The failure of CAP reform: A public choice analysis

Economic Affairs

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 42-48

  Elliott, Matthew ^a   Heath, Allister ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b HERTFORD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL POLICY; COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY; EUROPEAN UNION; POLICY REFORM;

EUROPE;

EID: 0033949838     PISSN: 02650665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0270.00221     Document Type: Article

References (47)

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32. In the case of a chicken supergame.
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34. i must hold (j are selective incentives).
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