On the use of collateral

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 191-214

  Coco, Giuseppe ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Credit market; Rationing

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; LENDING BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034008592     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00109     Document Type: Article

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