Iriaichi: Collective versus individualized management of community forests in postwar Japan

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 866-886

  Kijima, Yoko ^a   Sakurai, Takeshi ^b   Otsuka, Keijiro ^c,d  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Natl Res Inst of Agric Economics   (Japan)

^c TOKYO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^d INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; COMMUNITY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; FOREST MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT PRACTICE; POST-WAR;

JAPAN;

EID: 0033816291     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/452481     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. See, e.g., Scott H. Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954): 124-42; Anthony Scott, "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy 63 (1955): 116-24; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; Martin L. Weitzman, "Free Access vs. Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property," Journal of Economic Theory 8 (1974): 225-34.
2. See, e.g., Scott H. Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954): 124-42; Anthony Scott, "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy 63 (1955): 116-24; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; Martin L. Weitzman, "Free Access vs. Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property," Journal of Economic Theory 8 (1974): 225-34.
3. See, e.g., Scott H. Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954): 124-42; Anthony Scott, "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy 63 (1955): 116-24; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; Martin L. Weitzman, "Free Access vs. Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property," Journal of Economic Theory 8 (1974): 225-34.
4. See, e.g., Scott H. Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954): 124-42; Anthony Scott, "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy 63 (1955): 116-24; Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Review 57 (1967): 347-59; Martin L. Weitzman, "Free Access vs. Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property," Journal of Economic Theory 8 (1974): 225-34.
5. David de Meza and J. R. Gould, "The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992): 561-80.
6. Daniel W. Bromley, "The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes," in Making the Commons Work, ed. Daniel W. Bromley (San Francisco: ICS, 1992).
7. See, e.g., Gordon McGranahan, "Fuelwood, Subsistence Foraging, and the Decline of Common Property," World Development 19 (1991): 1275-87; Elinor Ostrom and Roy Gardner, "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation System Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993): 93-112; Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
8. See, e.g., Gordon McGranahan, "Fuelwood, Subsistence Foraging, and the Decline of Common Property," World Development 19 (1991): 1275-87; Elinor Ostrom and Roy Gardner, "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation System Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993): 93-112; Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
9. See, e.g., Gordon McGranahan, "Fuelwood, Subsistence Foraging, and the Decline of Common Property," World Development 19 (1991): 1275-87; Elinor Ostrom and Roy Gardner, "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation System Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993): 93-112; Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
10. Rajiv Sethi and E. Somanathan, "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review 86 (1996): 766-88.
11. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 49-70, and "Common Property Rights," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987); Carlisle F. Runge, "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (1981): 595-606; Carl Dahlman, The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
12. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 49-70, and "Common Property Rights," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987); Carlisle F. Runge, "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (1981): 595-606; Carl Dahlman, The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
13. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 49-70, and "Common Property Rights," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987); Carlisle F. Runge, "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (1981): 595-606; Carl Dahlman, The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
14. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 49-70, and "Common Property Rights," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987); Carlisle F. Runge, "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (1981): 595-606; Carl Dahlman, The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
15. However, there are a few exceptions. For example, see Glenn G. Stevenson, Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
16. M. A. McKean and E. Ostrom, "Common Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a Relic from the Past?" Unasylva 46 (January 1995): 3-15.
17. J. E. Michael Arnold, "Devolution of Control of Common Pool Resources to Local Communities: Experiences in Forestry," in Land Distribution and Rural Poverty, ed. Alain de Janvry, Jean-Philippe Platteau, and Elizabeth Sadoulet (Oxford: Clarendon, forthcoming).
18. Margaret A. McKean, "Management of Traditional Common Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan," in Bromley, ed.
19. On the basis of a survey of the Japanese literature on community management of forests, it is reported by Takeshi Sakurai that the division of use rights of community forest land was practiced throughout the country in postwar Japan ("Communal Forest Management in Japan: Its History and Present Situation," Farming Japan 31 [1997]: 48-51).
20. There are a lot of documents on traditional iriaichi, but, to the best of our knowledge, all of them except the McKean article cited in n. 10 are written in Japanese. For example, see Toshio Furushima, Nihon Ringyo Seido no Kenkyu (A study of forestry institutions in Japan) (Tokyo: Todai Shuppan Kai, 1965); Kyoetsu Kasai, Rinya Seido no Hatten to Sanson Keizai (The development of forestry institutions and the economy of mountain villages) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1964); and Yasuo Kondo, Bokuyano Kenkyu (A study on grassland) (Tokyo: Todai Shuppan Kai, 1959).
21. There are a lot of documents on traditional iriaichi, but, to the best of our knowledge, all of them except the McKean article cited in n. 10 are written in Japanese. For example, see Toshio Furushima, Nihon Ringyo Seido no Kenkyu (A study of forestry institutions in Japan) (Tokyo: Todai Shuppan Kai, 1965); Kyoetsu Kasai, Rinya Seido no Hatten to Sanson Keizai (The development of forestry institutions and the economy of mountain villages) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1964); and Yasuo Kondo, Bokuyano Kenkyu (A study on grassland) (Tokyo: Todai Shuppan Kai, 1959).
22. There are a lot of documents on traditional iriaichi, but, to the best of our knowledge, all of them except the McKean article cited in n. 10 are written in Japanese. For example, see Toshio Furushima, Nihon Ringyo Seido no Kenkyu (A study of forestry institutions in Japan) (Tokyo: Todai Shuppan Kai, 1965); Kyoetsu Kasai, Rinya Seido no Hatten to Sanson Keizai (The development of forestry institutions and the economy of mountain villages) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1964); and Yasuo Kondo, Bokuyano Kenkyu (A study on grassland) (Tokyo: Todai Shuppan Kai, 1959).
23. We used the price of cedar board, which is representative of timber prices in Japan, and the price of wood for firewood and charcoal, both of which were obtained from Japan Forestry Agency, ed., Ringyo Tokei Yoran (Statistical handbook of forestry) (Tokyo: Rinya Kosaikai, 1970-90).
24. For forestry in postwar Japan, see Yoshifusa Kitabatake, "What Can Be Learned from Domestic and International Aspects of Japan's Forest Resource Utilization?" Natural Resources Journal 32 (1992): 855-81; Toshio Hagino, Nihon Gendai Rinsei no Sengo Katei: Sono 50-nen no Jissho (Process of modern forestry policies in Japan: Fifty years of experience) (Tokyo: Nihon Ringyo Chosa Kai, 1996).
25. For forestry in postwar Japan, see Yoshifusa Kitabatake, "What Can Be Learned from Domestic and International Aspects of Japan's Forest Resource Utilization?" Natural Resources Journal 32 (1992): 855-81; Toshio Hagino, Nihon Gendai Rinsei no Sengo Katei: Sono 50-nen no Jissho (Process of modern forestry policies in Japan: Fifty years of experience) (Tokyo: Nihon Ringyo Chosa Kai, 1996).
26. Yoko Kijima, "Shinrin Kanrino Keizai Kouritsu: Sengo Nihon no Kyoyurin ni Okeru Jissho Bunseki" (Efficiency in management of community forests: An empirical analysis in postwar Japan) Keizai to Keizaigaku (Journal of the faculty of economics of Tokyo Metropolitan University) 87:67-77.
27. Since the mid-1970s, the real price of timber has declined because of massive imports of cheap timber from abroad, facilitated by the gradual appreciation of the yen.
28. Yujiro Hayami, S. Yamada, with M. Akino et al., The Agricultural Development of Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991).
29. J. Y. Lin, "The Household Responsibility System in China's Agricultural Reform: A Theoretical and Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 36 (1988): 199-224.
30. Parcel is called fude, which is a unit of area distinguishable from other areas in terms of land use.
31. Complete privatization was unfeasible in many cases. Although shares of community ownership rights were officially granted to individual members by the land-titling program in the late nineteenth century when the land tax system was introduced, the inheritance of those rights was not registered in many cases, and some offspring of the original owners had left the villages. Without consent of all the owners, community ownership could not be officially changed into truly private ownership.
32. When the land tax system was introduced in 1873, many community forests were nationalized, even though they were used by the communities. Responding to repeated requests by the communities that had lost forests, the government sold the land rights of forests to communities in the 1910s at the nominal value. See Kyoetsu Kasai, Rinya Seido no Hatten to Sanson Keizai (The development of forestry institutions and the economy of mountain villages) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1964).
33. Japan, Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Nogyo Sensasu, Nogyo Shuraku Kado (Agricultural census, agricultural community card) (Tokyo: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 1995). The earliest year for which data on communities (shuraku) could be obtained was 1970. Shuraku is smaller than the smallest administrative unit (village, town, or city depending on the population). We believe that the relative magnitudes of the community specific variables we used for the regression analysis have been largely unchanged for many years.
34. Among our sample communities, about 60% of households owned private forests, which were generally located in flatter areas near residences. Private forests were generally used as grassland before the war but were mostly converted to timber forests after that.
35. According to our interviews, households that owned private forests placed higher priority on the management of private forests than on that of community forests. Although this may reflect the superior incentive system of private ownership, it may also be due to the advantageous locations and generally more fertile soil of the private forests.
36. Since private forests were not subject to the land redistribution program of the land reform, the inequality of private forest ownership would not have changed significantly over extended periods. However, the inequality of the ownership of paddy fields must have changed substantially because of land reform.
37. Robert Wade, Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
38. Although we tried to select eight parcels from each community forest, we could select only seven cedar-planted parcels suitable for our analysis in two community forests. Hence, we selected nine parcels in two other community forests so as to maintain a total sample size of 32 collectively managed parcels and 32 individually managed parcels.
39. The analysis of aerial photographs was conducted by specialists at the Japan Forest Technical Association, Tokyo.
40. See G. S. Maddala, Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), for the construction of eq. (1).
41. This is different from the East African finding of Sandeep H. Patel, Thomas C. Pinckney, and William K. Jaeger, "Smallholder Wood Production and Population Pressure in East Africa: Evidence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve?" Land Economics 71 (1995): 516-30, that trees were more actively planted by wealthier people.
42. This point is commonly and widely recognized by those who are concerned with community forest management and policies. On the basis of this common recognition, the Forestry Agency of Japan has implemented the so-called modernization of the iriaichi program (Iriai Kindai-ka Jigyo) since 1967 to reorganize iriaichi toward an individualized ownership system or a cooperative ownership system in which clear ownership rights are established formally. See Masaomi Takai, Kaisaku Kumagai, Saburo Kuroki, and Hidetoshi Nakao, Rinya Iriaiken: Sono Seibi to Kadai (Common property rights: Reorganization and problems) (Tokyo: Ichirya Sha, 1989).
43. For a more compelling statistical test, it is desirable to obtain direct evidence on the relative profitability of timber production under individualized and collective management. Production records, however, are unavailable, and we had to rely on data generated from aerial photos. According to the results of our interview surveys, less thinning was in fact carried out under collective management because of the lack of work incentives and the difficulty in organizing collective work.