Introduction to focused approach to verification under FMCT

JNMM, Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 39-45

  Bragin, Victor ^a   Carlson, John ^a  

^a Australian Safeguards Non P   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FISSION PRODUCTS; NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING; NUCLEAR FUELS; PUBLIC POLICY; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;

FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES; MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT; NON PROLIFERATION AGENDA;

NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFEGUARDS;

EID: 0033887196     PISSN: 08936188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Possible Verification Arrangements under a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,' the ESARDA Seminar on 'Modern Verification Systems: Similarities, Synergies and Challenges', Helsinki, Finland, 11-15 May 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Focussed Approach to Verification under FMCT', FOA Seminar on Fissile Material Cut-off, Hassel Udden, Sweden, 3-5 June 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, and J.Hill, 'Viewpoint - Verifying a Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty,' The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 97-107; V.Bragin and J.Carlson, 'FMCT: Some Significant Divisions in the Scope Debate,' Disarmament Forum, Two, 1999, UNIDIR, pp. 29-34.
2. V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Possible Verification Arrangements under a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,' the ESARDA Seminar on 'Modern Verification Systems: Similarities, Synergies and Challenges', Helsinki, Finland, 11-15 May 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Focussed Approach to Verification under FMCT', FOA Seminar on Fissile Material Cut-off, Hassel Udden, Sweden, 3-5 June 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, and J.Hill, 'Viewpoint - Verifying a Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty,' The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 97-107; V.Bragin and J.Carlson, 'FMCT: Some Significant Divisions in the Scope Debate,' Disarmament Forum, Two, 1999, UNIDIR, pp. 29-34.
3. V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Possible Verification Arrangements under a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,' the ESARDA Seminar on 'Modern Verification Systems: Similarities, Synergies and Challenges', Helsinki, Finland, 11-15 May 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Focussed Approach to Verification under FMCT', FOA Seminar on Fissile Material Cut-off, Hassel Udden, Sweden, 3-5 June 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, and J.Hill, 'Viewpoint -Verifying a Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty,' The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 97-107; V.Bragin and J.Carlson, 'FMCT: Some Significant Divisions in the Scope Debate,' Disarmament Forum, Two, 1999, UNIDIR, pp. 29-34.
4. V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Possible Verification Arrangements under a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,' the ESARDA Seminar on 'Modern Verification Systems: Similarities, Synergies and Challenges', Helsinki, Finland, 11-15 May 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, J.Bardsley and J.Hill, 'Focussed Approach to Verification under FMCT', FOA Seminar on Fissile Material Cut-off, Hassel Udden, Sweden, 3-5 June 1998; V.Bragin, J.Carlson, and J.Hill, 'Viewpoint - Verifying a Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty,' The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 97-107; V.Bragin and J.Carlson, 'FMCT: Some Significant Divisions in the Scope Debate,' Disarmament Forum, Two, 1999, UNIDIR, pp. 29-34.
5. Of course, states party to FMCT would retain their right to voluntarily offer the IAEA to place any of their unirradiated direct-use material under international safeguards, but, we believe, this is does not need to be part of the FMCT arrangements.
6. In accordance with the above definition of subject material, we refer to the following activities as "production of fissile material" under an FMCT: separation of plutonium, HEU or U-233 from irradiated nuclear material; recovery of plutonium, HEU or U-233 from active waste; increasing the abundance of the isotope U-235 in uranium through any isotope separation process; and increasing the abundance of the isotope Pu-239 in plutonium through any isotope separation process. Note that this definition excludes nuclear production, ie production of plutonium and U-233 in nuclear reactors or through the use of any other intense neutron sources. Although LEU would not be subject to the FMCT, all uranium enrichment activities would be subject to monitoring to provide assurance there is no undeclared HEU production.
7. For an excellent overview of IAEA safeguards at reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants, having regard to the FMCT context, see T.Shea, 'IAEA Perspectives on Verification Measures Relevant to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)', Proc. of the FOA Fissile Material Seminar, Stockholm, Hassel Udden, June 1998, and T.Shea, 'Reconciling IAEA Requirements in a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons or Other Explosive Devices', Disarmament Forum, Two, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1999.
8. For an excellent overview of IAEA safeguards at reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants, having regard to the FMCT context, see T.Shea, 'IAEA Perspectives on Verification Measures Relevant to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)', Proc. of the FOA Fissile Material Seminar, Stockholm, Hassel Udden, June 1998, and T.Shea, 'Reconciling IAEA Requirements in a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons or Other Explosive Devices', Disarmament Forum, Two, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1999.