Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms

Economic Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 229-237

  Kosmopoulou, Georgia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

Allocative efficiency; Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms; Dominant strategy implementation; Payoff equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033248330     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050251     Document Type: Article

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