Separated at birth or separated by birth? The communist successor parties in Romania and Hungary

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 117-145

  Pop Elecheş, Grigore ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033440387     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (79)

1. After the FSN breakup, Iliescu's faction initially called itself the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) and only changed its name to PDSR in 1993, after its victory in the September 1992 elections.
2. See Heinz Timmermann, "Die KP-Nachfolgeparteien in Osteuropa," BIOst 31 (1994).
3. Barnabás Racz & István Kukorelli, "The Second-Generation Post-Communist Elections in Hungary in 1994," Europe-Asia Studies 47:2 (1995), 160.
4. As will be discussed in a later section, this alliance was at least partially meant to dispel fears both inside and outside Hungary that the MSZP's rise to power could revive authoritarian strands in many of the party's former communist officials.
5. The most consistent common element of the various stages has been the central position of Ion Iliescu, who has managed to retain de facto control over the party from the first days of the revolution until the present.
6. Ion Iliescu, Momente de istorie (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedicǎ, 1995), 31.
7. As we will see, this claim was strengthened by the presence in the FSN of a series of high-profile anti-communist dissidents and prominent intellectuals.
8. Iliescu, Momente, 37.
9. In an interview in Le Figaro, 8 January 1990, cited in Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution (München: Serie Piper, 1990), 51.
10. Iliescu, Momente, 61.
11. As Silviu Brucan, one of the FSN's most influential figures during the first half of 1990, remarked, "Our ideology consists of five points: more food, more heat, more electricity and light, better transportation and better health care." See Reuter, 29 December 1989, cited in Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution (München: Serie Piper, 1990), 51.
12. As Silviu Brucan, one of the FSN's most influential figures during the first half of 1990, remarked, "Our ideology consists of five points: more food, more heat, more electricity and light, better transportation and better health care." See Reuter, 29 December 1989, cited in Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution (München: Serie Piper, 1990), 51.
13. These blemishes include the PDSR's electoral alliance with several extremist parties, Iliescu's rather intolerant attitude toward dissenters within the party, and the occasionally strident nationalist overtones of the electoral campaign (which at some point resembled Ceauşescu's nationalist rhetoric).
14. Csilla Machos, "Elitenbildung und Elitenwandel in der Ungarischen Sozialistischen Partei (1989-1996)," Südosteuropa 1-2 (1997): 65-89.
15. Machos defined the MSZP elite as all the members of the Party Presidium since 1989, all the MSZP MP's in the 1990-94 legislature and the leaders of the parliamentary faction of the current legislature.
16. Machos, "Elitenbildung," 73
17. Due to the high number of MSZP MPs in the new legislature, Machos tracks only the leaders of the MSZP parliamentary faction for this period. Within this group, the number of former high-ranking officials declined from 4 out of 18 in May 1994 to one out of 19 in March 1996.
18. Machos, "Elitenbildung," 67.
19. Machos, "Elitenbildung," 74.
20. Matei Cǎlinescu and Vladimir Tismǎneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and the Collapse of Communism in Romania," in Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians (Ohio State University Press, 1991), 289.
21. Matei Cǎlinescu and Vladimir Tismǎneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and the Collapse of Communism in Romania," in Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians (Ohio State University Press, 1991), 289.
22. Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil (London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 1992), 122.
23. While the references to support this fear are potentially endless, I want to mention only two suggestive slogans present at virtually all anti-FSN demonstrations of that period: "FSN=PCR" and "Iliescu pentru noi, este Ceauşescu II" (For us, Iliescu is Ceauşescu II).
24. Vladimir Tismǎneanu, "The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania," in East European Politics and Societies 7:2 (Spring 1993): 337.
25. After all, the two enjoyed previous connections, since Roman's father had been a prominent communist and a close freind of Iliescu for several decades. This connection was one of the main reasons for Roman's rapid ascendance from obscurity to power in 1990. See Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 129.
26. Michael Shafir, "Romania: The Rechristening of the National Salvation Front," RFE/RL Research Reports, 2 July 1993.
27. Telling in this respect is Pasti's observation that the two presidents of the PDSR base their authority on having been appointed by Iliescu rather than on their legitimacy within the party. See Vladimir Pasti, The Challenges of Transition: Romania in Transition, trans. Fraga Cheva Cusin (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1997), 121.
28. Many former high-ranking officials instead drifted to Ilie Verdeţ's Socialist Labor Party (PSM), which was the only party that openly claimed to continue the legacy of the Communist Party. However, as mentioned before, the PSM has failed to play an important part in the Romanian political scence.
29. The short biographies are from Barla (1994, 1996), two editions of a dictionary of Romanian public and political figures, and include leading members of Parliament as well as PDSR members appointed to key positions in the state apparatus (ministries, etc.). See Graziela Barla, Personalitǎţi publice-politice: dicţionar, ediţia a II-a 1992-1994, (Bucureşti: Editura Holding Reporter, 1994); and Graziela Barla, Personaliǎţi publicepolitice: dicţionar, ediţia a III-a 1995-1996 (Bucureşti: Editura Holding Reporter, 1996). While the space limitations and selection criteria of the dictionary may have led to the omission of some important figures, I did not notice any major gaps, and it is unlikely that such omissions would significantly influence the overall results.
30. The short biographies are from Barla (1994, 1996), two editions of a dictionary of Romanian public and political figures, and include leading members of Parliament as well as PDSR members appointed to key positions in the state apparatus (ministries, etc.). See Graziela Barla, Personalitǎţi publice-politice: dicţionar, ediţia a II-a 1992-1994, (Bucureşti: Editura Holding Reporter, 1994); and Graziela Barla, Personaliǎţi publicepolitice: dicţionar, ediţia a III-a 1995-1996 (Bucureşti: Editura Holding Reporter, 1996). While the space limitations and selection criteria of the dictionary may have led to the omission of some important figures, I did not notice any major gaps, and it is unlikely that such omissions would significantly influence the overall results.
31. Indicative in this respect is Shleifer's discussion of the importance of human capital of politicians and elite change for the creation of favorable business environments in Poland and P issia. See Andrei Shleifer, "Government in Transition," European Economic Review 41:3-5 (April 1997): 400-401.
32. For example, former French PM and chairman of the Socialist International, Pierre Mauroy, said that the MSZP had had the most success of all the reform communist parties in transforming itself into a social-democratic party. Cited in Edith Oltay, "Hungarian Socialists Prepare for Comeback," RFE/RL Research Reports, 4 March 1994.
33. The $4.5bn foreign investment in 1995 is impressive not just in comparison to the $2.3bn from 1993 (the last full year of the previous government) but also in comparison to the results of other East European countries during 1995: $419m in Romania, $183m in Slovakia, etc., Business Central Europe web page at http://www.bcemag.com.
34. Karen Lowry Miller, "Hungary Gets the Message from Mexico: Reform or Else (Economic Reform Plan in Hungary)" Business Week, 17 April 1995, 61.
35. Statistics are from the Business Central Europe web page at www.bcemag.com.
36. Ironically, this statement is indirectly acknowledged by the Hungarian opposition parties, which have accused the MSZP of hurting the "man on the street" in order to make profits for foreign investors. See Susan Milligan, "Broken Promises," Infrastructure Finance (February 1997).
37. "Young, Hip and in Power in Hungary," Boston Globe, 5 June 1998.
38. During the 1996 election year, inflation increased again to 38.8 percent, which, however, is still a respectable rate by East European standards.
39. Thus while Hungary had privatized 75 percent of its large-scale firms by 1994, in Romania the proportion was only 13 percent. See Lavinia Stan, "Romanian Privatization Program: Catching Up with the East," in Lavinia Stan, ed., Romania in Transition (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997), 150.
40. Yves Van Frausum, "Industrial Restructuring in Romania: Diagnosis and Strategies," Europe-Asia Studies 47:1 (1995): 50.
41. Between 1991 and 1994, Romania spent on average less than 10 percent of GDP on Social Security benefits, while in Hungary the average was above 18 percent ot GDP. From World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996), 81
42. Business Central Europe web page at http//: www.bcemag.com.
43. Barry Wood, "Romania: Eastern Europe's Second-Biggest Market Is Often Overlooked," Europe, 356 (May 1996): 26.
44. Business Central Europe web page at http//: www.bcemag.com.
45. Alfred Reisch, "The New Hungarian Government's Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Reports, 26 August 1994.
46. Ibid.
47. Agnes Maczo Nagy of the Smallholders Party quoted in Michael Shafir, "A Possible Light at the End of the Tunnel," Transition, 27 September 1996.
48. Given the eloquent position of the United States, which indicated that it did not support autonomy on an ethnic basis, and the NATO requirements that none of the new members could have any unsettled disputes with their neighbors, one might, of course, interpret the MSZP's willingness to compromise as a mere pragmatic foreign-policy move. Nevertheless, the action is in accord with the broader stance of the party on nationality issues.
49. While it would be hard to establish the precise "cost" of the MSZP's nationality policies, the FIDESZ - Smallholders electoral alliance - which ultimately defeated the socialists, seems to have few ideological commonalities besides a more nationalist rhetoric and a strong dislike of the MSZP.
50. Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceauşescu (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press), 101-102.
51. Quoted in Tom Gallagher, "The Rise of the Party of Romanian National Unity," RFE/RL Research Report, 18 March 1994. Nǎstase was the leader of the PDSR until the 1996 elections, because, according to the Romanian constitutions, the president is not allowed to be a member of any political party.
52. Michael Shafir, "Ethnic Tension Runs High in Romania," RFE/RL Research Reports, 19 September 1994.
53. Maior had joined the Vǎcǎroiu government as an independent, and later became a PDSR member, despite the fact that as a member of Vatra Româneascǎ, the more logical party choice would have been its political arm, the PUNR of Gheorge Funar.
54. Michael Shafir, "A Possible Light at the End of the Tunnel," Transition, 27 September 1996.
55. Michael Shafir, "Romania's Road to 'Normalcy,' " Journal of Democracy (Winter 1997): 51.
56. Quoted in Evenimentul Zilei, 13 November 1996; cited in Transition, 27 December 1996.
57. Quoted in Evenimentul Zilei, 13 November 1996; cited in Transition, 27 December 1996.
58. The important implications of Hungary's heavy dependence on Western credit and foreign direct investment will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this essay.
59. Quoted in "Gyula Horn, Prime Minister of Hungary," Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, 30 June 1994.
60. Ákos Szilágyi "The Mediatization of Government Politics," in Csaba Gombár et al., eds., Question Marks: The Hungarian Government 1994-1995 (Budapest: Korridor Books, 1995), 203-206.
61. Henry Carey, "Irregularities or Rigging: The 1992 Romanian Parliamentary Elections," East European Quarterly (March 1995): 45.
62. Henry Carey, "From Big Lie to Small Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-Communist Romania," East European Politics and Societies (Winter 1996): 36.
63. Henry Carey, "Irregularities or Rigging: The 1992 Romanian Parliamentary Elections," East European Quarterly (March 1995): 43-66.
64. While Carey argues that the reason for this silence was government intimidation of the Romanian media (which in itself is questionable given that Romanian newspapers of the period are full of vehement attacks against Iliescu and the PDSR), it completely fails to account for why the Western media, which was certainly no great supporter of Iliescu, chose to ignore the affair.
65. One of countless examples of the trials to which the PDSR was subjected by its "allies" was an attack by C. V. Tudor, the chairman of the PRM, who accused Iliescu of subjugating the country to the Jews and predicting that "Vadim will be to you what you were unto Ceauşescu." See România Matre, 6 October 1995.
66. Colin Jones, "Old Guard, New Route," The Banker (January 1995): 34.
67. Daniel Dǎianu, "Macro-Economic Stabilization in Post-Communist Romania," in Lavinia Stan, ed., Romania in Transition (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997), 95.
68. By orthodox, I mean an approach sanctioned by the West as being reformist. Even though Western specialists widely disagree on the "correct" approach to transitions, most of them nevertheless agreed that Hungary's gradualism was more compatible with conventional economic wisdom than was Romania's original approach.
69. Indicative in this respect is Horn's aforementioned declaration that Hungary's plural democracy would not allow a return to the communist era, even it the MSZP would attempt such return (Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, 30 June 1994).
70. Hungary's foreign debt amounted to $21.3bn in 1990 and had risen to $28.3bn by 1994 when the socialists came to power. See Business Central Europe web page at http// www.bcemag.com.
71. Barry Wood, "Romania: Eastern Europe's Second-Biggest Market Is Often Overlooked," Europe, 356 (May 1996): 26.
72. Regardless of whether the 1989 "events" are interpreted as a revolution or a coup d'état, the timing and the initial impulse came from Timişoara.
73. Remarkably, the most important of these opposition parties, the National Peasants' Party (PNTCD), had originally been a rather nationalist, conservative party in the early interwar period.
74. One may, of course, justifiably ask whether the choice of coalition partners was not in itself a sign of the party's ideological leanings, but in both cases the successor parties had only limited choices. Thus in Romania, initially the PDSR unsuccessfully tried to form a coalition government with the Democratic Convention (CDR), which would have led to a more moderate governing coalition. In Hungary, the Free Democrats was the only parliamentary party that was willing to cooperate with the MSZP, but one may still speculate about the possible outcome of a MSZP-Smallholders coalition.
75. László Bruszt, "The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary," in András Bozóki et al., eds., Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 47.
76. László Lengyel, "The Character of the Political Parties in Hungary (Fall 1989)," in András Bozóki et al., eds., Post-Communist Transition, 34-41.
77. Iliescu, Momente, 60.
78. During the first months of 1990, the historical parties became the center of a moral-purification movement, which advocated the punishment of those responsible for crimes during the communist period and the exclusion from public life of all high functionaries of the previous regime (in the famous eighth clause of the Timişoara Proclamation).
79. Edith Oltay, "Hungarian Socialists Prepare for Comeback," RFE/RL Research Reports, 4 March 1994.