The nature of the British-Irish agreement

New Left Review

Volumn , Issue 233, 1999, Pages 66-95

  O'Leary, Brendan ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033418745     PISSN: 00286060     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. References will be to The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, no place of publication, no date, UK Government.
2. See, inter alia, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven 1977, and Michael Walzer, On Toleration, New Haven 1997.
3. See, inter alia, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven 1977, and Michael Walzer, On Toleration, New Haven 1997.
4. Lijphart claims that consociational rules were invented by Dutch politicians in 1917, Lebanese politicians in 1943, Austrian politicians in 1945, Malaysian politicians in 1955, Colombian politicians in 1958, Indian politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, South African politicians in 1993-4, and by British politicians addressing Northern Ireland in 1972. One does not have to agree with the citation of any or all of these cases to accept the point: politicians are more than capable of doing theory without the aid of theorists. See inter alia, Arend Lijphart, 'Foreword: One Basic Problem, Many Theoretical Options - And a Practical Solution?', in The Future of Northern Ireland, edited by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Oxford 1990, p. viii; 'Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa' in Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects, edited by Andrew Reynolds, London 1994, pp. 221-33; and 'The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation', American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 2, 1996, pp. 258-68.
5. Lijphart claims that consociational rules were invented by Dutch politicians in 1917, Lebanese politicians in 1943, Austrian politicians in 1945, Malaysian politicians in 1955, Colombian politicians in 1958, Indian politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, South African politicians in 1993-4, and by British politicians addressing Northern Ireland in 1972. One does not have to agree with the citation of any or all of these cases to accept the point: politicians are more than capable of doing theory without the aid of theorists. See inter alia, Arend Lijphart, 'Foreword: One Basic Problem, Many Theoretical Options - And a Practical Solution?', in The Future of Northern Ireland, edited by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Oxford 1990, p. viii; 'Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa' in Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects, edited by Andrew Reynolds, London 1994, pp. 221-33; and 'The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation', American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 2, 1996, pp. 258-68.
6. Lijphart claims that consociational rules were invented by Dutch politicians in 1917, Lebanese politicians in 1943, Austrian politicians in 1945, Malaysian politicians in 1955, Colombian politicians in 1958, Indian politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, South African politicians in 1993-4, and by British politicians addressing Northern Ireland in 1972. One does not have to agree with the citation of any or all of these cases to accept the point: politicians are more than capable of doing theory without the aid of theorists. See inter alia, Arend Lijphart, 'Foreword: One Basic Problem, Many Theoretical Options - And a Practical Solution?', in The Future of Northern Ireland, edited by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Oxford 1990, p. viii; 'Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa' in Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects, edited by Andrew Reynolds, London 1994, pp. 221-33; and 'The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation', American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 2, 1996, pp. 258-68.
7. One of the makers of the Agreement, Dr Mowlam, the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (1997-), has an academic consociational heritage - she wrote on Swiss federal and consociational practices in her educational career, and at least one of her advisors has had an abiding interest in the subject. Consociational thinking not only formed part of the background thinking of the UK Labour Party. It had an impact on the drafting of the Framework Documents of 1995, and the 'novel' executive formation in the Agreement, based on the d'Hondt rule, see Appendix, reflects consociational coalition principles used elsewhere in Europe and in the European Parliament.
8. See Statement of the Office of the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate), 18 December 1998. The Northern Ireland Act (1998) makes it plain that the top two Ministers can hold functional portfolios, Clause 15 (10).
9. Under the 7 Ministries possibility, if the DUP had not taken its seats the UUP would have had 4 out of 7 departments, that is a majority of departments with just over one fifth of the vote, a grossly disproportional scenario.
10. Statement of the Office of the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate), 18 December 1998.
11. The Droop quota used in STV is Total Vote (N+1) +1, where N = Number of Assembly members to be elected.
12. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley 1985, pp. 628 ff. The 'cross-community consent procedures' to elect the First and Deputy First Ministers require 'vote pooling' amongst Assembly members.
13. This option is also open to anti-Agreement voters, but DUP and UKUP voters are unlikely to give their lower order preferences to Republican Sinn Féin - should that party ever to choose to stand for elections.
14. The STV system has arguably helped encourage Sinn Féin to its current path: in the past it won few transfers from other parties' supporters. Since the early 1990s, that is no longer true because SDLP voters have been rewarding Sinn Fein for its increased moderation. STV also has the great merit of having been used in Northern Ireland for local government elections since 1973, and European Parliamentary elections since 1979 - so voters do not need to learn a new system.
15. See John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Policing Northern Ireland: A Fresh Start, Belfast 1999.
16. It is significant that the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages could be accepted by both nationalists and unionists as a basis for regulating the politics of language. See Statement of the Office of the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate), 18 December 1998, Annex 2.
17. My definition is certainly a necessary element of a federal system. Whether it is sufficient is more controversial. Normally, people expect a federation to have sub-central units of government that are co-sovereign with the centre throughout most of the territory of the state in question. However, any system of constitutionally entrenched autonomy for one region makes the relationship between that region and the centre functionally equivalent to a federal relationship. My thanks to John Coakley, Robert Hazell and Paul Mitchell for discussion of these matters.
18. The Agreement does not mention what happens if both institutions, and therefore the Agreement itself, collapses. In my view, what would happen is this: Northern Ireland would be governed, as at present, by the British government with input from Dublin through the British-Irish intergovernmental conference. The two Governments would likely pursue the promotion of national equality, reductions in the employment gap between Catholics and Protestants, and the reform of policing; and eventually shift towards direct co-sovereignty over the region. If the Agreement's core institutions are not established then any legal challenge to the implementation of changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's constitution is likely to be successful. Unionists opposed to the Agreement would do well to bear these considerations in mind.
19. This is the collective name in Gaelic for the two chambers of the Irish Parliament, Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann.
20. The possibility of a unionist Minister refusing to serve on the Council will appear to some as very grave, given that unionist parties which oppose the Agreement, especially the DUP, are, in principle, eligible for ministerial portfolios. However, this may be ruled out in practice: participation in the North-South Council has been made an 'essential' responsibility attaching to 'relevant' posts in the two Administrations ('relevant' means, presumably, any portfolio a part of which is subject to North-South co-operation). This leaves open the possibility that a politician opposed to the North-South Council might take a seat on it with a view to wrecking it. But Ministers are required to establish the North-South Institutions in 'good faith' and to use 'best endeavours' to reach agreement. Since these requirements are presumably subject to judicial review, it means it is unlikely that potential wreckers, like Ian Paisley or Peter Robinson, would be able to take part in the North-South Council, even if they wanted to. One of the requirements for membership of the Executive is that ministers must 'support . . . all decisions of the Executive Committee', and they can be removed if they do not - though that presupposes decisions being made by the Executive Committee. Whether these provisions will be justiciable remains to be seen.
21. The Republic's prosperity has, of course, been uneven in its distribution, but seems unlikely simply to wither, even if there is retrenchment within the European Union's structural and regional funds.
22. The Agreement suggested that Northern Ireland could, in principle, even go into EMU with the Republic, if Britain itself remained outside - providing there was agreement in the Assembly, and the Secretary of State and the Westminster Parliament assented. The UK Northern Ireland Act may have closed this possibility by describing currency as a 'reserved matter'.
23. The formation of an English Parliament would be the last blow.
24. See John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, Oxford 1995, ch. 10. See also Brendan O'Leary and Geoffrey Evans, 'Northern Ireland: La Fin-de-Siècle, the Twilight of the Second Protestant Ascendancy and Sinn Féin's Second Coming', Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 50, no. 4, 1997, pp. 672-80.
25. See John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, Oxford 1995, ch. 10. See also Brendan O'Leary and Geoffrey Evans, 'Northern Ireland: La Fin-de-Siècle, the Twilight of the Second Protestant Ascendancy and Sinn Féin's Second Coming', Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 50, no. 4, 1997, pp. 672-80.
26. Constitution of Ireland, Dublin 1937, as amended.
27. See Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, London 1996, second edition, chs. 6-7.
28. The Agreement page 20, para. 3, emphasis mine.
29. The Agreement, p. 21, paras. 1-4.
30. See McGarry and O'Leary, Policing Northern Ireland.
31. The Agreement, p. 22, paras. 1-2.
32. For sophisticated discussions of recognition, see inter alia, Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War, Cambridge 1996 and Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton 1992.
33. For sophisticated discussions of recognition, see inter alia, Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War, Cambridge 1996 and Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton 1992.
34. John Whyte, 'Dynamics of Political and Social Change in Northern Ireland', in Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation, edited by Dermot Keogh and Michael Haltzel, Cambridge 1993, pp. 103-16.
35. In the new dispensation there are now eight minorities: five are for the Agreement: nationalists, republicans, 'yes unionists', 'yes loyalists' and 'others'. Three are against: 'no unionists', 'no loyalists' and 'no republicans'. The latter are in what Marxists used to call an 'objective alliance of reactionaries'.
36. At the beginning of 1999 Robert McCarcney's UK Unionist Party split asunder, leaving McCartney isolated. His colleagues maintained, amongst other things, that he planned to withdraw the UKUP from the Assembly, an action that would have made matters easier for the pro-Agreement parties. One unionist journalist put it to me that 'Mr. McCartney's ideological problem is that he does not know with which part of Mr. Blair's disintegrating Kingdom he wishes to integrate'.