The limits of neorealism: Understanding security in Central Asia

Review of International Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 87-105

  Menon, Rajan ^a   Spruyt, Hendrik ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033480287     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S026021059900087X     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. For the rationale behind this testing procedure, see, for example, H. Eckstein, 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science,' in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, 7 (Reading, MA, 1975), p. 119.
2. B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993); M. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151-69.
3. B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993); M. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151-69.
4. Even those partial to neorealism are forced to invoke domestic level variables to explain when and how conflict occurs. See, for example, S. David, 'Explaining Third World Realignment', World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 233-56; S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987).
5. Even those partial to neorealism are forced to invoke domestic level variables to explain when and how conflict occurs. See, for example, S. David, 'Explaining Third World Realignment', World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 233-56; S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987).
6. D. Anglin, 'Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments', Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 431-55; S. Decalo, 'The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa', African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 7-36; S. Makinda, 'Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996), pp. 555-73.
7. D. Anglin, 'Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments', Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 431-55; S. Decalo, 'The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa', African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 7-36; S. Makinda, 'Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996), pp. 555-73.
8. D. Anglin, 'Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments', Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 431-55; S. Decalo, 'The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa', African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 7-36; S. Makinda, 'Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996), pp. 555-73.
9. See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT. 1975); H. D'Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus.
10. See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT. 1975); H. D'Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus.
11. See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT. 1975); H. D'Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus.
12. See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT. 1975); H. D'Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus.
13. See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT. 1975); H. D'Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus.
14. The East Asian states are prime examples. For a discussion of the 'developmental state', see F. Deyo, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, 1987). On the broader phenomenon, see A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1962).
15. The East Asian states are prime examples. For a discussion of the 'developmental state', see F. Deyo, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, 1987). On the broader phenomenon, see A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1962).
16. J. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, 1988). For the lack of state capacity of developing states also see R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990).
17. J. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, 1988). For the lack of state capacity of developing states also see R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990).
18. B. Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', Survival, 35 (1993), pp. 71-91.
19. C. Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985).
20. For the continued presence of former Communist cadres in the post-breakup USSR, see R. Suny, Revenge of the Past (Stanford, CA, 1993).
21. See, for example, the various suggestions to manage ethnic cleavages in Africa. S. Makinda, 'Democracy and Multi-Party Politics'; R. Southall, 'Negotiations and Social Democracy in South Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 487-509.
22. See, for example, the various suggestions to manage ethnic cleavages in Africa. S. Makinda, 'Democracy and Multi-Party Politics'; R. Southall, 'Negotiations and Social Democracy in South Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 487-509.
23. J. Herbst, 'War and the State in Africa', International Security 14 (Spring 1990), p. 119;
24. Herbst, 'The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa', International Organization 43 (Autumn 1989), pp. 673-92.
25. R. Menon, 'In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia', International Security, 20 (Summer 1995), p. 151.
26. C. Gall and T. de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London, 1997).
27. R. Menon, 'In the Shadow of the Bear'; Menon, 'After Empire: Russia and the Southern "Near Abroad"', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.). The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York, 1998).
28. R. Menon, 'In the Shadow of the Bear'; Menon, 'After Empire: Russia and the Southern "Near Abroad"', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.). The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York, 1998).
29. On China's growing power see A. Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia'; R. Betts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability'; D. Ball, 'Arms and Affluence' all in International Security 18 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-112.
30. On China's growing power see A. Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia'; R. Betts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability'; D. Ball, 'Arms and Affluence' all in International Security 18 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-112.
31. On China's growing power see A. Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia'; R. Betts, 'Wealth, Power and Instability'; D. Ball, 'Arms and Affluence' all in International Security 18 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-112.
32. Recent incidents pointing to ethnic tensions in Xinjiang include a 1990 rebellion near Kashgar, which was suppressed at the cost of 50 lives; bombings and the killings of establishment clerics and law enforcement personnel in Kashgar and Urumqi in 1992; and the arrest of thousands of Uighur elites and fighting between Uighurs and police in the summer of 1996. The principal factor behind the unrest, which by no means threatens Beijing's control of the region, is resentment over migration into Xinjiang of Han Chinese, who have grown from under four per cent of the region's population in 1949 to over half in 1996. Militant Islam, while also a factor, is of decidedly secondary importance. Details from A. Davis and S. Suh, 'The West Gets Wilder: Separatist Violence Worries the Xinjiang Government', Asiaweek, June 14, 1996, pp. 32-33. Also see 'The Uighurs: China's Muslim Rebels', The Economist, June 13, 1996, p. 33. For a good overview of ethnic questions in China, see D. Gladney, 'Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference', in W. Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1994 (Boulder, CO, 1994).
33. Recent incidents pointing to ethnic tensions in Xinjiang include a 1990 rebellion near Kashgar, which was suppressed at the cost of 50 lives; bombings and the killings of establishment clerics and law enforcement personnel in Kashgar and Urumqi in 1992; and the arrest of thousands of Uighur elites and fighting between Uighurs and police in the summer of 1996. The principal factor behind the unrest, which by no means threatens Beijing's control of the region, is resentment over migration into Xinjiang of Han Chinese, who have grown from under four per cent of the region's population in 1949 to over half in 1996. Militant Islam, while also a factor, is of decidedly secondary importance. Details from A. Davis and S. Suh, 'The West Gets Wilder: Separatist Violence Worries the Xinjiang Government', Asiaweek, June 14, 1996, pp. 32-33. Also see 'The Uighurs: China's Muslim Rebels', The Economist, June 13, 1996, p. 33. For a good overview of ethnic questions in China, see D. Gladney, 'Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference', in W. Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1994 (Boulder, CO, 1994).
34. Recent incidents pointing to ethnic tensions in Xinjiang include a 1990 rebellion near Kashgar, which was suppressed at the cost of 50 lives; bombings and the killings of establishment clerics and law enforcement personnel in Kashgar and Urumqi in 1992; and the arrest of thousands of Uighur elites and fighting between Uighurs and police in the summer of 1996. The principal factor behind the unrest, which by no means threatens Beijing's control of the region, is resentment over migration into Xinjiang of Han Chinese, who have grown from under four per cent of the region's population in 1949 to over half in 1996. Militant Islam, while also a factor, is of decidedly secondary importance. Details from A. Davis and S. Suh, 'The West Gets Wilder: Separatist Violence Worries the Xinjiang Government', Asiaweek, June 14, 1996, pp. 32-33. Also see 'The Uighurs: China's Muslim Rebels', The Economist, June 13, 1996, p. 33. For a good overview of ethnic questions in China, see D. Gladney, 'Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference', in W. Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1994 (Boulder, CO, 1994).
35. This has been apparent as early as 1992. In a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, in November of that year, (then) Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, noted that Central Asia should 'remain a CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] sphere and not a sphere of extremist forces and, in particular, of Islamic fundamentalism. And in this, I think, we can count on mutual understanding from our great neighbour'. Qian responded that Russia and China 'have common interests in preserving stability in the Central Asian region' and that China would expand economic relations with Central Asia taking account of the region's close links with Russia. Itar-Tass World Service in Russian, 1300 GMT, November 25, 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV, November 27, 1992, p. 9.
36. For the limits of Turkish and Iranian influence, see E. Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South (London, 1995); G. Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, 1995); S. Sayari, 'Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia', in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington, 1994). For the argument that the influence will likely flow the other way, see D. Pipes, 'The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World (New York, 1994).
37. For the limits of Turkish and Iranian influence, see E. Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South (London, 1995); G. Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, 1995); S. Sayari, 'Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia', in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington, 1994). For the argument that the influence will likely flow the other way, see D. Pipes, 'The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World (New York, 1994).
38. For the limits of Turkish and Iranian influence, see E. Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South (London, 1995); G. Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, 1995); S. Sayari, 'Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia', in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington, 1994). For the argument that the influence will likely flow the other way, see D. Pipes, 'The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World (New York, 1994).
39. For the limits of Turkish and Iranian influence, see E. Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South (London, 1995); G. Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, 1995); S. Sayari, 'Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia', in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington, 1994). For the argument that the influence will likely flow the other way, see D. Pipes, 'The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World (New York, 1994).
40. L. Greenfield, Nationalism :Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 1992); R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, 1992).
41. L. Greenfield, Nationalism :Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 1992); R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, 1992).
42. S. Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State (London, 1995), pp. 1-3, 71-2; M. B. Olcott, V. Tishkov, and A. Malashenko (eds), Identitchnost'i konflikt vpostsovetskikh gosudarstvakh (Identity and Conflict in the Post-Soviet States) (Moscow, 1997).
43. S. Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State (London, 1995), pp. 1-3, 71-2; M. B. Olcott, V. Tishkov, and A. Malashenko (eds), Identitchnost'i konflikt vpostsovetskikh gosudarstvakh (Identity and Conflict in the Post-Soviet States) (Moscow, 1997).
44. See, for example, the discussion of Kazakh attempts to restructure northern municipal governments run by Russians in I. Bremmer, 'Nazarbaev and the North: State-Building and Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan', Ethnic and Racial Studies. 17 (October 1994), pp. 619-35.
45. Turnover is likely given that seventy per cent of the region's population is under 40 years of age and the average number of net births per thousand for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, far exceeds the average for the other former Soviet republics. A. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London, 1994), p. 57; The First Book of Demographics for the Former Soviet Union (Shady Side, MD, 1992).
46. Turnover is likely given that seventy per cent of the region's population is under 40 years of age and the average number of net births per thousand for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, far exceeds the average for the other former Soviet republics. A. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London, 1994), p. 57; The First Book of Demographics for the Former Soviet Union (Shady Side, MD, 1992).
47. R. Bendix, Kings or People (Berkeley, CA, 1978); G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (New York, 1955).
48. R. Bendix, Kings or People (Berkeley, CA, 1978); G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (New York, 1955).
49. S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT, 1968).
50. B. Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Conservatives Triumph', RFEIRL Research Report, 2 (February 12, 1993), pp. 9-12; O. Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications (Washington, DC., 1993); Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan'; S. Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan', Harriman Institute Forum, 6 (July, 1993).
51. B. Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Conservatives Triumph', RFEIRL Research Report, 2 (February 12, 1993), pp. 9-12; O. Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications (Washington, DC., 1993); Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan'; S. Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan', Harriman Institute Forum, 6 (July, 1993).
52. B. Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Conservatives Triumph', RFEIRL Research Report, 2 (February 12, 1993), pp. 9-12; O. Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications (Washington, DC., 1993); Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan'; S. Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan', Harriman Institute Forum, 6 (July, 1993).
53. B. Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Conservatives Triumph', RFEIRL Research Report, 2 (February 12, 1993), pp. 9-12; O. Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications (Washington, DC., 1993); Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan'; S. Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan', Harriman Institute Forum, 6 (July, 1993).
54. See the chapters by M.B. Olcott and E. Huskey, in I. Bremmer and R. Taras (eds.), New States, New Politics (Cambridge, 1997).
55. The opposition could not participate in the 1994 elections and the ancien regime was thus perpetuated.
56. In January 1994 the leaders of Erk within Uzbekistan re-named the party Istaqlal Yoli (Path of Independence) without the consent of the leaders in exile and designated its goals in a way calculated to make it more acceptable to the Karimov government. M. Olcott, Central Asia's New States (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 115.
57. In the December 1994 elections to the Mejlis, the national parliament, the candidates, virtually all of whom belonged to the Democratic Party, faced no opposition.
58. Interview with the leaders of the Wattan Tarikieti party, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, December 1994.
59. S. Islam, 'Capitalism on the Silk Route?', in Mandelbaum, Central Asia; M. Kaser, The Economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (London, 1997).
60. S. Islam, 'Capitalism on the Silk Route?', in Mandelbaum, Central Asia; M. Kaser, The Economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (London, 1997).
61. For a general discussion of these tradeoffs, see K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1944); and, more recently, A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, 1991).
62. For a general discussion of these tradeoffs, see K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1944); and, more recently, A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, 1991).
63. I. Rotar', 'Mina, zalozhnnaia kremlevskimi kartografami: problema granits mozhet vzorvat' Srdeniuiu Aziiu,' (Mines Laid By the Kremlin's Mapmakers: The Territorial Problem Could Enflame Central Asia) Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 December 1992.
64. Since 1992 Yeltsin has co-opted many of the foreign policy themes of Russian nationalists and removed from his government a number of foreign policy moderates. The most graphic example of the personnel change is the substitution of Andrei Kozyrev with Yevgeni Primakov as foreign minister. On the general point of post-1992 foreign policy realignment see A. Arbatov, 'Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition', in V. Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (New York, 1997), pp. 142, 146; Menon, 'Shadow of the Bear', pp. 156-61.
65. Since 1992 Yeltsin has co-opted many of the foreign policy themes of Russian nationalists and removed from his government a number of foreign policy moderates. The most graphic example of the personnel change is the substitution of Andrei Kozyrev with Yevgeni Primakov as foreign minister. On the general point of post-1992 foreign policy realignment see A. Arbatov, 'Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition', in V. Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (New York, 1997), pp. 142, 146; Menon, 'Shadow of the Bear', pp. 156-61.
66. The following discussion of the ethnic composition of the Central Asian states is based on the data in Central Asia Monitor, 3 (1992), pp. 39-40. See also the data in Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World, p. 7.
67. The following discussion of the ethnic composition of the Central Asian states is based on the data in Central Asia Monitor, 3 (1992), pp. 39-40. See also the data in Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World, p. 7.
68. The ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's northern provinces is calculated from the data in P. Gillette, 'Ethnic Balance and Imbalance in Kazakhstan's Regions', Central Asia Monitor, 3 (1993), Table 2, p. 21.
69. See A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT, 1977); Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT, 1984); and Lijphart, 'Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989). pp. 33-48.
70. See A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT, 1977); Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT, 1984); and Lijphart, 'Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989). pp. 33-48.
71. See A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT, 1977); Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT, 1984); and Lijphart, 'Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989). pp. 33-48.
72. For good overviews of the consociationalist literature. D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 569-77; I. Lustick, 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism', World Politics, 50 (October 1997), pp. 88-117.
73. For good overviews of the consociationalist literature. D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 569-77; I. Lustick, 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism', World Politics, 50 (October 1997), pp. 88-117.
74. See Lustick, 'Lijphart, Lakatos'.
75. Despite Horowitz's critique of consociationalism, his suggestions for conflict resolution do share some features with Lijphart's work. See, for example, their discussion of federalism. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, chapter 16; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 87f.
76. Despite Horowitz's critique of consociationalism, his suggestions for conflict resolution do share some features with Lijphart's work. See, for example, their discussion of federalism. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, chapter 16; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 87f.
77. Turkmenistan and Russia reached agreement on this in December 1993. ITAR-TASS in English, 1624 GMT, December 23, 1994, in FBIS-SOV, December 27, 1993, pp. 78-9.
78. President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan has been particularly sensitive to this issue.
79. Kyrgyzstan's establishment of a Slavonic University, was, for example, a clear attempt to allay the fears of the local Russian population and to stem the emigration of skilled Russians needed to the country's economic future.
80. A point made by Istvan Hont about European state stability is, in this respect, applicable to Central Asia as well. He observes: 'Whether the large "nation-states" of Europe can preserve their territorial integrity . . . depends on whether their populations accept them as their own "state" or whether they see it as in their interest to secure a "state" more authentically of their own'. I. Hont, 'The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: 'Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State' in Historical Perspective', Political Studies, XLII (1994), p. 231.
81. M. Ochs, 'Peace Accord Reached in Tajikistan,' CSCE Digest 20 (July 1997), p. 76; U. Babakhanov and B. Pannier, 'Peace in Tajikistan Or New Stage in Conflict?' RFE/RL Newsline (27 June 1997), p. 6.
82. M. Ochs, 'Peace Accord Reached in Tajikistan,' CSCE Digest 20 (July 1997), p. 76; U. Babakhanov and B. Pannier, 'Peace in Tajikistan Or New Stage in Conflict?' RFE/RL Newsline (27 June 1997), p. 6.
83. The IMF's support for Kyrgyzstan's policies should be seen in this regard. In addition to Kyrgyzstan, Russia itself and the Ukraine have obtained considerable IMF support. Standby agreements in 1995 gave Russia about $6.4 billion and the Ukraine $1.5 billion. See The Economist, March 11, 1995, p. 50; March 18, 1995, p. 51 .
84. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 1997: Enterprise Performance and Growth (London: ERBD). The cumulative investment (1989-1996) was distributed as follows: Kazakhstan, $3.067 billion; Turkmenistan, $544 million, Uzbekistan, $156 million; Kyrgyzstan, $147 million; Tajikistan, $55 million.
85. On international oil and gas investment in the Caspian Sea region, see Rajan Menon, Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy Development in the Caspian Sea Zone (Seattle, Washington: National Institute for Asian Research, 1998); The Economist (22 July 1995), p. 36. Also see Menon, 'After Empire'. Iran's influence in the region is likely to be economic rather than ideological in nature, given its attempts to provide alternative transportation routes, although the US has stifled such attempts so far. The Economist (2 December 1995), p. 42; The Economist (24 January 1998), p. 43.
86. On international oil and gas investment in the Caspian Sea region, see Rajan Menon, Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy Development in the Caspian Sea Zone (Seattle, Washington: National Institute for Asian Research, 1998); The Economist (22 July 1995), p. 36. Also see Menon, 'After Empire'. Iran's influence in the region is likely to be economic rather than ideological in nature, given its attempts to provide alternative transportation routes, although the US has stifled such attempts so far. The Economist (2 December 1995), p. 42; The Economist (24 January 1998), p. 43.
87. On international oil and gas investment in the Caspian Sea region, see Rajan Menon, Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy Development in the Caspian Sea Zone (Seattle, Washington: National Institute for Asian Research, 1998); The Economist (22 July 1995), p. 36. Also see Menon, 'After Empire'. Iran's influence in the region is likely to be economic rather than ideological in nature, given its attempts to provide alternative transportation routes, although the US has stifled such attempts so far. The Economist (2 December 1995), p. 42; The Economist (24 January 1998), p. 43.
88. On international oil and gas investment in the Caspian Sea region, see Rajan Menon, Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy Development in the Caspian Sea Zone (Seattle, Washington: National Institute for Asian Research, 1998); The Economist (22 July 1995), p. 36. Also see Menon, 'After Empire'. Iran's influence in the region is likely to be economic rather than ideological in nature, given its attempts to provide alternative transportation routes, although the US has stifled such attempts so far. The Economist (2 December 1995), p. 42; The Economist (24 January 1998), p. 43.
89. For a range of discussions on this topic, see M. Esman and S. Telhami (eds.), International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca, 1995).
90. For a discussion of some of the Russian efforts to invigorate the CIS for some of these tasks see 'Russia and the Near Abroad', in The Economist, February 18, 1995, pp. 51-2.
91. See A. Sheehy, 'The CIS: A Shaky Edifice', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (January 1993), pp. 37-40; J. Adams, 'CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (June 1993), pp. 19-23; S. Foye, 'End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?' RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (July 1993), pp. 45-9; S. Crow, 'Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization', RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (March 1994), pp. 33-8.
92. See A. Sheehy, 'The CIS: A Shaky Edifice', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (January 1993), pp. 37-40; J. Adams, 'CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (June 1993), pp. 19-23; S. Foye, 'End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?' RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (July 1993), pp. 45-9; S. Crow, 'Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization', RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (March 1994), pp. 33-8.
93. See A. Sheehy, 'The CIS: A Shaky Edifice', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (January 1993), pp. 37-40; J. Adams, 'CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (June 1993), pp. 19-23; S. Foye, 'End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?' RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (July 1993), pp. 45-9; S. Crow, 'Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization', RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (March 1994), pp. 33-8.
94. See A. Sheehy, 'The CIS: A Shaky Edifice', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (January 1993), pp. 37-40; J. Adams, 'CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov', RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (June 1993), pp. 19-23; S. Foye, 'End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?' RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (July 1993), pp. 45-9; S. Crow, 'Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization', RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (March 1994), pp. 33-8.
95. Thus Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbaev, and others, have advocated bi-and tri-lateral agreements. Liz Fuller, '1997 in Review: The CIS - Half Alive or Half Dead?,' RFE/RL (22 December 1997).
96. True, the United States has initiated some limited forms of security cooperation in Central Asian: it provided $170 million to facilitate the removal of Kazakhstan's strategic nuclear weapons to Russia and for defense conversion. Washington has also given Kazakhstan six boats for patrolling the Caspian Sea and has helped train the crews. But these instances of security cooperation are not precursors to an American policy of balancing Russian power for the benefit of the states of the former Soviet Union.
97. For an optimistic assessment of the potential of OSCE to become a robust collective security system, see C. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61. For a critique, see R. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War', International Security 17 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43. See also K. Huber, 'The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East', RFE/RL Research Report 2 (July 1993), pp. 30-36; E. Fuller, 'The Karabakh Mediation Process: Grachev versus the CSCE?' RFE/RL Research Report 3 (June 1994), pp. 13-17.
98. For an optimistic assessment of the potential of OSCE to become a robust collective security system, see C. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61. For a critique, see R. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War', International Security 17 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43. See also K. Huber, 'The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East', RFE/RL Research Report 2 (July 1993), pp. 30-36; E. Fuller, 'The Karabakh Mediation Process: Grachev versus the CSCE?' RFE/RL Research Report 3 (June 1994), pp. 13-17.
99. For an optimistic assessment of the potential of OSCE to become a robust collective security system, see C. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61. For a critique, see R. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War', International Security 17 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43. See also K. Huber, 'The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East', RFE/RL Research Report 2 (July 1993), pp. 30-36; E. Fuller, 'The Karabakh Mediation Process: Grachev versus the CSCE?' RFE/RL Research Report 3 (June 1994), pp. 13-17.
100. For an optimistic assessment of the potential of OSCE to become a robust collective security system, see C. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61. For a critique, see R. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War', International Security 17 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43. See also K. Huber, 'The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East', RFE/RL Research Report 2 (July 1993), pp. 30-36; E. Fuller, 'The Karabakh Mediation Process: Grachev versus the CSCE?' RFE/RL Research Report 3 (June 1994), pp. 13-17.
101. Kupchan and Kupchan, 'Concerts', 157-160.
102. See R. Blackwill and F. S. Larrabee (eds.), Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security (Durham, NC., 1989) for the CSCE process of arms control and CBMs involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
103. See Sagan's argument that defence oriented systems are double edged. They diminish the propensity of aggressive foreign policies, but on the other hand defence oriented powers cannot come to the aid of allies. S. Sagan, '1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability', International Security, 11 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-76.
104. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace (New York, 1992), gives the optimistic view of the UN's abillities.
105. For discussions of some of the reasons for the UN's problems see S. Touval, 'Why the U.N. Fails', Foreign Affairs, 73 (September 1994), pp. 44-57; J. Ruggie, 'Peacekeeping and US Interests', The Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn 1994), pp. 175-184.
106. For discussions of some of the reasons for the UN's problems see S. Touval, 'Why the U.N. Fails', Foreign Affairs, 73 (September 1994), pp. 44-57; J. Ruggie, 'Peacekeeping and US Interests', The Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn 1994), pp. 175-184.
107. The 134 UN observers in Georgia play a minor role compared to Russian troops that are separating Georgian and Abkhaz fighters. For a discussion of the situation in Georgia, see L. Fuller, 'Solution to Abkhaz Conflict Continues to Prove Elusive', RFE/RL Newsline (10 July 1997), p. 6. The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) consists of only 96 members and has suffered from kidnapping and attack, see Menon, After Empire, p. 144, and fn. 116.
108. The 134 UN observers in Georgia play a minor role compared to Russian troops that are separating Georgian and Abkhaz fighters. For a discussion of the situation in Georgia, see L. Fuller, 'Solution to Abkhaz Conflict Continues to Prove Elusive', RFE/RL Newsline (10 July 1997), p. 6. The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) consists of only 96 members and has suffered from kidnapping and attack, see Menon, After Empire, p. 144, and fn. 116.
109. For a general discussion of Russia's range of choice vis-à-vis the former Union Republics, see H. Spruyt, 'The Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Nonimperial Outcomes in the Former Soviet Space', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), The End of Empire? (Armonk, NY, 1997).