Electoral surprise and the midterm loss in US congressional elections

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 507-521

  Scheve, Kenneth ^a   Tomz, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033439840     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000712349900023X     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2. Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini and Gerald D. Cohen, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Douglas A. Hibbs, Fredrik Carlsen, and Elin Foss Pedersen, 'Electoral Uncertainty, Long-Term Wage Contracts and Partisan Output Cycles' (unpublished manuscript, presented at Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1997).
3. Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini and Gerald D. Cohen, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Douglas A. Hibbs, Fredrik Carlsen, and Elin Foss Pedersen, 'Electoral Uncertainty, Long-Term Wage Contracts and Partisan Output Cycles' (unpublished manuscript, presented at Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1997).
4. Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Reagan Years: Turning to the Right or Groping Toward the Middle?' in Barry Cooper, Allan Kornberg and William Mishler, eds, The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988); Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Everett C. Ladd, 'On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election', Political Science Quarterly, 100 (1985), 1-25.
5. Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Reagan Years: Turning to the Right or Groping Toward the Middle?' in Barry Cooper, Allan Kornberg and William Mishler, eds, The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988); Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Everett C. Ladd, 'On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election', Political Science Quarterly, 100 (1985), 1-25.
6. Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Reagan Years: Turning to the Right or Groping Toward the Middle?' in Barry Cooper, Allan Kornberg and William Mishler, eds, The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988); Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Everett C. Ladd, 'On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election', Political Science Quarterly, 100 (1985), 1-25.
7. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
8. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
9. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
10. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
11. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
12. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
13. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
14. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
15. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
16. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
17. Several other explanations of the midterm loss exist in the literature. Robert S. Erikson ('The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29) groups these explanations into four categories: regression to the mean (Barbara Hinckley, 'Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 694-700; James E. Campbell, 'Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 1140-57); surge-and-decline (Angus Campbell, 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, eds, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Richard Born, 'Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 615-45; James E. Campbell, The Presidential Surge and Its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868-1988', Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 477-87); referendum on presidential performance (Edward Tufte, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 812-26; Richard Born, 'Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 599-612); and presidential penalty (Steven D. Levitt, 'An Empirical Test of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap in the U.S. House', Economics and Politics, 6 (1994), 25-37). As Erikson points out, aggregate data seem most consistent with the notion of a presidential penalty, 'the seemingly "punitive" response of an electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or standing with the electorate' (Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', p. 1013). He speculates that the presidential penalty arises from 'negative voting' (Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 44-66) and/or 'a simple balance theory of midterm elections'. Alesina and Rosenthal develop the balance theory by arguing that the presidential penalty arises from the behaviour of surprised moderates. We test their prediction while controlling for other explanations such as presidential performance.
18. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy, p. 10.
19. To test the Alesina-Rosenthal model of vote-switching between the on-year and the midterm, we restrict our attention to voters who turned out in both elections. Of course, part of the midterm loss may be driven by variation in turn-out from one election to the next. If we broaden the sample to include respondents who voted in at least one of the elections, the midterm loss in the pooled dataset rises to 6.9 per cent.
20. Results reported in this article are robust to alternative measures of moderation. The simplest measure of political moderation is an indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent did not identify strongly with either party (affiliation = 3 to 5). Our preferred measure, a four-point scale, contains more information and rests on the intuition that moderation is a matter of degree, but the results were qualitatively similar when we substituted the dummy variable in place of our four-point measure.
21. Alesina and Rosenthal assume that all voters experience the same degree of surprise about the outcome of the presidential election. In reality, people vary in their expectations. We take advantage of this variability by creating an individual-level measure of surprise and investigating its effect on the behaviour of voters.
22. We could not control for each respondent's perceptions of changes in national, as opposed to personal, economic conditions, because the requisite data were not available for 1958 and 1974. Several studies suggest, however, that national economic conditions exert little influence on the midterm vote. See, for example, Robert S. Erikson, 'Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 373-99.
23. The estimated coefficient also carries the anticipated sign when each of the three panels is analysed in isolation, though it is not always statistically distinguishable from zero with 95 per cent confidence, due to limited degrees of freedom. Introducing a fixed effect for each election does not affect our conclusions. Finally, the results are qualitatively similar when we estimate a nested model in which respondents first decide whether to vote and then decide whether to cast their ballots for the president's party. The interaction term does not affect a voter's propensity to turnout, but it does increase the probability of turning against the president's party at the midterm.
24. University of Michigan Survey Research Center, American Panel Study, 1956, 1958, 1960 (computer file) ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 1971); University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, American National Election Series 1972, 1974, 1976 (computer file), 2nd ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1979); Steven J. Rosenstone, Warren E. Miller Donald R. Kinder and the National Election Studies, American National Election Study, 1994: Post-Election Survey [Enhanced with 1992 and 1993 Data] (computer file), conducted by University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, 2nd ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1995).
25. University of Michigan Survey Research Center, American Panel Study, 1956, 1958, 1960 (computer file) ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 1971); University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, American National Election Series 1972, 1974, 1976 (computer file), 2nd ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1979); Steven J. Rosenstone, Warren E. Miller Donald R. Kinder and the National Election Studies, American National Election Study, 1994: Post-Election Survey [Enhanced with 1992 and 1993 Data] (computer file), conducted by University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, 2nd ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1995).
26. University of Michigan Survey Research Center, American Panel Study, 1956, 1958, 1960 (computer file) ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 1971); University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, American National Election Series 1972, 1974, 1976 (computer file), 2nd ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1979); Steven J. Rosenstone, Warren E. Miller Donald R. Kinder and the National Election Studies, American National Election Study, 1994: Post-Election Survey [Enhanced with 1992 and 1993 Data] (computer file), conducted by University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, 2nd ICPSR edn. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1995).
27. Gary King Elections to the United States House of Representatives, 1898-1992 (computer file). ICPSR version (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1995)
28. 'Results of the 1994 Election', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 53 (1995), 1090-7.