Planning and the liberal paradox: A democratic dilemma in social choice

Journal of Planning Literature

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 16-29

  Sager, Tore ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LIBERALIMS; PARETO PRINCIPLE; PLANNING PRACTICE; PLANNING THEORY; SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY; THEORY;

EID: 0031402131     PISSN: 08854122     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/088541229701200102     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. Aldrich, John. 1977. The dilemma of a Paretian liberal: Some consequences of Sen's theorem. Public Choice 30 (Summer): 1-21.
2. Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. Social choice and individual values. New York: John Wiley.
3. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas. 1986. Resolution of paradoxes in social choice. In Microeconomic theory, Larry Samuelson, ed. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
4. _. 1984. On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice. Journal of Economic Theory 32, 1: 52-66.
5. Banfield, Edward C. 1959. Ends and means in planning. International Social Science Journal 11, 3: 361-68.
6. Bar-Hillel, Maya, and Avishai Margalit. 1988. How vicious are cycles of intransitive choice? Theory and Decision 24, 2: 119-45.
7. Barry, Brian. 1986. Lady Chatterley's Lover and Doctor Fischer's Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto optimality and the problem of objectional preferences. In Foundations of social choice theory, Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Batra, Raveendran N., and Prasanta K. Pattanaik. 1972. On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions. Theory and Decision 3, 1: 1-11.
9. Bell, David E. 1985. Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research 33, 1: 1-27.
10. Bernholz, Peter. 1980. A general social dilemma: Profitable exchange and intransitive group preferences. Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 40, 1-2:1-23.
11. _. 1974. Is a Paretian liberal really impossible? Public Choice 20 (Winter): 99-107.
12. Blair, Douglas H., Georges Bordes, Jerry S. Kelly, and Kotaro Suzumura. 1976. Impossibility theorems without collective rationality. Journal of Economic Theory 13, 3:361-79.
13. Blair, Douglas H., and Robert A. Pollak. 1986. Rationality and social choice. In Microeconomic theory, Larry Samuelson, ed. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
14. Blau, J. H. 1975. Liberal values and independence. Review of Economic Studies 42, 3: 395-401.
15. Brand, A. 1990. The force of reason: An introduction to Habermas' theory of communicative action. London: Allen & Unwin.
16. Breyer, Friedrich, and Gary A. Gigliotti. 1980. Empathy and respect for the rights of others. Journal of Economics/Zeitschrifl für Nationalökonomie 40, 1-2: 59-64.
17. Broome, John. 1989. Should social preferences be consistent? Economics and Philosophy 5, 1: 7-17.
18. Craib, Ian. 1989. Psychoanalysis and social theory: The limits of sociology. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
19. Elster, Jon. 1989. Solomonic judgements: Studies in the limitations of rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20. _. 1986. The market and the forum: Three varieties of political theory. In Foundations of social choice theory, Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21. Faludi, Andreas. 1987. A decision-centered view af environmental planning. Oxford: Pergamon.
22. Feld, Scott L., and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Collectivities as actors: Consistency of collective choices. Rationality and Society 2, 4: 429-48.
23. Ferejohn, John A., and David M. Grether. 1977. Some new impossibility theorems. Public Choice 30 (Summer): 35-42.
24. Fischer, Frank. 1990. Technocracy and the politics of expertise. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
25. Fischer, Frank, and John Forester, eds. 1993. The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
26. Fishkin, James S. 1992. The dialogue of justice: Toward a self-reflective society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
27. Forester, John. 1993a. Beyond dialogue to transformative learning: How deliberative rituals encourage political judgment in community planning processes. Paper presented at Workshop on Evaluating the Theory-Practice and Urban-Rural Interplay in Planning, Ban, Italy, November 18-20.
28. _. 1993b. Critical theory, public policy, and planning practice: Toward a critical pragmatism. Albany: State University of New York Press.
29. _. 1993c. Learning from practice stories: The priority of practical judgment. In The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. See Fischer and Forester 1993.
30. _. 1991. Anticipating implementation: Reflective and normative practices in policy analysis and planning. In The reflective turn: Case studies in and on educational practice, Donald A. Schön, ed. New York: Teachers College Press.
31. _. 1989. Planning in the face of power. Berkeley: University of California Press.
32. Friedmann, John. 1994. The utility of non-Euclidean planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 60, 3: 377-79.
33. _. 1993. Toward a non-Euclidean mode of planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 59, 4: 482-85.
34. _. 1992. Empowerment: The politics of alternative development. Oxford: Blackwell.
35. _. 1987. Planning in the public domain: From knowledge to action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
36. _. 1973. Retracking America: A theory of transactive planning. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
37. Frohock, Fred M. 1987. Rational association. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
38. _. 1980. Rationality, morality, and impossibility theorems. American Political Science Review 74, 2: 373-84.
39. Gaertner, Wulf, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Kotaro Suzumura. 1992. Individual rights revisited. Economica 59 (May): 161-77.
40. Gärdenfors, Peter, and Philip Pettit. 1989. The impossibility of a Paretian loyalist. Theory and Decision 27, 3: 207-16.
41. Gibbard, Allan. 1974. A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim. Journal of Economic Theory 7, 4: 38-410.
42. Goodin, Robert E. 1986. Laundering preferences. In Foundations of social choice theory, Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43. Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. The theory of communicative action, vol. 2: Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason. Boston: Beacon.
44. _. 1984. The theory of communicative action, vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society. London: Heinemann.
45. Hardin, Russell. 1988. Morality within the limits of reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
46. 't Hart, Paul. 1990. Groupthink in government: A study of small groups and policy failure. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger.
47. Haworth, Lawrence. 1984. Orwell, the planning profession, and autonomy. Environments 16, 2: 10-15.
48. Hayek, Friedrich A. 1944. The road to serfdom. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
49. Hurley, Susan L. 1989. Natural reasons: Personality and polity. New York: Oxford University Press.
50. Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
51. Kelly, Jerry S. 1987. An interview with Kenneth J. Arrow. Social Choice and Welfare 4, 1: 43-62.
52. _. 1978. Arrow impossibility theorems. New York: Academic Press.
53. Kelsey, David. 1987. The role of information in social welfare judgements. Oxford Economic Papers 39, 2: 301-17.
54. _. 1985. The liberal paradox: A generalisation. Social Choice and Welfare 1, 4: 245-50.
55. Knight, Jade, and James Johnson. 1994. Aggregation and deliberation: On the possibility of democratic legitimacy. Political Theory 22, 2: 277-96.
56. Levi, Isaac. 1982. Liberty and welfare. In Utilitarianism and beyond, Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
57. Lindblom, Charles. 1959. The science of "muddling through." Public Administration Review 19, 2: 79-88.
58. Luke, Timothy W. 1987. Methodological individualism: The essential ellipsis of rational choice theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17, 3: 341-55.
59. McCarthy, Thomas. 1984. The critical theory of Jürgen Habermas. Oxford.: Polity.
60. Meyerson, Martin. 1956. Building the middle-range bridge for comprehensive planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 22, 2: 58-64.
61. Michael, Donald. 1973. On learning to plan and planning to learn. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
62. Miller, David. 1992. Deliberative democracy and social choice. Political Studies 40 (special issue): 54-67.
63. Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, state and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
64. Park, W. 1990. A review of research on groupthink. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 3, 4: 229-45.
65. Pattanaik, Prasanta. 1988. On the consistency of libertarian values. Economica 55 (November): 517-24.
66. Pearce, David W. 1983. Cost-benefit analysis, 2d ed. New York: St. Martin's.
67. Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: Freeman.
68. Riley, Jonathan. 1988. Liberal utilitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
69. Romney, A. Kimball, Susan Weller, and W. Batchelder. 1986. Culture as consensus: A theory of culture and informant accuracy. American Anthropologist 88, 2: 313-38.
70. Sager, Tore. Forthcoming. Meaningful collective choice? Public planning and Arrow's theorem. Progress in Planning.
71. _. 1994. Communicative planning theory. Aldershot, England: Avebury.
72. _. 1990. Communicate or calculate: Planning theory and social science concepts in a contingency perspective. Ph.D. diss. (No. 11), Nordic Institute for Studies in Urban and Regional Planning, Stockholm, Sweden.
73. Schön, Donald A. 1983. The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. London: Temple Smith.
74. Seabright, Paul. 1989. Social choice and social theories. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, 4: 365-87.
75. Seidl, Christian. 1986. The impossibility of nondictatorial tolerance. Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Suppl. 5): 211-25.
76. Sen, Amartya. 1992. Minimal liberty. Economica 59 (May): 139-59.
77. _. 1986. Social choice theory. In Handbook of mathematical economics, vol. 3, Kenneth J. Arrow and Michael D. Intriligator, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
78. _. 1983. Liberty and social choice. Journal of Philosophy 80, 1: 5-28.
79. _. 1982a. Introduction. In Choice, welfare and measurement, Amartya Sen, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
80. _. 1982b. Liberty as control: An appraisal. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7: 207-21.
81. _. 1976. Liberty, unanimity and rights. Economica 43, 171: 217-45.
82. _. 1970a. Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
83. _. 1970b. The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Journal of Political Economy 78, 1: 152-57.
84. Subramanian, S. 1987. The liberal paradox with fuzzy preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 4, 3: 213-18.
85. Sugden, Robert. 1985. Why be consistent? A critical analysis of consistency requirements in choice theory. Economica 52, 206: 167-83.
86. Uhlaner, Carole Jean. 1989. "Relational goods" and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action. Public Choice 62, 3: 253-85.
87. Vallentyne, Peter. 1989. How to combine Pareto optimality with liberty considerations. Theory and Decision 27, 3: 217-40.
88. Wollheim, Richard. 1962. A paradox in the theory of democracy. In Philosophy, politics and society, 2nd series, Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
89. Wootton, Barbara. 1945. Freedom under planning. Westport, CT: Greenwood.