Dishonesty and libel law: The economics of the "chilling" effect

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 155, Issue 2, 1999, Pages

  Garoupa, Nuno ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033475356     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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