Preventing deadly conflicts: Failures in Iraq and Yugoslavia

Global Society

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 5-33

  VÄyrynen, Raimo ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON; PEACE PROCESS;

IRAQ; YUGOSLAVIA;

EID: 0034060325     PISSN: 13600826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13600820050001103     Document Type: Article

References (141)

1. This paper was prepared for the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association Washington, DC, 16-20 February 1999 (TA03). It was revised in September 1999 for publication in Global Society.
2. The structural approach informs, for instance, Janie Leatherman, William DeMars, Patrick D. Gaffney and Raimo Väyrynen, Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises (West Hartford, CT: The Kumarian Press, 1999)
3. and much of Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Commission Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).
4. James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990), pp. 29-31. He contrasts behavioural interdependence with structural and evolutionary interdependence.
5. This approach characterises, for example, some research on economic sanctions as tools of preventive action; see T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Sanctions in International Crises", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 27-50.
6. Bruce W. Jentleson, "Preventive Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict: Possible, Difficult, Necessary", in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 294-297;
7. and Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 41-44.
8. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Genocide: Linking Empirical Research to International Responses (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1996), pp. 14-18, 50-52.
9. A similar distinction between "structural" and "operational" prevention has been used by the Carnegie Commission in Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) op. cit.
10. For a systematic comparison and assessment of "structural" and "direct" conflict prevention, see Peter Wallensteen, "Preventive Security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts", in Peter Wallensteen (ed.), Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Report No. 48, 1998), pp. 9-38.
11. Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 93-98.
12. Michael Lund (1996), Our Global Neighbourhood, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
13. For detailed analyses along these lines, see Christopher Clapham, Africa and International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
14. and Stephen Ellis, "Africa after the Cold War: New Patterns of Government and Politics", Development and Change, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1996), pp. 1-28.
15. David A. Lake and Robert Powell, "International Relations: A Strategic-choice Perspective", in David A. Lake and Robert Powell (eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 7-16.
16. Some of these alternatives are discussed by Jentleson (1999) Strategic Choice and International Relations, op. cit., pp. 299-303.
17. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 29-39. A related point is made by Smith who emphasises that the situations of intervention are inherently uncertain and, therefore, the consequences of actions cannot be easily foreseen;
18. see Dan Smith, "Preventing Conflict Escalation: Uncertainty and Knowledge", in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), The New Agenda for Peace Research (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 163-168.
19. Nicolaïdis discusses similar problems in terms of the delusion, perversion, and diversion fallacies from which preventive action may suffer; see Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework", in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), pp. 27-31.
20. David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict (New York: Hill & Wang, 1997), p. 237.
21. James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science", World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), pp. 169-195 (the quotation is on p. 193);
22. Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, "Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics", in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 3-38.
23. See also Jentleson (1999), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics op. cit., p. 297.
24. Hidemi Suganami, On the Causes of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
25. See also Smith (1999), On the Causes of War op. cit., pp. 168-170;
26. and Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Management: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 97-100.
27. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: The United Nations, 1992), p. 11.
28. Lund (1996), An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping op. cit., pp. 34-44.
29. Wallensteen arrives at an essentially similar definition, though he leaves out the causes of tensions by defining preventive diplomacy as "constructive actions undertaken to avoid the likely threat, use or diffusion of armed force by parties in a political dispute". Peter Wallensteen (1998), An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping op. cit., pp. 33-35.
30. For an earlier elaboration of this scheme, originally presented in a conference paper in 1995, see Leatherman, DeMars, Gaffney and Väyrynen (1999), An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping op. cit., pp. 97-101.
31. See also Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), op. cit., p. xviii.
32. For a standard approach, see Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 40-43;
33. and Lund (1996), The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945 op. cit., p. 38.
34. See Hayward Alker, Ted R. Gurr and Kumar Rupesinghe, "Conflict Early Warning Systems". Paper prepared for the XVI World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, 21-25 August 1994;
35. and Ruddy Doom, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom? (Brussels: Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Raad, 1996).
36. This problem is also evident in Nicolaïdis (1996), Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom? op. cit., pp. 31-36.
37. Leatherman, DeMars, Gaffney and Väyrynen (1999), Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom? op. cit., pp. 43-49.
38. See Jervis (1997), Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom? op. cit., pp. 174-175.
39. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 30-34.
40. For a more detailed analysis, see Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict", International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 134-181.
41. For an in-depth study of territorial conflicts and their resolution, see Arie Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).
42. The problems of sovereignty, territoriality, and dispute settlement are also discussed in a useful way by Friedrich Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich and Harpreet Mahajan, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict over Territory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985).
43. For a detailed scrutiny and assessment of Hammarskjöld's preventive diplomacy, see Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), esp. chs. 10-11, 13 and 15-16.
44. Inis L. Claude, Jr, Swords into Plowshares: Problems and Prospects of International Organization, 4th edn (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 317.
45. Quoted from Hammarskjöld's introduction to the 1959/60 annual report of the United Nations, reproduced in Joel Larus (ed.), From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 402.
46. Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr and Oran Young, Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 76-80.
47. David K. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement, 1962", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (eds.), U.S. - Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 435-465.
48. Callahan (1997), U.S. - Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons op. cit., p. 87.
49. Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 8-11.
50. The post-conflict early-warning and prevention is systematically discussed in the Ethiopian, Namibian and Ugandan cases by Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, The Transition of War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1996).
51. Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Incentives and the Bosnian Peace Process", in David Cortright (ed.), The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 155-179.
52. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Can International Financial Institutions Prevent Internal Violence? The Sources of Ethno-national Conflict in Transitional Societies", in Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 312-317.
53. International economic actors have started paying attention to the need for political reforms and conflict resolution in the targeted countries, but their concrete results have been rather timid so far. See Nicole Ball, "International Economic Actors", in Edward Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet (eds.), Coping with Conflict: After the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 168-197.
54. Milton J. Esman, Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict? (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Peaceworks No. 13, 1997);
55. and Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Relations, 1998).
56. In the United Nations the third strategy is called "preventive peacebuilding [which] comprises an extensive menu of possible actions in the political, economic and social fields, applicable especially to possible internal conflicts"; see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Confronting New Challenges: Annual Report on the Work of the Organization (New York: The United Nations, 1995), pp. 218-219.
57. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999), Confronting New Challenges: Annual Report on the Work of the Organization op. cit., p. 97.
58. Wallensteen (1998), Confronting New Challenges: Annual Report on the Work of the Organization op. cit., p. 27.
59. The importance of co-ordinating and sequencing of preventive actions by their users is stressed in Raimo Väyrynen, "Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: A Comparison of Different Instruments", International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-18.
60. John M. Rothgeb, Jr, Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 139-140.
61. Nikolaïdis (1996), Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System op. cit., pp. 37-39.
62. Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: The United States Institute for Peace, 1991), pp. 5, 12-14.
63. The concept of remote deterrence has been coined and elaborated in Amitai Etzioni, Winning Without War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 86-87, 98-100.
64. Lund (1996), Winning Without War op. cit., pp. 44-49.
65. I. William Zartman and Johannes Aurik, "Power Strategies in De-escalation", in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), pp. 155-157.
66. I. William Zartman and Johannes Aurik, Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts, Ibid., pp. 177-181.
67. See Rothgeb (1993), Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts op. cit., pp. 110-117.
68. The efficacy of incentives, possibly mixed with punishments, has also been stressed by David Cortright, "Incentives and Cooperation in International Affairs", in David Cortright (ed.), The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 3-18.
69. Laure Paquette, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1992-94: Did Preventive Diplomacy Occur?, in David Black and Susan J. Rolston (eds.), Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy in the New World (Dis)order (Halifax, NS: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995), pp. 89-104;
70. and Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
71. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 123-133.
72. George Bush argues, though, that "it is total misreading to conclude that we were giving Saddam a green light to seize his neighbor". However, Saddam was told that the United States does not "take a stand on territorial disputes" which can easily be construed as an implicit permission to act. See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 311.
73. Claude Rakisits, "The Gulf Crisis: Failure of Preventive Diplomacy", in Kevin Clements and Robin Ward (eds.), Building International Community: Cooperating for Peace Case Studies (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 63-72;
74. and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task", International Security, Vol. 17 , No. 2 (1992), pp. 147-179.
75. It is uncertain whether the United States ever really wanted a compromise. Bush issued a de facto declaration of war as early as August 1990 and later declared that there would be "no compromises, no bargaining for hostages, no trade-offs". He even hoped for an additional provocation by Iraq to justify the use of force; Bush & Scowcroft (1998), International Security, op. cit., pp. 332-333, 350, and 407.
76. This conclusion is reached by Stein (1992), International Security, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
77. For a detailed background analysis, see Rakisits (1994), International Security, op. cit., pp. 72-102.
78. For an analysis of the cognitive closure and its impact on the outbreak of World War I, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
79. A history, with selected documentation, on the various phases of Yugoslavia's dissolution has been written by Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the Break-up 1980-1992 (London: Verso, 1993).
80. I have discussed the Yugoslavian case in greater detail in Raimo Väyrynen, "Preventive Action: Failure in Yugoslavia", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), pp. 21-42.
81. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: TV Books, 1996), pp. 196-201.
82. For more detailed analyses see Mario Zucconi, "The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia", in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 237-278;
83. and Garsten Giersch, Konfliktregulierung in Jugoslawien 1991-1995 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).
84. These dilemmas are discussed in greater detail in Raimo Väyrynen, "Enforcement and Humanitarian Intervention: Two Faces of the Collective Action by the United Nations", in Chadwick Alger (ed.), The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-first Century (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1998), pp. 54-88.
85. Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, "Former Yugoslavia", in James Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 66-68.
86. Rein Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 125-136;
87. and Steven L. Burg, "The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis", in Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami (eds.), International Organizations and Ethnic Conflicts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 248-250. In 1995 this neglect came to haunt the UN as Croatia recaptured Western Slavonia and Krajina where UNPROFOR had protected the Serbian military control. Croatian actions were justified in the sense that these regions were its integral parts, but in retaking the territories Zagreb badly violated the rights of its own Serb citizens.
88. Giersch (1998) International Organizations and Ethnic Conflicts op. cit., pp. 252-263.
89. This idea is derived from Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), pp. 160-161.
90. See also Economides and Taylor (1996), Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" op. cit., pp. 76-77.
91. For an overview of European and US preferences and their tensions in Yugoslavia, see Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
92. For critical early assessments of UN performance in Yugoslavia, blaming especially the indecisiveness and reluctance of its leading member states, see Åge Eknes, "The United Nations' Predicament in the Former Yugoslavia", in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), The United Nations and the Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 109-126;
93. and David Rieff, "The Illusions of Peacekeeping", World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1994), pp. 1-18.
94. Bart (1997), World Policy Journal, op. cit., pp. 175-179;
95. and Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1996), pp. 295-300.
96. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), pp. 45-46.
97. Cigar (1995), Balkan Odyssey op. cit., pp. 166-177.
98. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 365-366.
99. This started, as a part of the implementation of the Dayton accord, through the "equip-and-train" programme which the Pentagon resisted fearing that it would increase the risk of a future war between the Bosnians and the Serbs; see Holbrooke (1998) Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War op. cit., pp. 276-278.
100. Larry Minear et al., "Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The UN's Role 1991-1993", Occasional Paper No. 18 (1994), pp. 121-125, Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University.
101. Woodward (1995), "Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The UN's Role 1991-1993", op. cit., pp. 328-330.
102. Lukic and Lynch (1996), "Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The UN's Role 1991-1993", op. cit., pp. 290-294;
103. and Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (New York: Penguin, 1996).
104. Giersch (1998), Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime op. cit., pp. 249-250.
105. Economides and Taylor (1996), Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime op. cit., pp. 88-89;
106. and Väyrynen (1998), Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime op. cit.
107. Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College, 1996), pp. 24-26;
108. and Chris Kutchera, Le défi kurde ou le reve fou de l'indépendance (Paris: Bayard, 1997), pp. 92-110.
109. Hamik Bozarslan, "Kurdistan. Économie de guerre, économie dans la guerre", in Jean Francois and Jean-Christophe Rufin (eds.), Economie des guerres civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996), pp. 120-123.
110. Hamik Bozarslan, Economie des guerres civiles, Ibid., pp. 112-116;
111. Sheri Laizer, Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War (London: Zed Books, 1996), pp. 111-112;
112. Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 224-225;
113. and Katherine A. Wilkens, "How We Lost the Kurdish Game", The Washington Post, 20 September 1996, pp. A13-14.
114. Evan Thomas, Christopher Dicken and Gregory Vistica, "Bay of Pigs Redux" , Newsweek (25 March 1998), pp. 36-44.
115. An overview of these mediation efforts and the KDP-PUK hostilities can be obtained from Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
116. Kutschera (1997), The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis op. cit., pp. 138-144;
117. and Graham-Brown (1999), The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis op. cit., pp. 231-234.
118. Laizer (1996), The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis op. cit., pp. 59-64, 111-113 and 124-125;
119. and Wilkens (1996) The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis op. cit.
120. Graham-Brown (1999), The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis op. cit., pp. 215-221;
121. and Kanan Makya, "The Politics of Betrayal", The New York Review of Books, Vol. 43, No. 16 (1996), pp. 8, 10.
122. Hamit Bozarslan, "Kurds: States, Marginality and Security", in Sam C. Nolutshungu (ed.), Margins of Insecurity: Minorities and International Security (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1996), pp. 104-111.
123. Quoted by Stephen Kinzer, "The Iraqi Attack on Kurdish Region was Part of a Larger Campaign that is Aimed at Iran", The New York Times (3 September 1996), p. A6.
124. The reluctance of the CIA to participate in 1996 in the raid against Saddam within Iraq can be explained partly by the effort not to offend Barzani; cf. Thomas, Dickey and Vistica (1998), The New York Times op. cit.
125. Gunter (1999), The New York Times op. cit., pp. 87-89;
126. and Graham-Brown (1999), The New York Times op. cit., pp. 234-235.
127. Wilkens (1996), The New York Times op. cit.;
128. and Graham-Brown (1999), The New York Times op. cit., pp. 301-315.
129. This was done most recently in a 24 July 1999 letter by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, to the Kurds; see Patrick Clawson, "Stealth Bombing: Our Silent War in Iraq", The New Republic (6 September 1999), pp. 18-20.
130. Wilkens (1996), The New Republic op. cit., p. A 14.
131. "Iraq and America", The Economist (21 September 1996), pp. 45-46.
132. Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Seeks to End Direct Aid for Kurds", The New York Times (12 September 1996), p. A4;
133. and Warren Richey and Scott Peterson, "Iraqi Kurd Advance Makes Mockery of US 'Safe Area' ", Christian Science Monitor (11 September 1996), pp. 1, 7.
134. David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third-party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 5 (1998), pp. 572-599.
135. Eric Hoskins, "The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq", in Thomas G. Weiss, David Cortright, George A. Lopez and Larry Minear (eds.), Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 91-147.
136. See also Graham-Brown (1999), Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions op. cit., pp. 70-83.
137. George Soros, "Conflict Prevention: Can We Meet the Challenge", in Conflict Prevention: Strategies to Sustain Peace in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 1997), pp. 77-78.
138. Alexander George and Jane Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).
139. See also Lund (1996), The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy op. cit.;
140. Wallensteen (1998), The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy op. cit.;
141. and Leatherman, DeMars, Gaffney and Väyrynen (1999), The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy op. cit.