Madison and after: The American model of political constitution

Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 592-604

  Elkin, Stephen L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040062322     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00602.x     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Since the term 'republican' will be used throughout the text, it will help to set out here what I mean by it. By republican I mean to connote that set of historical efforts to create regimes in which the people are to rule and their rule is to consist not of anything they (or more to the point, a majority of them) care to do. What the substance of these limits and the means of giving them life are to be has been the subject of much discussion and there has been much variety in the actual practices aimed at doing so. 'Republican' is to be contrasted with 'civic republican' which is an older doctrine that, whatever else it may be, is not centred on the rule of the people. On these two republicanisms, see the discussion by Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: the Moral Vision of the Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988). For a view that tends to merge the two see J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, University of Princeton Press, 1975).
2. Since the term 'republican' will be used throughout the text, it will help to set out here what I mean by it. By republican I mean to connote that set of historical efforts to create regimes in which the people are to rule and their rule is to consist not of anything they (or more to the point, a majority of them) care to do. What the substance of these limits and the means of giving them life are to be has been the subject of much discussion and there has been much variety in the actual practices aimed at doing so. 'Republican' is to be contrasted with 'civic republican' which is an older doctrine that, whatever else it may be, is not centred on the rule of the people. On these two republicanisms, see the discussion by Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: the Moral Vision of the Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988). For a view that tends to merge the two see J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, University of Princeton Press, 1975).
3. For some evidence about our aspirations, see Robert Lane, 'Market justice, political justice,' American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 383-402; Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984); Pamela Johnston Conover et al., 'Duty is a Four Letter Word: Democratic Citizenship in a Liberal Polity' (University of North Carolina, n.d.); and Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. ch. 6.
4. For some evidence about our aspirations, see Robert Lane, 'Market justice, political justice,' American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 383-402; Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984); Pamela Johnston Conover et al., 'Duty is a Four Letter Word: Democratic Citizenship in a Liberal Polity' (University of North Carolina, n.d.); and Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. ch. 6.
5. For some evidence about our aspirations, see Robert Lane, 'Market justice, political justice,' American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 383-402; Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984); Pamela Johnston Conover et al., 'Duty is a Four Letter Word: Democratic Citizenship in a Liberal Polity' (University of North Carolina, n.d.); and Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. ch. 6.
6. For some evidence about our aspirations, see Robert Lane, 'Market justice, political justice,' American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 383-402; Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984); Pamela Johnston Conover et al., 'Duty is a Four Letter Word: Democratic Citizenship in a Liberal Polity' (University of North Carolina, n.d.); and Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. ch. 6.
7. Cf. Edmund S. Morgan's comments that 'Madison wrote not only the United States Constitution, or at least most of it, but also the most searching commentary on it that has ever appeared'. 'The Fixers,' New York Review of Books, 2 March (1995), 25-27, p. 25.
8. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
9. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
10. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
11. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
12. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
13. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
14. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
15. For a longer account of Madison's theory see the chapter by Richard Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution: the separation of powers, rights and representative democracy,' in this volume. In my understanding of Madison, I have been helped by the many excellent discussions of his thought, particularly those by Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990); Garry Wills, Explaining America: the Federalist (Garden City, Doubleday, 1981); David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984); Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Marc F. Plattner, 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit' in Robert Goldwin and William A. Shambra (eds), How Capitalistic is the Constitution? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1982). Two recent and thoughtful overviews of his thought can be found in Drew A. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Richard K. Matthews, If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (Lawrence KA, University Press of Kansas, 1995).
16. The Federalist, no. 10 in J. E. Cooke (ed.), The Federalist (Middletown CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1961).
17. Again see Bellamy, 'The political form of the constitution'.
18. The Federalist, no. 51.
19. James Madison, 20 June 1788, as quoted in Ann Stuart Diamond, 'Decent even though democratic,' in R. Goldwin and W. Schambra (eds), How Democratic is the Constitution?, p. 38.
20. Cf. Plattner 'American democracy and the acquisitive spirit'.
21. See the summing up of this literature in Stephen L. Elkin, 'Business-state relations in the commercial republic,' Journal of Political Philosophy, 2, 2 (1994), 115-39.
22. The canonical text is probably George Stigler, The Citizen and the State (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975). See also the broad survey by Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds), The Democratic State (Lawrence KS, The University Press of Kansas, 1985). See also my introductory essay in that volume 'Between liberalism and capitalism: an introduction to the democratic state'.
23. The canonical text is probably George Stigler, The Citizen and the State (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975). See also the broad survey by Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds), The Democratic State (Lawrence KS, The University Press of Kansas, 1985). See also my introductory essay in that volume 'Between liberalism and capitalism: an introduction to the democratic state'.
24. Although even here there is reason to be uneasy about Madison's formulations. As Lindblom has argued, the privileged position of business operates outside of electoral control. See his Politics and Markets (New York, Basic, 1977).
25. See The Federalist, no. 10; see also Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, esp. ch. 5.
26. See The Federalist, no. 10; see also Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, esp. ch. 5.
27. The Federalist, no. 37. See also, Herbert Storing, 'The constitution and the Bill of Rights' in Robert Goldwin and William Schambra (eds), How does the Constitution secure Rights? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1985).
28. The Federalist, no. 37. See also, Herbert Storing, 'The constitution and the Bill of Rights' in Robert Goldwin and William Schambra (eds), How does the Constitution secure Rights? (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1985).
29. The Federalist, nos 11, 12 and 30.
30. I here draw freely on my 'The constitution of a good society: the case of the commercial republic' in Karol E. Soltan and Stephen L. Elkin (eds), The Constitution of Good Societies (University Park, Penn State Press, forthcoming).
31. See Lindblom, Politics and Markets, esp. ch. 13 and Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 4. Cf. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, ch. 7.
32. See Lindblom, Politics and Markets, esp. ch. 13 and Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 4. Cf. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, ch. 7.
33. See Lindblom, Politics and Markets, esp. ch. 13 and Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 4. Cf. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, ch. 7.
34. See the discussion in Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, ch. 6.
35. A parallel argument has been made by both Samuel Huntington and Bernard Crick. Huntington comments that 'the capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests' and 'the public interest is the interest of public institutions'. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 24, 25. Crick says that the public interest is simply a way of 'describing the common interest in preserving the means of making public decisions politically'. Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 177.
36. A parallel argument has been made by both Samuel Huntington and Bernard Crick. Huntington comments that 'the capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests' and 'the public interest is the interest of public institutions'. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 24, 25. Crick says that the public interest is simply a way of 'describing the common interest in preserving the means of making public decisions politically'. Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 177.
37. I have discussed how citizens might learn the broad substance of the public interest in 'Citizen and city locality, public-spiritedness and the American regime' in Martha Derthick (ed.), Local Self-Government (Washington, The Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution, forthcoming).
38. Adams to Caleb Davis, 3 April, 1781. In Harry Alonzo Cushing (ed.), The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York, 1904-1908), vol. 4, p. 255.
39. As quoted in Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, Norton, 1972), p. 427.
40. J. Shklar, American Citizenship: the Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 5. Shklar goes on to say that what she calls 'ideal citizens' have 'no serious interests apart from public activity; they live in and for the forum'. She further comments that 'these perfected citizens are sometimes thought to be healthier and more fulfilled than people who are indifferent to politics, but there is little medical proof of such a proposition'. (p. 11).
41. For a discussion of this whole matter see Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, esp. chs 8-9.