Bittersweet victory: The 1999 Malaysian general election and the Anwar Ibrahim affair

Round Table

Volumn , Issue 354, 2000, Pages 245-258

  Abbott, Jason P ^a  

^a NOTTINGHAM TRENT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; ELECTION; PARTY POLITICS; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

MALAYSIA;

EID: 0034024313     PISSN: 00358533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/750459438     Document Type: Article

References (83)

1. Indeed on 19 September 1999 the largest pro-Anwar demonstration since the former deputy PM's arrest took place at the National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur.
2. The Barisan Alternatif combines the predominantly Chinese Democratic Party (DAP) with the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), KeADILan (formed by Anwar's wife) and the Socialist Party of Malaysia (PRM).
3. Sherri Prasso, Mark Clifford and Joyce Barnathan, 'The Feud', Business Week, 9 November 1998, p 29.
4. 'Mattress shown in Anwar trial', 15 December 1998, BBC World News On-Line: Asia-Pacific, http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_ 235000/235255.stm.
5. K. S. Jomo, 'Why the Dr M./Anwar Rift', http://www.freemalaysia.com. Posted 2 February 1999.
6. Eg interview with Murray Hiebert, reporter, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 April 1999, Kuala Lumpur; Harold Crouch, 27 April 1999; Zukifli Bin Sulong, Group Editor, Harakah, 28 April 1999; Chandra Muzaffar, Deputy President of KeADILan, 4 May 1999.
7. Eg interview with Murray Hiebert, reporter, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 April 1999, Kuala Lumpur; Harold Crouch, 27 April 1999; Zukifli Bin Sulong, Group Editor, Harakah, 28 April 1999; Chandra Muzaffar, Deputy President of KeADILan, 4 May 1999.
8. For example, on 4 August 1999 the key witness in Anwar's sodomy trial testified that police had ordered him to amend the date of his alleged sexual encounter with Anwar. Anwar's former driver Azizan stated under cross examination that Assistant Police Commissioner Musa Hassan had told him to change the date from May 1992 to May 1993 because the apartment that the incident was alleged to have taken place was not even built in mid 1992! (source: Agence France-Presse (AFP), reported on GERAK-NET, 4 August 1999).
9. H. Crouch, 'Authoritarian Trends, the UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power', in J. S. Kahn and Francis Loh (eds), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992; G. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1991.
10. H. Crouch, 'Authoritarian Trends, the UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power', in J. S. Kahn and Francis Loh (eds), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992; G. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1991.
11. W. Case, '1996 UMNO Party Election: Two for the Show', Pacific Affairs, Vol 7, No 3, 1997a, pp 393-411; W. Case, 'Malaysia: Still the Semi-democratic Paradigm', Asian Studies Review, Vol 21, No 2-3, 1997, pp 79-90.
12. W. Case, '1996 UMNO Party Election: Two for the Show', Pacific Affairs, Vol 7, No 3, 1997a, pp 393-411; W. Case, 'Malaysia: Still the Semi-democratic Paradigm', Asian Studies Review, Vol 21, No 2-3, 1997, pp 79-90.
13. J. Jesuadson, 'Statist Democracy and the Limits to Civil Society in Malaysia', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol 33, No 3, 1995, pp 335-356; J. Jesuadson, 'The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia', in G. Rodan (ed), Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, Routledge, London, 1996.
14. J. Jesuadson, 'Statist Democracy and the Limits to Civil Society in Malaysia', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol 33, No 3, 1995, pp 335-356; J. Jesuadson, 'The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia', in G. Rodan (ed), Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, Routledge, London, 1996.
15. Jesuadson (1995), op cit, Ref 10, p 338.
16. For example, see W. Case, 'Umno Paramountcy', Party Politics, Vol 2, No 1, 1996, pp 115-127, especially p 117.
17. D. Rueschemeyer, E. H. Stephens and J. D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 7.
18. Jesuadson (1996), op cit, Ref 10, p 132.
19. S. Barraclough, 'The Dynamics of Coercion in the Malaysian Political Process', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 19, No 4, 1985, pp 797-822, especially p 820; B. Welsh, 'Attitudes towards Democracy in Malaysia', Asian Survey, Vol 36, No 9, 1996, pp 882-903.
20. S. Barraclough, 'The Dynamics of Coercion in the Malaysian Political Process', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 19, No 4, 1985, pp 797-822, especially p 820; B. Welsh, 'Attitudes towards Democracy in Malaysia', Asian Survey, Vol 36, No 9, 1996, pp 882-903.
21. S. Huntingdon, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991.
22. Se Jesuadson (1996), op cit, Ref 10, p 128.
23. Following an elite struggle between Mahathir and his former minister of trade and industry, Razaleigh in 1987, 11 members of UMNO resigned from the party and challenged the result of the 1987 party elections in which Mahathir had narrowly defeated Razaleigh. The judiciary found that UMNO was an unlawful society because 30 of its branches had not been registered in 1987. Mahathir quickly formed UMNO Baru (new UMNO) to prevent his rivals using the party name but again they challenged this action in the courts. Mahathir finally countered by suspending the country's top judge the Lord President. For more details of the Mahathir-Razaleigh struggle, see A. B. Shamsul, 'The "Battle Royal": The UMNO Elections of 1987', in M. Ayoob and N. Chee Yuen, Southeast Asian Affairs 1988, Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore, 1988).
24. In 1983 a constitutional crisis ensued in Malaysia over Mahathir's attempt to remove the monarch's right to withhold assent from parliamentary bills. Although a compromise deal allowed the monarch 30 days in which to return a bill with comments the monarch's blocking power was removed. For more details see B. T. Koo, Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1995, pp 202-209.
25. For example, in 1993, despite appeals by Mahathir that the post of deputy president of the UMNO should not be contested, Anwar Ibrahim, then Finance Minister and Vice President of UMNO, successfully ousted the incumbent, Ghafar Baba. However, concerned by the prospect that a similar challenge might occur for the Presidency in 1996, Mahathir pushed through a series of internal party reforms that effectively ensured that an incumbent President could not be challenged. For more details see Case, 1997a, op cit, Ref 9, pp 399-401.
26. Eg, economic growth averaged 5.4 per cent between 1981 and 1989 and 8.8 per cent between 1990 and 1996. Between 1970 and 1993 the middle class expanded from 20 per cent of the working population to 33.5 per cent in 1993 (Jesuadson, 1996, op cit, 10, p 129).
27. Interview, 4 May 1999, Kuala Lumpur.
28. Ibid.
29. S. Jayasankaran, 'Credible Clean-up', FEER, 19 June 1997.
30. Mahathir himself had been the leading figure behind the original project to create a car that was 'Made in Malaysia' (see J. Abbott, 'Not Like the Rest: Practical and Theoretical Implications from Southeast Asia's Economic Development', Unpublished PhD Thesis, Nottingham Trent University, 1998).
31. S. Jayasankaran, 'Pricey Pet Projects', FEER, 12 November 1998.
32. Although privatized in 1985 a 32 per cent stake in MAS was acquired by Malaysian Helicopter Services (MHS) which is controlled by Tajuddin Ramli, a close associate of Daim Zainuddin (K. S. Jomo, Privatising Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, Realities, Boulder, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996, p 53).
33. This was regarded as a significant move since Anwar had replaced Daim as finance minister in 1991. Daim is regarded as one of the most powerful and wealthiest men in Malaysia and a favourite target for those who accuse the Prime Minister of fostering cronyism (for further details see E. T. Gomez and K. S. Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp 54-55).
34. Anwar had given Mahathir his unqualified support throughout the political crises of 1983 and 1987 (see, for example, C. Muzaffar, 'The Anwar Episode: An Analysis', Indonesia and the Malay World, Vol 26, No 76, 1998, pp 234-238, especially p 234).
35. Email correspondence with M. G. G. Pillai, 19 September 1999.
36. Interview with Zulkifli Bin Sulong, Group Editor, Harakah, 28 April 1999.
37. PAS has duly enlarged the 'For Members Only' banner under the title header, but openly goads the government by distributing the newspapers to street stalls where it can be openly purchased. PAS leaders believe that the growing support for the party, especially among the Malay rural and urban poor will discourage the government from banning the publication outright for fear of the backlash that might be generated.
38. Telephone interview with editor of Aliran Monthly, 27 April 1999, Kuala Lumpur.
39. Ironically the ease by which thousands of pro-Anwar supporters were able to access the Internet can partly be attributed to the promotion by Mahathir himself of the so-called Multimedia Super Corridor project. The project aims to create a high-tech digital network linking businesses, government, schools, and universities around the capital and its environs. Prompted by the project and the media promotion of it, the number of so-called Internet cafés that have sprung up in central Kuala Lumpur is remarkable for a developing country.
40. Cited in Sabri Zain, 'How the Internet is Molding Public Opinion in Malaysia', posted on 'GERAK-NET', 10 August 1999.
41. Telephone interview with Anil, Aliran, 27 April 1999, Kuala Lumpur.
42. Ibid.
43. M. G. G. Pillai, quoted in Sabri Zain, op cit, Ref 35.
44. The most common hosts are 'Geocities' (Yahoo) and 'Tripod' (offered by the Lycos network).
45. The only major piece of work on this subject to date is Gary Rodan's work on Singapore. While welcome, Rodan's article presents an overly pessimistic account that suggests that political control is much more of a possibility than has yet to be demonstrated. For example see J. M. Guehenno, The End of the Nation State, University of Minnesota Press, Victoria Elliott, 1995.
46. See for example Muzaffar, op cit, Ref 29, p 236.
47. Interviews with political figures and commentators in Kuala Lumpur in April 1999 suggested that approximately a fifth of UMNO members still privately support Anwar. However all UMNO members are acutely aware that any patronage is dependent upon support for the existing leadership.
48. On 27 October 1987 the government launched Operation Lalang. On the first day alone 55 people were detained under the ISA. In addition three newspapers were closed down and the scope of the operation subsequently extended to Sarawak. For further details see Koo, op cit, Ref 19, pp 284-287.
49. Two such cases included Professor Jomo of the University of Malaya and Irene Fernandez of Tenganita.
50. In 1990 a similar opposition alliance led by the breakaway Malay party Semangat '46 won 35 seats in parliament although the overall number of opposition seats was higher than in 1999 because the Sabah based PBS has defected from the ruling coalition and proceeded to win the 14 seats it contested (see H. Crouch, in J. S. Kahn and F. Loh, eds, Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p 36).
51. In 1990 the Barisan Nasional secured only 53.7 per cent of the popular vote.
52. Arjuna Ranawana, 'Behind the Smile', Asiaweek, 10 December 1999. One political analyst, Charles Santiago, estimates that approaching 70 per cent of Malays voted for the opposition (Sangwon Suh and Arjuna Ranwana, 'The Great Divide'), Asiaweek, 10 December 1999.
53. Arjuna Ranawana, 'Behind the Smile', Asiaweek, 10 December 1999. One political analyst, Charles Santiago, estimates that approaching 70 per cent of Malays voted for the opposition (Sangwon Suh and Arjuna Ranwana, 'The Great Divide'), Asiaweek, 10 December 1999.
54. In the 1999 election 46 of Barisan Nasional's 148 MPs were elected from East Malaysia.
55. Sangwon and Ranwana, op cit, Ref 47.
56. See 'UMNO's Malay Dilemma: Election Post-mortem', The Straits Times (Singapore), 5 December 1999.
57. Abduhl Razak Baginda, Executive Director, Malaysia Strategic Research Centre, quoted in 'Bittersweet Victory', Time, 13 December 1999.
58. Eg, former Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hatim commented: 'There is a clear erosion of support among the Malays for UMNO and the front ... if this is not addressed it is dangerous for the future', 'Wake-up Call', Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 December 1999.
59. Interview with President of the Bar Council in Malaysia, Mr Chalvarajah, 4 May 1999.
60. All of those interviewed between May and June 1999, whether Western or Malaysian, agreed that economic growth had resulted in the growth of an increasingly active middle class in Malaysia. While views differed about the overall impact that this had had upon Malaysian politics all agreed that it created increased demands for reform and transparency.
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