relevant part that: The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market . . . . Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (emphasis added).
95. Article 86 provides in relevant part that: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States." Id. (emphasis added). For specific differences between EU law on abuse of dominance and U.S. law on monopolization, see Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals, and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (1996);
96. Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community - Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981 (1986).
97. Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 248, 5 C.M.L.R. 357, 375 (1966); Coöperatieve Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek v. Commission, Case 61/80, 1981 E.C.R. 851, 867.
98. Völk v. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 302, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273, 282 (1969), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 8074; EC Commission, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 O.J. (C 231) 2, as amended, 1994 O.J. (C 368) 20 and 1997 O.J. (C 372) 13. For discussion, see 2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE ch. 7, D. 2 (2d ed. 1992).
99. The Commission, citing its 1964 Grosfillex decision, noted it "was one of the first antitrust authorities to have applied the internal effect theory to foreign companies." EUROPEAN COMM'N, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 35 (1981). The Commission was even more explicit in Aniline Dyes Cartel, stating that "[t]his decision is applicable to all the undertakings which took part in the concerted practices, whether they are established within or outside the Common Market. . . . The competition rules of the Treaty are, consequently, applicable to all restrictions of competition which produce within the Common Market effects set out in Article 85(1)." Aniline Dyes Cartel, 1969 O.J. (L 195) 11, [1969] C.M.L.R. D23, D33. See also EUROPEAN COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 60 (1984) (Commission's decisions in Eastern Aluminum and Wood Pulp "reflect the policy, which is essential in view of the realities of modern world trade, that all undertakings doing business within the EEC must respect the rules of competition in the same way, regardless of their place of establishment ('effects doctrine')"). ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs), Case 48/69, 172 E.C.R. 619, 626, C.M.L.R. 557 (1972) (Commission argues that jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of economic effects that claimant's conduct produced in the Common Market). See generally P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 245 (1992); Liad Whatstein, Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law - Comments and Reflections, 26 ISRAEL L. REV. 195 (1992).
100. The Commission, citing its 1964 Grosfillex decision, noted it "was one of the first antitrust authorities to have applied the internal effect theory to foreign companies." EUROPEAN COMM'N, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 35 (1981). The Commission was even more explicit in Aniline Dyes Cartel, stating that "[t]his decision is applicable to all the undertakings which took part in the concerted practices, whether they are established within or outside the Common Market. . . . The competition rules of the Treaty are, consequently, applicable to all restrictions of competition which produce within the Common Market effects set out in Article 85(1)." Aniline Dyes Cartel, 1969 O.J. (L 195) 11, [1969] C.M.L.R. D23, D33. See also EUROPEAN COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 60 (1984) (Commission's decisions in Eastern Aluminum and Wood Pulp "reflect the policy, which is essential in view of the realities of modern world trade, that all undertakings doing business within the EEC must respect the rules of competition in the same way, regardless of their place of establishment ('effects doctrine')"). ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs), Case 48/69, 172 E.C.R. 619, 626, C.M.L.R. 557 (1972) (Commission argues that jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of economic effects that claimant's conduct produced in the Common Market). See generally P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 245 (1992); Liad Whatstein, Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law - Comments and Reflections, 26 ISRAEL L. REV. 195 (1992).
101. The Commission, citing its 1964 Grosfillex decision, noted it "was one of the first antitrust authorities to have applied the internal effect theory to foreign companies." EUROPEAN COMM'N, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 35 (1981). The Commission was even more explicit in Aniline Dyes Cartel, stating that "[t]his decision is applicable to all the undertakings which took part in the concerted practices, whether they are established within or outside the Common Market. . . . The competition rules of the Treaty are, consequently, applicable to all restrictions of competition which produce within the Common Market effects set out in Article 85(1)." Aniline Dyes Cartel, 1969 O.J. (L 195) 11, [1969] C.M.L.R. D23, D33. See also EUROPEAN COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 60 (1984) (Commission's decisions in Eastern Aluminum and Wood Pulp "reflect the policy, which is essential in view of the realities of modern world trade, that all undertakings doing business within the EEC must respect the rules of competition in the same way, regardless of their place of establishment ('effects doctrine')"). ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs), Case 48/69, 172 E.C.R. 619, 626, C.M.L.R. 557 (1972) (Commission argues that jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of economic effects that claimant's conduct produced in the Common Market). See generally P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 245 (1992); Liad Whatstein, Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law - Comments and Reflections, 26 ISRAEL L. REV. 195 (1992).
102. The Commission, citing its 1964 Grosfillex decision, noted it "was one of the first antitrust authorities to have applied the internal effect theory to foreign companies." EUROPEAN COMM'N, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 35 (1981). The Commission was even more explicit in Aniline Dyes Cartel, stating that "[t]his decision is applicable to all the undertakings which took part in the concerted practices, whether they are established within or outside the Common Market. . . . The competition rules of the Treaty are, consequently, applicable to all restrictions of competition which produce within the Common Market effects set out in Article 85(1)." Aniline Dyes Cartel, 1969 O.J. (L 195) 11, [1969] C.M.L.R. D23, D33. See also EUROPEAN COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 60 (1984) (Commission's decisions in Eastern Aluminum and Wood Pulp "reflect the policy, which is essential in view of the realities of modern world trade, that all undertakings doing business within the EEC must respect the rules of competition in the same way, regardless of their place of establishment ('effects doctrine')"). ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs), Case 48/69, 172 E.C.R. 619, 626, C.M.L.R. 557 (1972) (Commission argues that jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of economic effects that claimant's conduct produced in the Common Market). See generally P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 245 (1992); Liad Whatstein, Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law - Comments and Reflections, 26 ISRAEL L. REV. 195 (1992).
103. Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. E.C. Commission, Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 14,491 (1988) (Wood Pulp). 77 Id., 4 C.M.L.R. 901, 941 ¶¶ 17-18 (1988). In 1990 the Commission held that another Webb-Pomerene association was not entitled to an individual exemption under art. 85(3). The association did not contend that it was immune from Art. 85. Ansac, 1991 O.J. (L 152) 54.
104. Re The PVC Cartel: The Community v. Atochem SA, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 1, 14, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 345, 370; see also Re The Cartonboard Cartel: The Community v. Buchmann GmbH, 1994 O.J. (L 243) 1, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 547.
105. Re The LdPE Cartel: The Community v. Atochem SA, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 21, 35; [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 382, 409-10.
106. Bulk Oil v. Sun Int'l Ltd., Case 174/84, 1986 E.C.R. 559, 589, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 732; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 14,288; Distillers Co. Ltd., 1978 O.J. (L 50) 16, [Transfer Binder, New Developments Jan. 1976-Feb. 1978] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 10,011.
107. Javico Int'l v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, Case C-306/96, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 172, 192 (Judgment Apr. 28, 1998).
108. Revised Recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. No. C (95) 130 (Final) (July 27, 1995), reprinted in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE AGENCIES' 1995 GUIDELINES, 53-2nd CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1997) at Worksheet 16. For the 1986 Recommendation, see 25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986). Cf. OECD, MINIMIZING CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS: APPROACHES OF "MODERATION AND RESTRAINT" 7 (1987).
109. Revised Recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. No. C (95) 130 (Final) (July 27, 1995), reprinted in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE AGENCIES' 1995 GUIDELINES, 53-2nd CORP. PRACTICE SERIES (BNA 1997) at Worksheet 16. For the 1986 Recommendation, see 25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986). Cf. OECD, MINIMIZING CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS: APPROACHES OF "MODERATION AND RESTRAINT" 7 (1987).
110. Aluminum Imports from Eastern Europe, 1985 O.J. (L 92) 1 at 14.7, [Transfer Binder, New Developments Jan. 1982-June 1995] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 10,658.
111. Critics See Impropriety in European Lobbying by Antitrust Chief, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1982, at A1.
112. IBM v. Commission, Cases 60/81R & 190/81R, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, 2655, [1981] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 870.
113. Wood Pulp, supra note 76, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at ¶ 22.
114. SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 16 (1991).
115. [T]he Commission as a collegiate body does not have to consult another department or branch of government to ascertain the likely impact of a proposed course of action on the Community's external relations. A Commission decision on competition policy reflects the totality of the Commission's views and policies. My colleague in charge of external relations sits near me in Commission when decisions are taken and his department talks to mine. Id. at 16-17.
116. In the Franco-Japanese Ballbearings agreement, the Commission similarly held that measures resulting from agreements or concerted practices between Japanese firms that were merely authorized by the Japanese authorities under Japanese law (as opposed to measures that were imposed on Japanese firms by the Japanese authorities or measures taken in pursuance of trade agreements between the Community and Japan) could be subject to Article 85 because the firms would be free to enter into the agreements or engage in the concerted practices. Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement, Nov. 29, 1974, 1974 O.J. (L 343) 19, 23 (1974), [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D8, D14-D15, [1973-75 Transfer Binder] Common. Mkt. Rep (CCH) ¶ 9697; see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 20 (1974).
117. Article 9 of Regulation 4056/86 on Maritime Transport provides that, if the application of the Regulation to restrictive practices conflicts with "provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action" of third countries, the Commission "shall, at the earliest opportunity," enter into consultations and negotiations aimed at reconciling the conflicting interests. 1986 O.J. (L 378) 4, 8-9, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 2821K. For background, see Helmut W.R. Kreis, EC Competition Law and Maritime Transport, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 481 (1992).
118. Council Reg. 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, as amended, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, and 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1. For background, see Symposium, International Mergers and Joint Ventures, 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991); H. Colin Overbury, Politics or Policy? The Demystification of EC Merger Control, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 557 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993); DAMIEN NEVEN ET AL., MERGER IN DAYLIGHT: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS or EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL (1993).
119. Council Reg. 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, as amended, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, and 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1. For background, see Symposium, International Mergers and Joint Ventures, 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991); H. Colin Overbury, Politics or Policy? The Demystification of EC Merger Control, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 557 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993); DAMIEN NEVEN ET AL., MERGER IN DAYLIGHT: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS or EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL (1993).
120. Council Reg. 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, as amended, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, and 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1. For background, see Symposium, International Mergers and Joint Ventures, 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991); H. Colin Overbury, Politics or Policy? The Demystification of EC Merger Control, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 557 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993); DAMIEN NEVEN ET AL., MERGER IN DAYLIGHT: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS or EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL (1993).
121. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) Arts. 65 and 66 (Apr. 18, 1951). For concentrations in the EU steel industry that fell both under the EU Regulation and the ECSC, see Usinor Sacilor/ASD, Case IV/M073 (Apr. 29, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J.(C 193) 34, and Péchiney/Usinor-Sacilor, Case IV/M097 (June 24, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J. (C 175) 18.
122. Gencor/Lonrho, Case IV/M619 (Apr. 24, 1996), cited in 1997 O.J. (L 11) 130, 4 C.M.L.R. 742.
123. Shortly thereafter, in December 1996, the Commission initiated a detailed investigation of the shareholding of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited in Lonrho plc., which was closed after Anglo-American agreed to reduce its shareholding in Lonrho. Anglo American Corp./Lonrho, Case IV/M754, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 983.
124. For background, see European Union, Press Release, The European Commission Takes a Favorable Decision in Principle on the Merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas after Concessions Offered by Boeing (July 23, 1997), Case IV/M877, [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 270.
125. See EU Changes Course, Will Not Ground Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Consolidation, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1821, at 115 (July 24, 1997).
126. Commission Report to the Council on the Application of the Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMM'N, TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 317, 323 (1998); see also C. JOHN COOK & C.S KERSE, EU MERGER CONTROL 9-11 (2d ed. 1996); Andre R. Fiebig, International Law Limits on the Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger Control Regulation and Suggestions for Reform, 1998 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 323; Jennifer Antognini-O'Neill, Conflicts in International Merger Enforcement: The Proposed De Havilland Merger, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1993).
127. Commission Report to the Council on the Application of the Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMM'N, TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 317, 323 (1998); see also C. JOHN COOK & C.S KERSE, EU MERGER CONTROL 9-11 (2d ed. 1996); Andre R. Fiebig, International Law Limits on the Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger Control Regulation and Suggestions for Reform, 1998 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 323; Jennifer Antognini-O'Neill, Conflicts in International Merger Enforcement: The Proposed De Havilland Merger, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1993).
128. Commission Report to the Council on the Application of the Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMM'N, TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 317, 323 (1998); see also C. JOHN COOK & C.S KERSE, EU MERGER CONTROL 9-11 (2d ed. 1996); Andre R. Fiebig, International Law Limits on the Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger Control Regulation and Suggestions for Reform, 1998 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 323; Jennifer Antognini-O'Neill, Conflicts in International Merger Enforcement: The Proposed De Havilland Merger, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1993).
129. Commission Report to the Council on the Application of the Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMM'N, TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 317, 323 (1998); see also C. JOHN COOK & C.S KERSE, EU MERGER CONTROL 9-11 (2d ed. 1996); Andre R. Fiebig, International Law Limits on the Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger Control Regulation and Suggestions for Reform, 1998 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 323; Jennifer Antognini-O'Neill, Conflicts in International Merger Enforcement: The Proposed De Havilland Merger, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 87 (1993).
130. Karel van Miert, Analysis and Guidelines on Competitive Policy, Address at Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs, London (May 11, 1993); see also Karel van Miert, Global Forces Affecting Competition Policy in a Post-Recessionary Environment, 17 WORLD COMPETITION 137 (1993).
131. Sir Leon Brittan, Competition Policy in the European Community: The New Merger Regulation, Address Before the EC Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 26, 1990); see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 17 (1991).
132. Reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991). 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991), and 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,504. For background see John J. Parisi, The E.C.-U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws: Another Step Towards Fostering International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement, Address Before the European Trade Law Ass'n (Dec. 12, 1991); Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Antitrust Field and in Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 571 (1993); Joseph P. Griffin, EC/U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1051 (1993); William K. Walker, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Effect of the European Community - United States Antitrust Agreement, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583 (1992). In August 1994 the European Court of Justice held that the Commission did not have the authority to enter into the 1991 Agreement. France v. Commission, Case C-327/91 (Aug. 9, 1994); [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 517. The Council subsequently authorized the Commission to enter into a virtually unchanged Agreement, which was entered into in April 1995. 1995 O.J. (L 95) 45, corrected, 1995 O.J. (L 131) 38.
133. Reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991). 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991), and 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,504. For background see John J. Parisi, The E.C.-U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws: Another Step Towards Fostering International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement, Address Before the European Trade Law Ass'n (Dec. 12, 1991); Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Antitrust Field and in Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 571 (1993); Joseph P. Griffin, EC/U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1051 (1993); William K. Walker, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Effect of the European Community - United States Antitrust Agreement, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583 (1992). In August 1994 the European Court of Justice held that the Commission did not have the authority to enter into the 1991 Agreement. France v. Commission, Case C-327/91 (Aug. 9, 1994); [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 517. The Council subsequently authorized the Commission to enter into a virtually unchanged Agreement, which was entered into in April 1995. 1995 O.J. (L 95) 45, corrected, 1995 O.J. (L 131) 38.
134. Reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991). 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991), and 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,504. For background see John J. Parisi, The E.C.-U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws: Another Step Towards Fostering International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement, Address Before the European Trade Law Ass'n (Dec. 12, 1991); Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Antitrust Field and in Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 571 (1993); Joseph P. Griffin, EC/U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1051 (1993); William K. Walker, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Effect of the European Community - United States Antitrust Agreement, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583 (1992). In August 1994 the European Court of Justice held that the Commission did not have the authority to enter into the 1991 Agreement. France v. Commission, Case C-327/91 (Aug. 9, 1994); [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 517. The Council subsequently authorized the Commission to enter into a virtually unchanged Agreement, which was entered into in April 1995. 1995 O.J. (L 95) 45, corrected, 1995 O.J. (L 131) 38.
135. See supra note 82.
136. Australia-United States: Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982). See generally Stephen D. Ramsey, Note, The United States-Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: A Step in the Right Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127 (1983).
137. Canada-United States: Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984). See generally Gary E. Dyal, Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1065 (1985). For the first joint criminal antitrust prosecutions by Canadian and U.S. authorities, see United States v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers Inc., [Transfer Binder, U.S. Antitrust Cases 1988-1996] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,094 (Case 4086) (D. Mass. 1994), where the defendants agreed to plead guilty and pay criminal fines. A new Canada/U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws was entered on August 3, 1995. See Anne K. Bingaman & Joel I. Klein, Cooperating on Antitrust, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Jan. 1, 1996, at 27.
138. Canada-United States: Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984). See generally Gary E. Dyal, Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1065 (1985). For the first joint criminal antitrust prosecutions by Canadian and U.S. authorities, see United States v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers Inc., [Transfer Binder, U.S. Antitrust Cases 1988-1996] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,094 (Case 4086) (D. Mass. 1994), where the defendants agreed to plead guilty and pay criminal fines. A new Canada/U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws was entered on August 3, 1995. See Anne K. Bingaman & Joel I. Klein, Cooperating on Antitrust, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Jan. 1, 1996, at 27.
139. Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956. The French and U.S. Governments reportedly are negotiating a cooperation agreement. France and U.S. Approach Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation and Assistance, 65 Antitrust & Trade. Rep. (BNA) No. 1643, at 741 (Dec. 9, 1993).
140. See Commission Report to the Council, supra note 97, at 317, 321; John J. Parisi, Address, The EC-U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competitive Laws: An Update on What Has Been Accomplished (June 10, 1993).
141. See Council Reg. No. 4064/89, supra note 91; see, e.g., Mitsubishi/Union Carbide, Case No. IV/M024 (Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J. (C 5) 7; Matsushita/MCA, Case No. IV/M037 (Jan. 10, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J. (C 10) 15; AT&T/NCR, Case No. IV/M050 (Jan. 18, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J. (C 16); Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser, Case No. IV/M121, cited in 1991 O.J. (C 86) 15; Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, Case No. IV/M068, cited in 1991 O.J. (L 290) 35; Kyowa Bank/Saitama Bank, Case No. IV/M069 (Mar. 7, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J. (C 66) 13; Delta Air Lines/Pan Am, Case No. IV/M130 (Sept. 13, 1991), cited in 1991 O.J. (C 289) 14; Bankamerica/Security Pacific, Case No. IV/M137 (Oct. 22, 1991), cited in O.J. C 289/14 (1991); PepsiCo/General Mills, Case No. IV/M232 (Aug. 5, 1992), cited in 1992 O.J. (C 228) 6; Mondi/Frantschach, Case No. IV/M210 (May 12, 1992), cited in 1992 O.J. (C 124) 19; Ericsson/Ascom, Case No. IV/M236 (July 8, 1992), cited in 1992 O.J. (C 201) 26; Del Monte/Royal Foods, Case No. IV/M277 (Dec. 9, 1992), cited in 1992 O.J. (C 331) 13; Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, Case No. IV/M292 (Mar. 12, 1993), cited in 1993 O.J. (C 83) 5; Ford/Hertz, Case No. IV/M397 (Mar. 7, 1994), cited in 1994 O.J. (C 121); American Home Products/American Cyanamid, Case No. IV/M500 (Sept. 19, 1994), cited in 1994 O.J. (C 278) 3; Ericsson/Raychem, Case No. IV/M519 (Nov. 22, 1994), cited in 1994 O.J. (C 350) 3; Kohlberg Kravis Roberts/Borden, Case No. IV/M517 (Nov. 24, 1994), cited in 1994 O.J. (C 364) 3; Lockheed Martin/Loral Corp., Case No. IV/M697 (Mar. 27, 1996), cited in 1996 O.J. (C 314) 9; Dow/DuPont, Case No. IV/M663 (Feb. 21, 1996), cited in 1996 O.J. (C 104) 4; Chase Manhattan/Chemical Bank, Case No. IV/M642 (Oct. 26, 1995), cited in 1996 O.J. (C 33); Kimberly-Clark/Scott, Case No. IV/M623 (Jan. 16, 1996), cited in 1996 O.J. (L 183) 1; Mitsubishi Bank/Bank of Tokyo, Case No. IV/M596 (July 17, 1995), cited in 1995 O.J. (C 198) 5; Seagram/MCA, Case No. IV/M589 (May 29, 1995), cited in 1995 O.J. (C 149) 11; Ingersoll-Rand/Clark Equipment, Case No. IV/M588 (May 15, 1995), cited in 1995 O.J. (C 154) 4; Viacom/Bear Stearns, Case No. IV/M717 (Mar. 25, 1996), cited in 1996 O.J. (C 132) 3; ESPN/Star, Case No. IV/M 826 (Nov. 11, 1996), cited in 1996 O.J. (C 368) 8; Gillette/Duracell, Case IV/M 836 (Nov. 8, 1996), cited in 1996 O.J. (C 364) 4; Compaq/Tandem, Case IV/M963 (Aug. 11, 1997), cited in 1997 O.J. (C 283) 13; Compaq/Digital, Case No. IV/M 1120 (Mar. 23, 1998), cited in 1998 O.J. (C 128) 21; Dana/Echlin, Case No. IV/M 1207 (Jul. 6, 1998), cited in 1998 O.J. (C 267) 18; Continental/ ITT, Case No. IV/M 1292 (Sept. 20, 1998), cited in 1998 O.J. (C 385) 4.
142. See U.S., EU Commission Sign Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1407 (Sept. 25, 1991).
143. Charles S. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, The U.S.-E.C. Antitrust Agreement and International Cooperation in Merger Control, Address, Brussels (Oct. 13, 1992); U.S.-EC Notices Increase Since Accord; Confidentiality Concerns Are Downplayed, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1554, at 267 (Feb. 27, 1992).
144. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case No. IV/M877 (July 7, 1997), [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 270.
145. United States v. Gillette Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,142 (D.D.C.) (consent decree); Warner-Lambert/Gillette, 1993 O.J. (L 116) 21.
146. DuPont/ICI, Case No. IV/M214 (Sept. 30, 1992), cited in 1993 O.J. (C 7) 13, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. M41; Re Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 23,417, 23,507 (FTC 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 37,944 (July 14, 1993) (proposed consent agreement).
147. Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision of Apr. 24, 1996, [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 741, amending Decision of June 8, 1994, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 160; Montedison SpA, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,749 (FTC 1995).
148. British Telecom/MCI II, Case No. IV/M856 (May 14, 1997), [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 17; United States v. Concert plc, 1997-2 Trade Cas.(CCH) ¶ 71,935 (D.D.C. 1997) (consent decree).
149. Agreement, supra note 100, art. V(2). A similar "positive comity" provision is art. V(2) of the 1995 Canada/U.S. Agreement. See supra note 103.
150. Agreement, supra note 100, art. V(4).
151. See Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Address, The Role of Competition Policy in a Global Economy, Brussels (June 22, 1994); EUROPEAN COMM'N, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY ¶ 64 (1992); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). The Member States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have agreed to avoid or minimize conflicts with foreign laws, policies, or interests by following an approach of "moderation and restraint, respecting and accommodating the interests of other Member Countries." OECD, MINIMIZING CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS, supra note 82.
152. See Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws (1998); Department of Justice Press Release, U.S. and European Communities Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement (June 4, 1998); U.S. and European Union Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement, 74 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1864, at 587 (June 11, 1998).
153. Claude Rakovsky, Address, The Commission's Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Competition, Brussels (Sept. 18, 1997).
154. Department of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Asks European Communities to Investigate Possible Anticompetitive Conduct Affecting U.S. Airlines' Computer Reservation Systems (Apr. 28, 1997).
155. At the time of this writing, no result of the Commission's investigation has been announced.
156. James R. Atwood, Positive Comity - Is It a Positive Step?, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 79, 87 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993).
157. Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI(1).
158. Id., art. VI(3). The six factors are: (a) the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities involved of conduct within the enforcing Party's territory as compared to conduct within the other Party's territory; (b) the presence or absence of a purpose on the part of those engaged in the anticompetitive activities to affect consumers, suppliers, or competitors within the enforcing Party's territory; (c) the relative significance of the effects of the anticompetitive activities on the enforcing Party's interests as compared to the effects on the other Party's interests; (d) the existence or absence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the enforcement activities; (e) the degree of conflict or consistency between the enforcement activities and the other Party's laws or articulated economic policies; and (f) the extent to which enforcement activities of the other Party with respect to the same persons, including judgments or undertakings resulting from such activities, may be affected. The factors are very similar to the factors utilized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane I, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F. 2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), and Timberlane II, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
159. See 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 56, at § 3.2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19.
160. See Department of Justice, Press Release, Microsoft Agrees to End Unfair Monopolistic Practices (July 16, 1994); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995); European Commission, Press Release, Following an Undertaking by Microsoft to Change its Licensing Practices, the European Commission Suspends its Action for Breach of the Competition Rules (July 17, 1994), [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 143.
161. Alexander Schaub, International Cooperation in Antitrust Matters: Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/MDD Proceedings, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Feb. 1998, at 4.
162. Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, The Justice Department's Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Address Before the International Trade Section and Antitrust Committee of the D.C. Bar (Nov. 29, 1988) The 1995 International Guidelines express a similar view in a footnote. International Guide lines, supra note 56, § 3.1 at n.51.
163. Sir Leon Brittan, Address, Jurisdictional Issues in EEC Competition Law (Feb. 8, 1990) (in Wood Pulp, "the Court did not endorse the effects doctrine."); see also Walter Van Gerven, EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment, 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 451, 466-67 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990) ("[I]t is clear that the Court has . . . consciously refrained - in the Wood Pulp case, as well as, earlier, in the Dyestuffs cases -from endorsing the effects doctrine."); Paul Torremans, Extraterritorial Application of EU and U.S. Competition Law, 21 EUR. L. REV. 280, 285 (1996).
164. Sir Leon Brittan, Address, Jurisdictional Issues in EEC Competition Law (Feb. 8, 1990) (in Wood Pulp, "the Court did not endorse the effects doctrine."); see also Walter Van Gerven, EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment, 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 451, 466-67 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990) ("[I]t is clear that the Court has . . . consciously refrained - in the Wood Pulp case, as well as, earlier, in the Dyestuffs cases - from endorsing the effects doctrine."); Paul Torremans, Extraterritorial Application of EU and U.S. Competition Law, 21 EUR. L. REV. 280, 285 (1996).
165. See, e.g., Jose Perez Santos, The Territorial Scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 571, 575-77 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Theofanis Christoforou & David B. Rockwell, European Economic Community Law: The Territorial Scope of Application of EEC Antitrust Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 195, 204 (1989).
166. See, e.g., Jose Perez Santos, The Territorial Scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 571, 575-77 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990); Theofanis Christoforou & David B. Rockwell, European Economic Community Law: The Territorial Scope of Application of EEC Antitrust Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 195, 204 (1989).
167. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1992).
168. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 796-97 n.23.
169. Id. at 797.
170. See supra text accompanying note 33.
171. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 56, § 3.2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 20,612 n.167.
175. Rule, supra note 127.
176. In United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), defendants, citing a diplomatic note from the Finnish Embassy, argued the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction because of principles of international comity. The trial court rejected the argument noting: [W]hatever the relevance of comity concerns in antitrust disputes between private parties, see Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1984), they are not a factor here. The State Department has considered Finland's position, and the United States has decided to go ahead with the case. It is not the Court's role to second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity concerns under these circumstances. The ABA Antitrust Section's Special Committee on International Antitrust noted: [I]n Baker Hughes, however, U.S. competition was centrally implicated and the only "comity" concern appeared to be that Finland, whose national was sued, objected to the suit. If the only concern was possible interference with U.S. relations with Finland, Judge Gesell's decision not to second guess the government was unobjectionable. Report of Special Committee 158 n.38 (1991). The author of this article was a member of the ABA Special Committee.
177. See generally Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of executive action, its intent must be clearly expressed). The principle of separation of powers assumes a role for each of the three branches of government, not, as the Justice Department states, only for the executive. Congress passes laws affecting foreign commerce. The executive administers those laws and conducts U.S. foreign policy consistently with those laws. The courts construe that legislation and determine the legality of executive action consistent with that legislation, with the Constitution, and with standards that the courts define for themselves. International law is part of the law of the United States, except to the extent that Congress has decreed otherwise. Congress has not, in the antitrust law, abrogated international law. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations if any other possible construction remains. . . .").
178. See Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F. 2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
179. Comments of the ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and of International Law and Practice on the 1994 Draft International Guidelines at 25-28 (Dec. 1994); Report to the House of Delegates on Draft 1988 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 658-59 (1988); 23 INT'L LAW. 325, 332-33 (1989) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. The recommendations contained in that report were adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates as Report No. 301 on August 10, 1988.
180. Comments of the ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and of International Law and Practice on the 1994 Draft International Guidelines at 25-28 (Dec. 1994); Report to the House of Delegates on Draft 1988 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 658-59 (1988); 23 INT'L LAW. 325, 332-33 (1989) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. The recommendations contained in that report were adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates as Report No. 301 on August 10, 1988.
181. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 1, Reporters' Note 4, at 11 (1987): The special place of the judiciary in United States jurisprudence is as significant for the law of foreign relations as for other United States law. Judicial review gives the courts power to invalidate actions of the political branches in foreign relations - statutes, international agreements, and executive actions - as violations of the Constitution. See also Louis Henkin, The Courts in Foreign Affairs, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION ch. VIII (1972).
182. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
183. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
184. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
185. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611.
186. See, e.g., Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). After the court entered a default judgment the State Department suggested the judgment be vacated in the interest of U.S. foreign relations. See 23 I.L.M. 402 (1984). Subsequently, the judgment was set aside and the action was dismissed. 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986).
187. Task Force Report, supra note 142, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. at 663, 23 INT'L LAW. at 336-37.
188. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); cf. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frères Société Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947). See generally 6 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-20 (1968).
189. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
190. 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990). The decision itself reinforces the premise of judicial independence. The court disagreed with the Legal Adviser's suggestion that the act of state doctrine did not apply to the award of the contract in question, on the ground that the award might not have represented a sufficiently formal expression of Nigeria's public policy. It agreed, however, that adjudication of the case would not be embarrassing to the political branch's conduct of foreign relations, placing considerable weight on the executive's opinion on the latter point. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the "Bernstein letter" issue in affirming the court of appeals' judgment. 493 U.S. at 405.
191. 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983).
192. Lowenfeld, supra note 42, at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
193. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 796.
194. Id. at 799.
195. 509 U.S. at 820 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,600, at 77,414, 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For a discussion of some of these cases in the context of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense, see Don Wallace, Jr. & Joseph P. Griffin, The Restatement and Foreign Sovereign Compulsion: A Plea for Due Process, 23 INT'L LAW. 593, 596-99 (1989).
197. See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1987) ("The concept of international comity requires in this context a more particularized analysis of the respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation"); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 218 n.16 (1988) ("we are not unaware of the international comity questions implicated by the Government's attempts to overcome protections afforded by the laws of another nation").
198. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
199. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962) ("issue for the jury's resolution" remained because of the failure of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense); Société Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211-12 (1958) (noncompliance with production order excused because compliance would violate foreign law); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 n.14 (D. Del. 1970) (foreign sovereign compulsion immunizes an otherwise illegal boycott).
200. See 749 F. 2d at 1384.
201. W.M. Knighton, Nationality and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: U.S. Law Abroad, Address Before the International Law Institute of the Georgetown University Law Center, (Aug. 13, 1981); see, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Raymond J. Pikna, The Uranium Cartel Saga - Yellowcake and Act of State: What Will Be Their Eventual Fate?, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 591 (1980); Philip Sutherland, Comment Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation: Extraterritorial jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters, 5 MONASH U. L. REV. 76 (1978).
202. W.M. Knighton, Nationality and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: U.S. Law Abroad, Address Before the International Law Institute of the Georgetown University Law Center, (Aug. 13, 1981); see, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Raymond J. Pikna, The Uranium Cartel Saga - Yellowcake and Act of State: What Will Be Their Eventual Fate?, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 591 (1980); Philip Sutherland, Comment Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation: Extraterritorial jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters, 5 MONASH U. L. REV. 76 (1978).
203. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco SA, 871 F.2d 252, modified, 890 F. 2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) (injunction granted to private party was upheld after U.K. and U.S. Governments had cleared the transaction); see also F.A. Mann, The Extremism of American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 410 (1990).
204. See Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 597. The Ninth Circuit stated that the court's cognizance of the possible international implications of its actions "is especially required in private suits . . . for in these cases there is no opportunity for the executive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact, nor any statement implicit in the filing of the suit that consideration has been outweighed." Id. at 613.
205. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522 (1987). For amicus briefs submitted by foreign governments, see 25 I.L.M. 1519 (1986) (France); id. at 1539 (Federal Republic of Germany); id. at 1549 (Switzerland); id. at 1557 (U.K.); see also Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994).
206. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
207. For instance, the British Parliament enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980. The Act prohibits enforcement by U.K. courts of certain foreign judgments and, in certain circumstances, entitles British citizens and businesses against whom foreign courts have awarded multiple damages to recover the noncompensatory element of the judgment from the plaintiff through an action in a U.K. court. The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, ch. 11, and Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982); see G.R. Sunderland, Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of U.S. Laws Regulating International Trade: A British Response, 28 FED. B. NEWS 235 (1981); see also Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 33 Elizabeth II, ch. 49 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985); Australia: Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, No. 3, Austl. Acts (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1038 (1984); France: Law Pertaining to the Disclosure of Documents and Information of an Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial, or Technical Nature to Foreign Natural or Juristic Persons, Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799, reprinted in relevant part in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987).
208. After the Justice Department announced its change of policy in April 1992, Japanese Government officials announced that they believed the U.S. policy violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Japanese Trade Ministry to Study Plan by U.S. to Extend Reach of Antitrust Law, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 479 (Apr. 9, 1992).
209. International Bar Takes Aim at U.S. Litigation Practices, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 17 (quoting Edmund Hosker, Remarks at International Bar Association Meeting (Oct. 12, 1993)).
210. Sir Leon Brittan, A Framework for International Competition, Address Before the World Economic Forum (Feb. 3, 1992); Sir Leon Brittan, Address Before European Law Conference, Oxford (Nov. 5, 1993). For background, see John H. Jackson, Statement on Competition and Trade Policy Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary (June 18, 1992), reprinted in 26 J. WORLD TRADE 111 (1992); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-First Century - Rounding the Circle, 48 REC. OF ASS'N OF BAR OF N.Y. 535 (1993); Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277.
211. Sir Leon Brittan, A Framework for International Competition, Address Before the World Economic Forum (Feb. 3, 1992); Sir Leon Brittan, Address Before European Law Conference, Oxford (Nov. 5, 1993). For background, see John H. Jackson, Statement on Competition and Trade Policy Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary (June 18, 1992), reprinted in 26 J. WORLD TRADE 111 (1992); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-First Century - Rounding the Circle, 48 REC. OF ASS'N OF BAR OF N.Y. 535 (1993); Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277.
212. Sir Leon Brittan, A Framework for International Competition, Address Before the World Economic Forum (Feb. 3, 1992); Sir Leon Brittan, Address Before European Law Conference, Oxford (Nov. 5, 1993). For background, see John H. Jackson, Statement on Competition and Trade Policy Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary (June 18, 1992), reprinted in 26 J. WORLD TRADE 111 (1992); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-First Century - Rounding the Circle, 48 REC. OF ASS'N OF BAR OF N.Y. 535 (1993); Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277.
213. Report of Special Committee, supra note 139, at ch. 11.
214. See WTO Ministerial Conference Singapore, Final Declaration (Dec. 13, 1996) reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997). For background, see Joseph P. Griffin, The WTO Study of the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy: Timely and Controversial, 145 CORP. COUNSEL'S INT'L ADVISER 10 (June 1, 1997).
215. The report of the working group, WT/WGTCP/2 (98-4914), is available on the WTO website, www.wto.org. See also WTO Working Group Suggests Extension of Term on Trade/ Antitrust Policy, 75 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1889, at 656 (Dec. 10, 1998); U.S. and WTO Members Strike Compromise on Competition Policy Group, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 24 (Dec. 11, 1998).
216. The report of the working group, WT/WGTCP/2 (98-4914), is available on the WTO website, www.wto.org. See also WTO Working Group Suggests Extension of Term on Trade/ Antitrust Policy, 75 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1889, at 656 (Dec. 10, 1998); U.S. and WTO Members Strike Compromise on Competition Policy Group, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 24 (Dec. 11, 1998).
217. Id. ¶¶ 153-154.
218. Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Address: A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy 13-14 (Nov. 18, 1996); see also Daniel Tarullo, Wrong Lesson from Boeing, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at 12; Joel I. Klein, No Monopoly on Antitrust, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 20.
219. Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Address: A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy 13-14 (Nov. 18, 1996); see also Daniel Tarullo, Wrong Lesson from Boeing, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at 12; Joel I. Klein, No Monopoly on Antitrust, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 20.
220. Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Address: A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy 13-14 (Nov. 18, 1996); see also Daniel Tarullo, Wrong Lesson from Boeing, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at 12; Joel I. Klein, No Monopoly on Antitrust, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 20.
221. Klein, supra note 176, at 14.
222. Id. There is apparently significant concern among government officials that confidential business information relevant to fact-intensive competition analyses could be used to advance trade-related objectives.
223. Id. at 15.
224. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
225. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
226. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
227. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
228. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
229. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
230. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
231. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling
232. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
233. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
234. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
235. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
236. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
237. See EU Officials Step Up Campaign for WTO Competition Policy Rules, 16 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 14 (Apr. 24, 1998); The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Remarks, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 29, 1997). For background, see Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1995); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995); ABA Report on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign Markets, 29 INT'L LAW. 945 (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995); REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RULES, COM (95) 359 Final (July 12, 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (calling for an international agreement on competition policy); OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994); Two OECD Committees Grapple with Antitrust/Trade Interface, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1660 at 469 (Apr. 21, 1994); Administration in No Rush to Discuss Competition Issues in WTO, 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (May 6, 1994); International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 and Special Supp. (Aug. 19, 1993).
238. For background, see A. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International Deregulation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437 (1998); Eleanor M. Fox, Towards World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (1997);
239. For background, see A. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International Deregulation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437 (1998); Eleanor M. Fox, Towards World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (1997);
240. Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1997);
241. Ignacio de León, The Dilemma of Regulating International Competition Under the WTO System, 3 E.C.L.R. 162 (1997). See also Department of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Has Major Competitive Concerns with American Airlines and British Airways Alliance (May 21, 1998); Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Statement Before Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcom. of Senate Judiciary Comm. on "International Aviation Agreements and their Competitive Implications" (Mar. 19, 1998); European Commission Press Release, European Commission Publishes its Conditions for Approving the British Airways/American Airlines Air Alliance (July 8, 1998); European Commission Press Release, European Commission States Conditions for Approving Lufthansa/SAS/United Airlines Air Alliance (July 8, 1998).
242. See, e.g., Department of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Clears WorldCom/ MCI Merger after MCI Agrees to Sell its Internet Business (July 15, 1998) ("[T]here was a high degree of cooperation between the agencies. With the parties' consent, the agencies shared information with one another."); European Commission Press Release, Commission Clears Worldcom and MCI Merger Subject to Conditions (July 8, 1998) ("The Commission's investigations, and negotiations or remedies, were undertaken in parallel with the examination of the case which is still being conducted by the US Department of Justice (USDOJ). The process so far has been marked by considerable level of co-operation between the two authorities, including exchange of views on the analytical method to be used, co-ordination of information gathering and joint meetings and negotiations with the parties . . . The two authorities will continue to co-operate until the undertakings are fully implemented and exchanged formal letters to this effect in accordance with the EC-U.S. agreement regarding the application of competition laws.")