Civil-military relations in Colombia: A workable relationship or a case for fundamental reform?

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 529-548

  Watson, Cynthia A ^a  

^a National War College   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP; MILITARY INTERVENTION; POLITICAL SYSTEM; VIOLENCE;

COLOMBIA;

EID: 0033911561     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713701039     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Dr Norman Bailey, remarks at Carlisle Barracks conference, 'War and Peace in Colombia,' 13 November 1999.
2. Ironically, however, Colombia managed to send a token force to participate in the Korean War, the only South American state to do so.
3. Douglas Farah, 'Drug cartels hold tech advantage', Washington Post, 15 November 1999, pp A1, 18.
4. Many explanations have been offered. A prevalent one is that the guerrillas, working with the narcos, were seeking to destroy court records on upcoming drug trials. While the Tranquilandia coca reprocessing site southeast of Bogotà was discovered and destroyed that year, the explanation that the drug dealers were asking the M-19 to protect them does not ring entirely true. The M-19 had always been the most media-hungry of the insurgents (their seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy in 1980 and ability to hold it for three months presaged the Peruvian incident whereby the Japanese Embassy in Lima was held by guerrillas for months in 1997). The M-19's actions were probably as much an attempt to keep their profile high as to help narcotics traffickers. The other difficulty with the narcoguerrilla theory is that the M-19 were not the ones getting benefits from Tranquilandia; that was FARC, working with cocaine traffickers. The insurgents were quite distinct at that time.
5. The Colombian National Police, Human Rights and US Drug Policy, Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1993, p 9.
6. Indeed, note the criticisms that civilian (but hardhanded) Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori has made of President Pastrana throughout the latter's term in office. Rather than offering a helping hand with moral support, Fujimori has said that he would not negotiate with terrorists. His support from the military throughout his decade in office is firm and unchallenged as a result.
7. Juan O Tamayo, 'Colombian security forces seek gentler way', Miami Herald, 12 September 1999 (internet edition).
8. Included among them were three of five divisional commanders and two brigade commanders. 'Minister quits in split over strategy', Latin American Weekly Report, WR-99-21, 1 June 1999, p 242.
9. This was not a unanimous assessment of the FARC's governance. While some reports claimed that the FARC was more efficient at meting out justice than had been the government, others claimed that the FARC was equally unresponsive and interested in increasing coca planting to arument revenues.
10. 'López plantea beligerancia para Farc', El Tiempo, 11 October 1999 (internet edition).
11. As true in similar situations elsewhere, the numbers are not firm. Some estimates go as high as 1.5 million but the generally accepted issue is that one in every nine Colombians has been displaced by political violence in the 1990s.
12. Reports in mid-February 2000 slamming FFAA assistance to the paramilities undercut Bogota's argument that it is addressing the human rights questions. See Human Rights Watch and other international human rights monitors.
13. 'Colombian general fired after massacre', Agence France Presse, 2 September 1999 (internet edition). See also 'Pastrana sacks third general', Latin American Weekly Report, 7 September 1999, p 417.
14. 'Colombian general fired after massacre', Agence France Presse, 2 September 1999 (internet edition). See also 'Pastrana sacks third general', Latin American Weekly Report, 7 September 1999, p 417.
15. For a marvelous discussion of the basic points in civil-military relations plaguing this region for generations see Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999, especially the introduction.
16. Michael Latham, in 'Ideology, social science, and destiny: modernization and the alliance for progress', Diplomatic History, 22, (2), 1998, pp 199-230, points out that the Kennedy Administration received at least one suggested solution to explaining class differences and social tensions in the region by highlighting Colombia. Under the democatic leadership of Alberto Lleras Camargo, that nation seemed more advanced than most others in the region. If the United States provided enough resources to 'assure' success there, it might be possible to 'demonstrate to all of Latin America that a resolute, competent, reform-minded government with vigorous US assistance can fulfill the hopes of the Alliance for Progress within a reasonably brief period' (p 225).
17. 'Colombia calls for arms from Uncle Sam', The Economist, 25 September 1999 (internet edition).
18. Interview with Deborah Amos on ABC World News Tonight, 21 September 1999.
19. The Pastrana government unveiled its national strategy on 17 September 1999.
20. The latest report by Amnesty International, dated 16 September 1999, indicates that outside observers are still not sanguine that human rights conditions have ceased to deteriorate. The charges of massive violations date back to the administration of Valencia (1978-82) when the first state of siege was declared. Conditions mutated further during the Betancur Cuartas administration (1982-86) when the amnesty was declared and death squads began flourishing. Their activities became acutely directed not against their initial targets - the guerrillas who had engaged in kidnapping narcotraficantes and their families - but at those people deemed allied to the guerrillas. Massacres have accelerated and proliferated in the 1990s, taking on a national character instead of remaining isolated in certain areas of the country.
21. I would argue this is already happening, with the effect of undercutting the population's trust in the civilian leadership.
22. Few in the USA have any idea that the illegal migration problem between Colombia and Venezuela exists. Two decades ago, estimates were that one of every three people in Venezuela might be an illegal Colombian. At that time, the reason was the income disparities between petroleum-rich Venezuela and relatively poorer Colombia. Today, many of the migrants have fled because of political violence, although conditions in Venezuela are no where near as prosperous or inviting as they were a generation earlier.
23. 'More "spillover" from Colombian war', Latin American Weekly Report, WR-99-22, 8 June 1999, p 256.
24. Over the 15 months of the Pastrana administration, FARC has managed to get its demilitarised zone south of Bogotá but has not returned to the bargaining table as promised. In a number of instances, FARC has announced that the government is not negotiating in good faith (largely because it is asking for more assistance from Washington, with FARC understanding that Washington is not happy with the demilitarised zone) Pastrana has also been pressured to negotiate with the ELN, after the ELN staged a number of highly visible stunts kidnapping Colombian citizens ostensibly to get the government to sit down and discuss a demilitarised zone in the northeast. Pastrana has thus far been completely unwilling to do so and is more hardline in his responses to FARC than when he assumed office in August 1998.
25. I have borrowed this term from Dr BD Cole in his work on Maoist revolutionary warfare.