Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 21, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 781-793

  Ahmed, Samina ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING; SECURITY THREAT;

PAKISTAN;

EID: 0033667129     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/014365900750011972     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. M E Carranza, 'An impossible game: stable nuclear deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani tests', The Nonproliferation Review, 6 (3), 1999, p 12.
2. Rejecting internal criticism that Pakistan is internationally isolated as a result of its regional policies, Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf says: 'Nobody can ignore a nuclear state with a population of 140 million. We [need] to play our cards right'. M Ziauddin, 'CE hints at meeting politicians soon: but corrupt to be kept away', Dawn, 26 May 2000.
3. Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, for instance, calls upon the international community to appreciate and support Pakistan's proposals for a South Asian 'strategic nuclear restraint regime'. Hasan Akhtar, 'Discrimination opposed: Pakistan to retain nuclear deterrence', Dawn, 24 May 2000.
4. Pakistan and India were on the brink of war in 1986-87, 1990 and 1999.
5. See S Ahmed, 'Pakistan's nuclear weapons program: turning point and nuclear choices', International Security, 26(4), 1999, pp 183-184.
6. The USA failed to persuade France and the UK to impose sanctions, which were also opposed by Russia.
7. Following the May tests, the head of Pakistan's uranium enrichment laboratories, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, noted that Pakistan could now be 'counted among the only seven countries of the globe having a nuclear capability'. 'Nuclear blasts have added to country's pride: Qadeer', Dawn 1 January 1999.
8. A former military official discloses that the high command put 'pressure on the government to let India know, in no uncertain terms, that Pakistan also possessed weapons of mass destruction'. Lt Gen (retd) K Matinuddin, 'Nuclearization of South Asia: implications and prospects', Spotlight on Regional Issues, 17 (7-8), 1998, pp 33-34.
9. S Ahmed, The nuclear debate', Newsline, June 1998, pp 191-192.
10. M E Carranza, 'Rethinking Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations: condemned to nuclear confrontation?' Asian Survey, 26 (6), 1996, p 572.
11. T Graham, Jr. 'Sanctions: hang tough', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54 (5), 1998, pp 24-25.
12. Carranza, 'Rethinking Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations', p 567.
13. US intelligence sources disclose that Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan included nuclear materials, reactor and enrichment technology and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. D Albright, F Berkhout & W Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, New York: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1997, pp 166-167.
14. The test site had already been prepared in 1996 after report that India intended to conduct tests in 1995. Zahid Hussain, 'Laying the groundwork', Newsline, June 1998 p 24 . See also D Albright, 'Pakistan: the other shoe drops', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 54 (4), 1998, p 24.
15. The test site had already been prepared in 1996 after report that India intended to conduct tests in 1995. Zahid Hussain, 'Laying the groundwork', Newsline, June 1998 p 24 . See also D Albright, 'Pakistan: the other shoe drops', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 54 (4), 1998, p 24.
16. Dr A Q Khan states that a decision was taken to detonate 'our own nuclear devise the very day India staged its second nuclear test', but delayed until the government first ascertained the international reaction to the Indian explosion. 'PM had decided to detonate nuclear devise on May 9, Dr Khan', Dawn, 16 February 1999.
17. In the 1980s the USA waived us Pakistan-specific non-proliferation legislation on five consecutive occasions, despite its knowledge that Pakistan was a violator. M Reiss, 'Safeguarding the nuclear peace in South Asia', Asian Survey, 38 (12), 1993, p 1110.
18. The Brown amendment allowed the delivery of a package of weapons and military hardware to Pakistan and the Harkin - Warner amendment restored support for US companies operating in Pakistan under the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
19. Information Minister Mushahid Hussain claimed that U:S incentives included $3 billion in economic assistance.
20. A Statutory Regulatory Order was issued to control the export of nuclear technology or nuclear substances. Ansur Abbasi, 'Pakistan puts curbs on export of nuclear material', Dawn, 11 March 1999.
21. Pakistan's debt was rescheduled until January 2001 but the disbursement of additional funding from international financial institutions (IFIS) such as the IMF and the Asian Development Bank is still being negotiated.
22. Quoted in P Hoodbhoy, 'Pakistan's nuclear future', in S Ahmed & Cortright (eds), Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinon and Nucleus Options, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998, p 78.
23. Quoted in Z Hussein, 'On the brink', Newsline, June 1999, pp 24-25.
24. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad warned India, 'We will not hesitate to use any weapons in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity'. Quoted in News Desk, 'Pakistan may use any weapon', The News, 31 May, 1999.
25. US negotiator, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott states: 'Having India and Pakistan stabilize their nuclear competition at the lowest level is both the starting point and the near term objective of US diplomatic efforts'. S Talbott, 'Dealing with the bomb in South Asia', Foreign Policy, 78, 1999, pp 111, 119.
26. As a result of his discussions with Talbott, claims Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, the USA recognises 'that India shall maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent as determined by us. There is no longer any talk of a "rollback"'. Interview With Jaswant Singh, The Hindu, 29 November 1999.
27. Statesman News Service, 'N-button in PM's hands', Statesman, 18 August 1999.
28. 'US urged to set up rational security architecture,' Dawn, 1 June 2000.
29. Z Hussain, 'Beating a hasty retreat', Newsline, July 1999, p 23.
30. In the India - Pakistan context, states Indian Army Chief, V P Malik, 'Having crossed the nuclear threshold does not mean that a conventional war is out ... nuclear deterrence only restricts all out war'. Quoted in 'Army chief fears rising tension on China's borders', Asian Age, 11 February 1999.
31. According to Pakistan's military ruler, General Musharraf, Pakistan would 'never' use nuclear weapons unless it was attacked, adding that: 'We are not Iraq ... No threat can go unanswered'. Shaheen Sehbai, 'Musharraf may visit Kabul for talks on Osama', Dawn, 5 February 2000.