A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions

Economics Letters

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 183-189

  Kline, J Jude ^a   Menezes, Flavio M ^a  

^a Faculties (Bldg No 26) A   (Australia)

Author keywords

D44; Double auctions; Emission permits auctions; Q29

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033416464     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00128-7     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Cason T.N. Seller incentive properties of EPA's emission trading auctions. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 25:(2):1993;177-195.
2. Cason T.N. An experimental investigation of the seller incentives in EPA's emission trading auction. American Economic Review. 85:(4):1995;905-922.
3. Cason T.N., Plott C.R. EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory experiment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 30:(2):1996;133-160.
4. Dubey P. Price-quantity strategic market games. Econometrica. 50:1982;111-126.
5. Laffont J.-J., Tirole J. Pollution permits and compliance strategies. Journal of Public Economics. 62:(1-2):1996;85-125.
6. Ledyard J.O., Szakaly-Moore K. Designing organizations for trading pollution rights. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 25:1994;167-196.
7. Satterthwaite M.A., Williams S.R. The rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction as the market becomes large. Review of Economic Studies. 56:(4):1989;477-498.