What is a strategic partnership?

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 15-24

  Sean, Kay ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034179111     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2000.11655882     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Many different adjectives have been joined with the term "partnership" in descriptions of this form of international relations. "Strategic partnership," designating the broadest level of partnership, was the most commonly used term in the 1990s. Other terms adopted by various states include "strategic dialogue," "special relationship," "enhanced relationship," "constructive strategic partnership," "comprehensive partnership," "long-term comprehensive partnership," long-term stable constructive partnership," and "good-neighborly mutual-trust partnership."
2. Based on an off-the-record interview with a high-level defense official involved in these discussions.
3. For discussion of post-cold war primacy and offensive/defensive realism, see the various articles in Sean Lynn-Jones et al., America's Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For recent discussion on the offensive and defensive components of grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and Causes of War," International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 5-43; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 44-82.
4. For discussion of post-cold war primacy and offensive/defensive realism, see the various articles in Sean Lynn-Jones et al., America's Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For recent discussion on the offensive and defensive components of grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and Causes of War," International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 5-43; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 44-82.
5. For discussion of post-cold war primacy and offensive/defensive realism, see the various articles in Sean Lynn-Jones et al., America's Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For recent discussion on the offensive and defensive components of grand strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and Causes of War," International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 5-43; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" International Security 22, no. 4 (spring 1998): 44-82.
6. For further discussion, see Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
7. On the implications foralliances, see Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security 9, no. 4 (spring 1985): 3-43.
8. For example, see Sean Kay and Judith Yaphe, "Turkey's International Affairs: Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," INSS Strategic Forum, no. 122 (July 1997).
9. Department of Defense News Briefing, April 17, 1998.
10. Press statement by James P. Rubin, spokesman, U.S. Department of State, July 15, 1998.
11. The U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue was initiated on July 10, 1998, at a meeting between. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Moussa. The first session focused on the status of the peace process in the Middle East, counterterrorism, developments related to Iraq and Iran, and African regional issues.
12. Statement by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on military cooperation with Israel, September 26, 1992.
13. "Ukraine and Turkey Move Closer," British Broadcasting Service (February 13, 1998).
14. Since the height of the cold war in the 1960s, the United States has reduced its force presence in Turkey from more than 20,000 personnel and dependents at twenty installations to less than 800 personnel at six installations. Plans are in the works to close the U.S. radar site at Pirinclik and reduce the number of personnel at Incirlik. Overall U.S. direct assistance to Turkey declined from $500 million in grants in 1991 to $175 million in market-rate loans in 1997. See Kay and Yaphe, "Turkey's International Affairs," p. 2.
15. Mert Ozkan, "Worried Turks Watch U.S. North Iraq Patrols," Reuters (February 3, 1999).
16. For detailed discussion of the concept of cooperative security, see Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbrunner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); Janne E. Nolan, ed., Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).
17. For detailed discussion of the concept of cooperative security, see Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbrunner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); Janne E. Nolan, ed., Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).
18. Off-the-record discussion, Washington, DC, April 1997.
19. White House, "Remarks by President Clinton and President Constantinescu to Citizens of Romania," July 11, 1997.
20. U.S. Department of State, address at Bucharest University, Romania, March 19, 1998.
21. Press statement by James P. Rubin, July 15, 1998.
22. "U.S.-Romania Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation," U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, July 16, 1998. This agreement was part of an ongoing dialogue on common economic, energy, and environmental initiatives that will be reviewed annually by an economic-and political-reform working group of the U.S.-Romanian strategic partnership.
23. When the strategic partnership was first proposed in June and July 1997, Romania responded with a wish list of items it sought as compensation for not being invited to join NATO. The primary focus in Bucharest was to enhance military and defense industry ties by attracting U.S. investment and technology transfers. Romania apparently wanted the strategic partnership to expand ties between its defense sector and Lockheed Martin. The military areas it wanted improved through the strategic partnership included logistical support for rapid-reaction capability and upgraded command and control systems. See Brooks Tigner, "Romania Seeks U.S. Military Aid, Investment in Partnership," Defense News (July 21, 1997): 52.
24. "U.S.-Ukraine Security Committee Report," U.S. Department of Defense, November 15, 1996.
25. Remarks Prepared for Delivery by U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, July 12, 1997.
26. Fred Iklé and Sergei A. Karagonov, Harmonizing the Evolution of U.S. and Russian Defense Policies (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993). The study group's members were Aleksei Arbatov, Gen. John R. Galvin, Catherine Kelleher, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Gen. Edward Meyer, Nikolai V. Mikhailov, Sergei Rogov, John D. Steinbruner, Dmitrii Trenin, and Paul D. Wolfowitz.
27. Reuters (May 11, 1995).
28. See Albright's statements before the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, February 18, 1997, and before the Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, March 5, 1997.
29. Joint Press Conference, Moscow, January 26, 1999.
30. Interview, January 1999. The Chinese rejected an alternative, "comprehensive engagement," as having negative connotations. They viewed engagement as implying engagement in a conflict (e.g., as in engaging an enemy).
31. Quoted in Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S.-Sino Slogan Elicits Confusion," Defense News (November 10, 1997): 3.
32. Ibid. In July 1997, a while before Roth made this comment, Secretary Albright had deflected the characterization of a strategic partnership between the United States and China when she commented, in response to a question about the concept's meaning, that "it is important to have a strategic dialogue, in the course of which we would discuss issues all around the world that are of mutual interest." At the same press conference, the Chinese foreign minister advanced the issue, stating that "President Jiang Zemin had pushed President Clinton since 1994 with the hope that China and the United States could establish a strategic partnership that is oriented towards the twenty-first century." See Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, "Press Briefing," Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 26, 1997.
33. Ibid. In July 1997, a while before Roth made this comment, Secretary Albright had deflected the characterization of a strategic partnership between the United States and China when she commented, in response to a question about the concept's meaning, that "it is important to have a strategic dialogue, in the course of which we would discuss issues all around the world that are of mutual interest." At the same press conference, the Chinese foreign minister advanced the issue, stating that "President Jiang Zemin had pushed President Clinton since 1994 with the hope that China and the United States could establish a strategic partnership that is oriented towards the twenty-first century." See Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, "Press Briefing," Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 26, 1997.
34. "Joint U.S. China Statement," October 29, 1997.
35. Opall-Rome, "U.S.-Sino Slogan."
36. Based on interviews with U.S. officials, Washington, DC, March 1999. For further discussion, see Ted Galen Carpenter, "Roiling Asia: U.S. Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbors," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998): 2-6.
37. Off-the-record discussion with a high-level Clinton administration official, April 1996.
38. For further discussion, see Robert A. Manning, "The Monroe Doctrine, Chinese-Style," Los Angeles Times (August 16, 1998): M2.
39. BBC World Service, "Russian Foreign Minister Begins Asian Tour" (July 23, 1998).
40. Reuters (April 26, 1996).
41. Russia appears to be seeking a broad range of strategic partnerships within the former Soviet Union as a means of maintaining its influence in the region and reinserting a general buffer on its western and southern flanks. Concurrent to the December 1996 Yeltsin-Li Peng talks, Russia's defense minister, Igor Rodionov, spoke at an international conference titled "Promotion of Strategic Partnership and Military and Political Integration Among CIS Member States." Rodionov asserted that NATO expansion and the efforts of several Asian countries, including Turkey, Iran, Japan, and China, could become a threat.
42. See, for example, Ralph Cossa, "Closer Sino-Russian Ties Pose No United Threat to West," Defense News (February 10, 1997): 29. For a contrary view, see Stanley Kober, "Russia's Search for an Identity," in NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, DC: Cato Institute Press, 1997), pp. 129-41.
43. See, for example, Ralph Cossa, "Closer Sino-Russian Ties Pose No United Threat to West," Defense News (February 10, 1997): 29. For a contrary view, see Stanley Kober, "Russia's Search for an Identity," in NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, DC: Cato Institute Press, 1997), pp. 129-41.
44. "Russia Tells EU Wants End to NATO Monopoly in Europe," Reuters (October 22, 1999).
45. Craig R. Whitney, "France Presses for a Power Independent of the U.S.," New York Times (November 7, 1999): A5.
46. Quoted in William Drozdiak, "Possible U.S. Missile Shield Alarms Europe: Allies Fear Arms Race, Diminished Security Ties," Washington Post (November 6, 1999): A1.