Building a developmental state: The Korean case reconsidered

Politics and Society

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 309-346

  Chibber, Vivek ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033471578     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329299027003002     Document Type: Article

References (157)

1. An exception to the neoclassical orthodoxy was the series of studies released by Harvard University's Council on East Asian Studies: Leroy Jones and Il Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); David Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development in Korea, 1945-1978 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). These studies were among the first to show in detail the extensive role that the state played in Korean development. They were also the first to note the centrality of imposing "discipline" on capital. However, they did not have much success in overturning the reigning wisdom among economists.
2. An exception to the neoclassical orthodoxy was the series of studies released by Harvard University's Council on East Asian Studies: Leroy Jones and Il Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); David Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development in Korea, 1945-1978 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). These studies were among the first to show in detail the extensive role that the state played in Korean development. They were also the first to note the centrality of imposing "discipline" on capital. However, they did not have much success in overturning the reigning wisdom among economists.
3. An exception to the neoclassical orthodoxy was the series of studies released by Harvard University's Council on East Asian Studies: Leroy Jones and Il Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); David Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development in Korea, 1945-1978 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). These studies were among the first to show in detail the extensive role that the state played in Korean development. They were also the first to note the centrality of imposing "discipline" on capital. However, they did not have much success in overturning the reigning wisdom among economists.
4. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
5. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
6. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
7. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
8. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
9. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
10. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
11. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
12. The literature on this is by now enormous. But seminal and still informative works are Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). More recently, Amsden in particular has gone on to propose a more generalized model of development based on the East Asian experience. See Alice Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" New Left Review 182 (July/August 1990): 5-31 ; Alice Amsden, "A Theory of Government in Late Industrialization," in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Alice Amsden, "Like the Rest: South-East as 'Late' Industrialization," Journal of International Development 7, no. 5 (1995): 791-99. A nother impressive body of work along the same lines has been developed by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy April (1995): 55-107; and especially Dani Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," European Economic Review 41 (1997): 411-42.
13. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 265.
14. Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" 23-24 for first part of quote; ibid., 16 for second part, emphasis added.
15. Amsden, "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model?" 23-24 for first part of quote; ibid., 16 for second part, emphasis added.
16. Jones and Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development, 67.
17. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 263.
18. Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 91.
19. Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997), 5.
20. Alice Amsden and Robert Wade, two of the pioneers in the recent critiques of neoclassical orthodoxy, have tended to remain quite reticent on the general relation of power between the state and capital in Korea. Their analyses have focused on describing the sundry ways in which the Korean experience relied on selective state intervention while leaving aside the issue of sources of the state's power. It is not therefore clear to me how they would react to the position developed in this paper.
21. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 265; Amsden, "Third World Industrialization," 22.
22. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 265; Amsden, "Third World Industrialization," 22.
23. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 145.
24. Ibid., 102.
25. The most articulate exponent of this position has been Atul Kohli, "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 'Developmental State,'" World Development 22, no. 9 (1994): 1269-93. But see also Sang-In Jun, "The Origins of the Developmental State in South Korea," Asian Perspective 16, no. 2 (1992).
26. The most articulate exponent of this position has been Atul Kohli, "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 'Developmental State,'" World Development 22, no. 9 (1994): 1269-93. But see also Sang-In Jun, "The Origins of the Developmental State in South Korea," Asian Perspective 16, no. 2 (1992).
27. See their exchange with Kohli: Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-In Moon, "Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique," World Development 25, no. 6 (1997): 867-81 ;
28. Atul Kohli, "Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Reply," World Development 25, no. 6 (1997): 883-88.
29. Byung-Kook Kim, "Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change: The State in Korea and Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988), 100-3.
30. Yeonmi Ahn, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid: The Nature of American Aid and Its Impact on the State-Business Relationship in South Korea, 1945-1972" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1992), 231, 281-83.
31. Ibid., 183-84.
32. Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), chap. 2.
33. This too is widely recognized in the literature. For two of the best recent analyses of business strategies in the 1950s, see Ahn, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid,"
34. and Timothy Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea, 1945-1979" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1996).
35. Analysts have sometimes attributed the absence of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs to the import-substituting strategy of the Rhee regime, which set up a dense thicket of protectionist measures and relied heavily on discretionary allocation of scarce import licenses and other subsidies; the conclusion that naturally flows from this position is that it was a turn to more market-oriented policies in the next decade - centering on the rationalization of the exchange rate - that drove Korean business into more productive activities by closing off the ready avenues to profit through manipulation of price differentials. But the contrast drawn between the two periods along this dimension is illusory - the policy regime under Park Chung Hee did not do away with protection and import substitution, nor did it rely any less on discretionary allocation of scarce resources. On this, see Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, and especially the excellent articles by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right," and "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State."
36. Analysts have sometimes attributed the absence of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs to the import-substituting strategy of the Rhee regime, which set up a dense thicket of protectionist measures and relied heavily on discretionary allocation of scarce import licenses and other subsidies; the conclusion that naturally flows from this position is that it was a turn to more market-oriented policies in the next decade - centering on the rationalization of the exchange rate - that drove Korean business into more productive activities by closing off the ready avenues to profit through manipulation of price differentials. But the contrast drawn between the two periods along this dimension is illusory - the policy regime under Park Chung Hee did not do away with protection and import substitution, nor did it rely any less on discretionary allocation of scarce resources. On this, see Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, and especially the excellent articles by Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right," and "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State."
37. For an account of Rhee's ouster, see Quee-Young Kim, The Fall of Synghman Rhee (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); for the coup that brought Park to power, see Se-jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
38. For an account of Rhee's ouster, see Quee-Young Kim, The Fall of Synghman Rhee (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); for the coup that brought Park to power, see Se-jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
39. Byung-Kook Kim, Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change, 248-50; David Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development: Coup, State, and the Republic of Korea's First Five Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1994), 377-83.
40. Byung-Kook Kim, Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change, 248-50; David Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development: Coup, State, and the Republic of Korea's First Five Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1994), 377-83.
41. Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," chap. 6;
42. Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963: Crisis, Uncertainty, and Contradiction" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1990), 172-77.
43. The congruence between the junta's reforms and those proposed by Chang has led some scholars to suggest that had he been given enough time, Chang would have eventually pushed through the measures himself. The coup, and hence the authoritarian regime, was thus unnecessary to the Korean experience. This is most explicitly argued by Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 384-400.
44. Stephan Haggard, Byung-kuk Kim, and Chung-in Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966," Journal of Asian Studies 50 (1991): 857.
45. See David C. Kang, "South Korean and Taiwanese Development and the New Institutional Economics," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 575. There is no detailed study of how this delicate operation was managed, for understandable reasons. Conventional sources will simply not yield the required information for such a project. It need hardly be emphasized, however, that one of the most promising directions of future research on the comparative political economy of developmental states lies here. For an interesting critique of the neoclassical and "new institutionalist" analyses of corruption from a broadly class-analytical perspective, see Mushtaq Khan, "State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist Explanations," in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis, eds., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1995), and Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development 8, no. 5 (1996): 683-96.
46. See David C. Kang, "South Korean and Taiwanese Development and the New Institutional Economics," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 575. There is no detailed study of how this delicate operation was managed, for understandable reasons. Conventional sources will simply not yield the required information for such a project. It need hardly be emphasized, however, that one of the most promising directions of future research on the comparative political economy of developmental states lies here. For an interesting critique of the neoclassical and "new institutionalist" analyses of corruption from a broadly class-analytical perspective, see Mushtaq Khan, "State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist Explanations," in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis, eds., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1995), and Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development 8, no. 5 (1996): 683-96.
47. See David C. Kang, "South Korean and Taiwanese Development and the New Institutional Economics," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 575. There is no detailed study of how this delicate operation was managed, for understandable reasons. Conventional sources will simply not yield the required information for such a project. It need hardly be emphasized, however, that one of the most promising directions of future research on the comparative political economy of developmental states lies here. For an interesting critique of the neoclassical and "new institutionalist" analyses of corruption from a broadly class-analytical perspective, see Mushtaq Khan, "State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist Explanations," in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis, eds., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1995), and Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development 8, no. 5 (1996): 683-96.
48. Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 34; Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966," 860. The formation of the EPB came as something of a relief to U.S. advisers in Seoul. Initial reports after the coup were reporting worrisome signs of a continuation and even exacerbation of the Rhee-era dispersal of authority. Ministries seemed to be usurping a "new degree of autonomy" that had not been possible under the previous regime, and all indications were that "strategically placed bureaucrats" were about to launch "pet projects" that the new regime would be powerless to stop. See Green to Secretary of State, May 28, 1961, 895B.00/5-2861, Department of State Records, (hereafter DSR), RG 59, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), College Park, Maryland.
49. Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 34; Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966," 860. The formation of the EPB came as something of a relief to U.S. advisers in Seoul. Initial reports after the coup were reporting worrisome signs of a continuation and even exacerbation of the Rhee-era dispersal of authority. Ministries seemed to be usurping a "new degree of autonomy" that had not been possible under the previous regime, and all indications were that "strategically placed bureaucrats" were about to launch "pet projects" that the new regime would be powerless to stop. See Green to Secretary of State, May 28, 1961, 895B.00/5-2861, Department of State Records, (hereafter DSR), RG 59, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), College Park, Maryland.
50. The notion to establish an apex body for planning came not from Park, as has often been assumed, but from the economists in the EDC. This is stressed by Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 377-83.
51. See also Byun-kook Kim, Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change, 248-51.
52. Chung H. Lee, "The Government, Financial System, and Large Private Enterprises in the Economic Development of South Korea," World Development 20 (1992): 190.
53. This episode is now a standard part of every account of Park's rise to power. Representative samples may be had in Jones and Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development, 69-70, 280-82; Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 112-17.
54. This episode is now a standard part of every account of Park's rise to power. Representative samples may be had in Jones and Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development, 69-70, 280-82; Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 112-17.
55. See Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development," 229-32.
56. Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 117. Emphasis added.
57. Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 48, emphasis added;
58. see also Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan," in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 127-28, where he repeats this almost verbatim.
59. Ha-Joon Chang, "The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea," Cambridge Journal of Economics 17 (1993): 152, emphasis added.
60. Despite the criticism that follows, I should note that Chang's is one of the very finest studies on the Korean experience. See also Ha-Joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (London: Macmillan, 1994), where he embeds his account of Korea in a wider discussion of its implications for neoclassical economics.
61. I would like to thank Robert Brenner and the editorial board of Politics & Society for their strenuous reading of this section of the paper.
62. "As long as they could obtain the necessary capital inputs, both national firms and multinational subsidiaries had clear preferences for operating within the context of protected home markets - rather than assuming the risks of entering new markets and/or competing with subsidiaries established elsewhere"; Robert Kaufman, "How Societies Change Developmental Models or Keep Them: Reflections on the Latin American Experience in the 1930's and the Postwar World," in Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 129.
63. Alan Richards and John Waterbury, The Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 196;
64. see also Abla M. Abdel-Latif, "The Non-Price Determinants of Export Success or Failure: The Egyptian Ready-Made Garment Industry, 1975-89," World Development 21, no. 10 (1993): 1677-84.
65. Biweekly Economic review, no. 10, 895B.00/5-1961, RG 59, DSR.
66. Green to Secretary of State, 5/24/61, 895B.00/5-2461; "Developments on the Illicit Accumulators Front," in Biweekly Economic Review, no. 14, 895B.00/7-1461, RG 59, DSR; for quote, see Berger to Secretary of State, 6/28/61, 895B.054/6-2861, RG 59, DSR.
67. Green to Secretary of State, 5/24/61, 895B.00/5-2461; "Developments on the Illicit Accumulators Front," in Biweekly Economic Review, no. 14, 895B.00/7-1461, RG 59, DSR; for quote, see Berger to Secretary of State, 6/28/61, 895B.054/6-2861, RG 59, DSR.
68. Berger to Secretary of State, 8/1/61, 895B.00/8161, RG 59, DSR.
69. Berger to Secretary of State, 9/29/61, 895B.00/92961, RG 59, DSR.
70. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 14, 895B.00/7-1461, RG 59, DSR.
71. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 9, 895B.00/5-462, RG 59, DSR. See also Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 251-60, and Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea," 184-87.
72. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 9, 895B.00/5-462, RG 59, DSR. See also Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 251-60, and Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea," 184-87.
73. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 9, 895B.00/5-462, RG 59, DSR. See also Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 251-60, and Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea," 184-87.
74. The most detailed study of the initial plan as it related to farmers and small business is Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea," 94-120. See also Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 104-6; Inwon Choue, "The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: South Korea's Turn toward Export-Led Heavy and Chemical Industrializtion, 1961-1974" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1988), 155-66.
75. The most detailed study of the initial plan as it related to farmers and small business is Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea," 94-120. See also Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 104-6; Inwon Choue, "The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: South Korea's Turn toward Export-Led Heavy and Chemical Industrializtion, 1961-1974" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1988), 155-66.
76. The most detailed study of the initial plan as it related to farmers and small business is Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea," 94-120. See also Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 104-6; Inwon Choue, "The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: South Korea's Turn toward Export-Led Heavy and Chemical Industrializtion, 1961-1974" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1988), 155-66.
77. Lim, "Competition, Markets, and the Politics of Development in South Korea," 105.
78. See Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, 68.
79. David Cole and Young Woo Nam, "The Pattern and Significance of Economic Planning in Korea," in Irma Edelman, ed., Practical Approaches to Development Planning: Korea's Second Five-Year Plan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 18.
80. Choue, "The Politics of Industrial Restructuring," 161.
81. In fact, Park admitted, as did Kim Jong Pil in later years, that junta had little understanding of the plan's operational coherence. See Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 358-64.
82. The most detailed study of this chain of events is Yoo, "A New Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963." The crisis was closely followed and ably reported by the Far Eastern Economic Review (henceforth FEER). See in particular the issues of 3/7/63, 8/22/63, and 9/19/63.
83. FEER, 9/19/63, 737.
84. David Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 218. The authors, who were present in Korea at the time as advisers, recall that "planning as such was definitely not a well-established or influential process" as late as 1964.
85. Choue, "The Politics of Industrial Restructuring," 161-63; Byong-Kook Kim, Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change, 261-63.
86. Choue, "The Politics of Industrial Restructuring," 161-63; Byong-Kook Kim, Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change, 261-63.
87. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 3, 2/10/64, E 2-2 KOR S, Box #735, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, DSR; Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966," 865-66.
88. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 3, 2/10/64, E 2-2 KOR S, Box #735, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, DSR; Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966," 865-66.
89. While some scholars have pointed to the importance of Vietnam as a market for Korean goods after the mid-1960s, its role in the early years of the Park regime is less widely appreciated. Vietnam was the major destination for many iron and steel products, which were the most lucrative category for exports in 1963, bringing in $12.1 million, as against just $600,000 in 1962. In comparison, textiles and related products only garnered $7.8 million in 1963. This also points to the precarious moorings of export success in the early years of the regime. For the statistics cited, see Quarterly Economic Summary - October-December 1963, 3/3/64, E 2-3 KOR S, Box #735, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
90. For the impending cutback on U.S. aid, see Ahn, The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, chap. 6, and Woo, Race to the Swift, 72-80. The American insistence on devaluation and export promotion was detailed in the so-called "Dillon letter," which embedded these demands in a larger stabilization program. This was first presented by advisers during the Chang Myon regime and continued to be the core set of proposals for subsequent U.S pressure. On the Dillon letter, see Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 318-30. For American pressure more generally, see Woo, Race to the Swift, 76-79 and Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, 67.
91. For the impending cutback on U.S. aid, see Ahn, The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, chap. 6, and Woo, Race to the Swift, 72-80. The American insistence on devaluation and export promotion was detailed in the so-called "Dillon letter," which embedded these demands in a larger stabilization program. This was first presented by advisers during the Chang Myon regime and continued to be the core set of proposals for subsequent U.S pressure. On the Dillon letter, see Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 318-30. For American pressure more generally, see Woo, Race to the Swift, 76-79 and Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, 67.
92. For the impending cutback on U.S. aid, see Ahn, The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, chap. 6, and Woo, Race to the Swift, 72-80. The American insistence on devaluation and export promotion was detailed in the so-called "Dillon letter," which embedded these demands in a larger stabilization program. This was first presented by advisers during the Chang Myon regime and continued to be the core set of proposals for subsequent U.S pressure. On the Dillon letter, see Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 318-30. For American pressure more generally, see Woo, Race to the Swift, 76-79 and Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, 67.
93. For the impending cutback on U.S. aid, see Ahn, The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, chap. 6, and Woo, Race to the Swift, 72-80. The American insistence on devaluation and export promotion was detailed in the so-called "Dillon letter," which embedded these demands in a larger stabilization program. This was first presented by advisers during the Chang Myon regime and continued to be the core set of proposals for subsequent U.S pressure. On the Dillon letter, see Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 318-30. For American pressure more generally, see Woo, Race to the Swift, 76-79 and Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, 67.
94. For the impending cutback on U.S. aid, see Ahn, The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, chap. 6, and Woo, Race to the Swift, 72-80. The American insistence on devaluation and export promotion was detailed in the so-called "Dillon letter," which embedded these demands in a larger stabilization program. This was first presented by advisers during the Chang Myon regime and continued to be the core set of proposals for subsequent U.S pressure. On the Dillon letter, see Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development," 318-30. For American pressure more generally, see Woo, Race to the Swift, 76-79 and Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, 67.
95. This distinction appears to have been proposed by Gustav Ranis and is noted by James Cypher and James Dietz in their excellent textbook on the subject, The Process of Economic Development (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1997), 319.
96. It may, however, require autonomy from and power over agrarian elites if the move is to promote manufacturing exports in a country with a history of exporting primary products.
97. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 90-92; John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 96-98; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 59; Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late Industrialiazon in Historical Perspective," in William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff, eds., Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 295. For an example of Park's punishment of a firm that refused to abide by export targets, see Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 55-56.
98. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 90-92; John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 96-98; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 59; Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late Industrialiazon in Historical Perspective," in William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff, eds., Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 295. For an example of Park's punishment of a firm that refused to abide by export targets, see Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 55-56.
99. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 90-92; John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 96-98; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 59; Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late Industrialiazon in Historical Perspective," in William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff, eds., Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 295. For an example of Park's punishment of a firm that refused to abide by export targets, see Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 55-56.
100. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 90-92; John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 96-98; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 59; Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late Industrialiazon in Historical Perspective," in William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff, eds., Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 295. For an example of Park's punishment of a firm that refused to abide by export targets, see Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 55-56.
101. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 90-92; John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 96-98; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 59; Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late Industrialiazon in Historical Perspective," in William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff, eds., Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 295. For an example of Park's punishment of a firm that refused to abide by export targets, see Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 55-56.
102. Pappano to Dept. of State, 5/31/62, 895B.00/5-3162, RG 59, DSR.
103. Doherty to Dept. of State, 4/10/62, 494.95B41/4-1062, RG 59, DSR.
104. Biweekly Economic Report, no. 9, 9/18/64, E2-2 KOR S, Box #735, Subject-Numeric Files 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
105. Quarterly Economic Summary, 12/17/64, E2-3 KOR S, Box#735, Subject-Numeric Files 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
106. Berger to Secretary of State, 1/8/63, 394.41/1-863, RG 59, DSR.
107. The argument offered here also implies that the success of Korean exports over time was not a simple outcome of the subsidies that the state offered to exporters. It is not uncommon to find commentators pointing to state subsidization of exports as the source of the enthusiasm that business displayed for ELI. But as Dani Rodrik has pointed out, this argument fails on two counts: first, the subsidies had been in place since around 1958, while exports really began to take off after 1962; second, and more important, the extent of subsidies in Korea was in fact lower than in several other developing countries that were far less successful in making a switch to exports. In other words, subsidies might have encouraged Korean firms to export, but the fact that the latter not only tried the strategy but remained committed to it cannot be explained by the attraction of the former. See especially Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," 421-22. See also Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 134, 266.
108. The argument offered here also implies that the success of Korean exports over time was not a simple outcome of the subsidies that the state offered to exporters. It is not uncommon to find commentators pointing to state subsidization of exports as the source of the enthusiasm that business displayed for ELI. But as Dani Rodrik has pointed out, this argument fails on two counts: first, the subsidies had been in place since around 1958, while exports really began to take off after 1962; second, and more important, the extent of subsidies in Korea was in fact lower than in several other developing countries that were far less successful in making a switch to exports. In other words, subsidies might have encouraged Korean firms to export, but the fact that the latter not only tried the strategy but remained committed to it cannot be explained by the attraction of the former. See especially Rodrik, "The 'Paradoxes' of the Successful State," 421-22. See also Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 134, 266.
109. This strategic relocation to neighboring countries and the use of the latter as export platforms came to be rationalized by Japanese scholars and politicians as the "flying geese" theory of development, which bears some resemblance to Raymond Vernon's well-known product-cycle theory. In the flying geese theory, the establishment of export processing in backward countries was supposed to be the first step toward mature industrialization for them, as they rode the coattails of the more developed country into export markets. While I do agree with the importance of Japan as an initial conduit to export markets, this should not be taken as an endorsement of the theory just alluded to. In particular, my account stresses the contingency of the ultimate outcome, which turns crucially on the presence of a state with sufficient capacity and autonomy to discipline capital - local, but also international. In the absence of such a state, there is no reason to assume that the requisite transfer of technology, productivity, and investment patterns will be generated. Export orientation on its own can just as well lead to enclave economies, wildly uneven development, and financial fragility. For recent criticisms of the "flying geese" theory in the East Asian contest, see Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, "Contradictions of Capitalist Industrialization in East Asia: A Critique of 'Flying Geese' Theories of Development," Economic Geography 74, no. 2 (1998); more generally, see Michael Mortimore, "Flying Geese or Sitting Ducks? Transnational and Industry in Developing Countries," CEPAL Review 51 (1993).
110. This strategic relocation to neighboring countries and the use of the latter as export platforms came to be rationalized by Japanese scholars and politicians as the "flying geese" theory of development, which bears some resemblance to Raymond Vernon's well-known product-cycle theory. In the flying geese theory, the establishment of export processing in backward countries was supposed to be the first step toward mature industrialization for them, as they rode the coattails of the more developed country into export markets. While I do agree with the importance of Japan as an initial conduit to export markets, this should not be taken as an endorsement of the theory just alluded to. In particular, my account stresses the contingency of the ultimate outcome, which turns crucially on the presence of a state with sufficient capacity and autonomy to discipline capital - local, but also international. In the absence of such a state, there is no reason to assume that the requisite transfer of technology, productivity, and investment patterns will be generated. Export orientation on its own can just as well lead to enclave economies, wildly uneven development, and financial fragility. For recent criticisms of the "flying geese" theory in the East Asian contest, see Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, "Contradictions of Capitalist Industrialization in East Asia: A Critique of 'Flying Geese' Theories of Development," Economic Geography 74, no. 2 (1998); more generally, see Michael Mortimore, "Flying Geese or Sitting Ducks? Transnational and Industry in Developing Countries," CEPAL Review 51 (1993).
111. The most notable exception to this is the fine work of Robert Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle: The Crucial Role of Japan (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), to which I am greatly indebted. But more recently, John Lie has also drawn attention to the importance of the Japanese as a conduit to American markets. Though he does not spend a great deal of time examining its significance for the rise of the developmental state, Lie's analysis is, in important respects, quite close to the one developed here. See Lie, Han Unbound, especially pp. 86, 129.
112. The most notable exception to this is the fine work of Robert Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle: The Crucial Role of Japan (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), to which I am greatly indebted. But more recently, John Lie has also drawn attention to the importance of the Japanese as a conduit to American markets. Though he does not spend a great deal of time examining its significance for the rise of the developmental state, Lie's analysis is, in important respects, quite close to the one developed here. See Lie, Han Unbound, especially pp. 86, 129.
113. Sanjaya Lall, "Marketing Barriers Facing Developing Country Manufactured Exporters: A Conceptual Note," Journal of Development Studies 27, no. 4 (1991); Robert Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle.
114. Sanjaya Lall, "Marketing Barriers Facing Developing Country Manufactured Exporters: A Conceptual Note," Journal of Development Studies 27, no. 4 (1991); Robert Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle.
115. Gary Gereffi has analyzed markets for such goods as "buyer-driven" commodity chains, as against "producer-driven" chains, exemplified most clearly by the automobile industry. See Gereffi, "Global Comodity Chains: New Forms of Coordination and Control among Nations and Firms in International Industries," Competition and Change 4 (1996): 427-29; Gary Gereffi, "Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia," Journal of Asian Business 12, no. 1 (1996).
116. Gary Gereffi has analyzed markets for such goods as "buyer-driven" commodity chains, as against "producer-driven" chains, exemplified most clearly by the automobile industry. See Gereffi, "Global Comodity Chains: New Forms of Coordination and Control among Nations and Firms in International Industries," Competition and Change 4 (1996): 427-29; Gary Gereffi, "Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia," Journal of Asian Business 12, no. 1 (1996).
117. MacArthur to Secretary of State, 12/10/60, 494.95B41/12-1060; see also his telegrams of 1/2/61 and 1/24/61, in 494.95B41/1-261 and 494.95B41/1-2461, respectively, all in RG 59, DSR.
118. McConnaughy to Secretary of State, 1/26/61, 494.95B41/1-2661, RG 59, DSR.
119. Reischauer to Secretary of State, 11/20/61, 895B.05194/11-2061, RG 59, DSR; Berger to Secretary of State, 12/13/61, 895B.05194/12-1361, RG 59, DSR. Note that Park's assent suggests that he was already committed to normalization jut a few months after taking power, although it took another four years to achieve it. More on this anon.
120. Reischauer to Secretary of State, 494.95B41/12-1361, RG 59, DSR; Reischauer to SS, 494.95B41/2-1662, RG 59, DSR.
121. Reischauer to SS, 895B.05194/3-2662, RG 59, DSR; Reischauer to SS, 895B.05194/2-2162, RG 59, DSR.
122. Oriental Econmist, March 1963, 146-49.
123. Biweekly Economic Review, no. 9, 5/4/64, E2-2, KOR S, Box# 735, Subject Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
124. FEER, 1/3/63, 11; "Textile Industry Report," 6/13/65, INCO-FIBERS, KOR S, Box #1141, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
125. FEER, 1/3/63, 11; "Textile Industry Report," 6/13/65, INCO-FIBERS, KOR S, Box #1141, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
126. Pappeno to Department of State, 4/23/62, 895B.00/4-2362.
127. Berger to Secretary of State, 1/2/63, 394.41/1-263, RG 59, DSR.
128. Reischauer to Department of State, 2/21/62, 895B.05194/2-2162, RG 59, DSR.
129. Quick to Department of State, 5/23/62, 895B.35/5-2362, RG 59, DSR.
130. Quarterly Economic Summary (July-September), 1964, E2-3 KOR S, Box #735, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
131. "Textile Industry Report," 6/13/65, INCO-FIBRES, KOR S, Box #1141, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
132. Quarterly Economic Summary, 8/17/64, E2-3, KOR S, Box #735, Subject Numeric Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, DSR.
133. Byoung Doo Lee, "The Politics of Industrialization: The Textiles Industry in South Korea and the Philippines" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1990), 353; see also Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, 235-36.
134. Byoung Doo Lee, "The Politics of Industrialization: The Textiles Industry in South Korea and the Philippines" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1990), 353; see also Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, 235-36.
135. Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, Table 8.25, p. 241.
136. Byoung Doo Lee, "The Politics of Industrialization," 293-96, 307-8.
137. Barabara Stallings conjectured on the likely importance of foreign capital for Korean export success, particularly of the availability of marketing facilities, in "The Role of Foreign Capital in Economic Development," in Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles, 76. In a perceptive passage, she notes that while U.S. advisers may have been important in applying pressure for a turn toward exports, "it was clear that foreign capital had to participate in order to make it a success" (emphasis added), ibid. This distinction between proposing a strategy and sustaining it over time is elided by the statists.
138. Other commentators have drawn attention to the importance of the Normalization Treaty of 1965: see Woo, Race to the Swift; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery; and Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966.
139. Other commentators have drawn attention to the importance of the Normalization Treaty of 1965: see Woo, Race to the Swift; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery; and Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966.
140. Other commentators have drawn attention to the importance of the Normalization Treaty of 1965: see Woo, Race to the Swift; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery; and Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966.
141. Other commentators have drawn attention to the importance of the Normalization Treaty of 1965: see Woo, Race to the Swift; Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery; and Haggard, Kim, and Moon, "The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-1966.
142. In Young Kim, "The Political Economy of a Chaebol's capital Accumulation in South Korea: The Case of Samsung, 1938-1987" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1996), 209-10.
143. Chol, like Park himself, had been educated in Japan; ibid., 205-7.
144. Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971), 87-90. See also Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, 73-74.
145. Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971), 87-90. See also Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, 73-74.
146. Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis, 88.
147. Woo, Race to the Swift, 86.
148. Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, 136.
149. Ibid., 137.
150. Ibid., 140-41.
151. Chung H. Lee, "United States and Japanese Direct Investment in Korea: A Comparative Study," Hitosubashi Journal of Economics 20, no. 2 (1980): 39. This article is an excellent study of the Japanese connection during Park's rule.
152. Lee, "United States and Japanese Direct Investment in Korea," 33.
153. Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, 143.
154. Ibid., 144. But see also 141-45. The importance of trading companies for access to markets is also pointed out by Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 139.
155. Ibid., 144. But see also 141-45. The importance of trading companies for access to markets is also pointed out by Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 139.
156. See above, note 70.
157. Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, 119-30.