Job assignment and promotion

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 31-51

  Valsecchi, Irene ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILAN   (Italy)

Author keywords

Internal organisation of firms; Job assignment; Promotion

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; LABOR MARKET; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034010698     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00103     Document Type: Review

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