The Middle East: A region without regionalism or the end of exceptionalism?

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 911-925

  Aarts, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; ECONOMIC RELATIONS; LIBERALIZATION; REGIONAL ECONOMY; REGIONALISM;

MIDDLE EAST;

EID: 0033390316     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436599913406     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. On the concept of the Middle Eastern and the Arab subsystem, see P Noble, "The Arab state system: pressures, constraints and opportunities', in B Korany & A E Hillal Dessouki (eds). The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1991;
2. A M Said Aly, "The shattered consensus-Arab perceptions of security', in The International Spectator, XXXI (4), 1996, pp 26-27;
3. B Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-1991, London: Macmillan, 1993. This essay in most cases refers to the Arab world or subregions thereof (ie the 21 member states of the Arab League). When Israel is included, however, we explicitly use the term 'Middle East'. Neither Iran nor Turkey-normally making part of the 'Middle East"-are being dealt with here. The same applies to the new republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For an alternative definition, see Geoffrey Kemp & Robert E Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Brookings Institution Press, 1997, pp 13-15.
4. B Hettne, The New Regionalism, Implications for Global Development and International Security, Helsinki: UNUAVIDER, 1994, p 28.
5. G Nonneman, 'Problems facing cooperation and integration attempts in the Middle East', in Nonneman (ed), The Middle East and Europe. An Integrated Community Approach, London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1992, p 33. It hardly needs saying that integration attempts based on the idea of a revolutionary new 'Pax Islamica' are too eccentric to have a chance of successful implementation. See D George, 'Pax Islamica: an alternative new world order?', in A S Sidahmed & A Ehteshami (eds), Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1996, pp 71-90.
6. M Faour, The Arab World after Desert Storm, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, pp 77-93;
7. Paul Aarts, 'Democracy, oil and the Gulf war'. Third World Quarterly, 13(3), 1992, pp 525-538.
8. J P Zanders, 'A new security (dis)order for the Gulf POLE-Papers (Brussels: Centrum voor Polemologie), 2, 1994, p 1; and Faour, Tlie Arab World, p 86.
9. J Agnew & S Corbridge, Mastering Space. Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy, London: Routledge, 1995, p 156.
10. As such, these schemes do not find their dynamics in the region itself and, consequently, cannot be considered as forms of 'new regionalism'. Hettne, The New Regionalism, p 34.
11. It should be noted that in the field of Middle East studies this kind of research, ie mapping and analysing attitudes of different social actors vis-à-vis regionalisation issues, is scarcely out of the egg.
12. The subregional, functional approach to integration stands in contrast to the 'Prussian model', which over-emphasises the role of a 'pivotal territory' in overwhelming others into accepting unification. This overnight unitary approach has long been favoured by pan-Arabists of the Nasserite and Ba'thist kind (and, of course, the Arab Nationalist Movement-ANM).
13. T al-Hamad, 'Imperfect alliances: will the Gulf monarchies work together?, MERIA Journal, 2, post 4, 1997 (via Internet; originally published in Middle East Quarterly, March 1997).
14. N Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, Politics and Society in the Middle East, London: IB Tauris, 1995, p 156.
15. For an overview of piecemeal attempts at cooperation, see ibid, pp 153-158; Nonneman, The Middle East and Europe, pp 54-57; and F Lawson, 'Punctuated integration and the Gulf Cooperation Council', in K Thomas & M A Tétreault (eds). Racing to Regionalize: Democracy, Capitalism, and Regional Political Economy, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1999 (forthcoming). See also A Abdelkarim (ed), Change and Development in the Gulf, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
16. G Joffé, "The western Arab world: background assessment' and 'The development of the DMA and integration in the western Arab world', in Nonneman, The Middle East and Europe, pp 193-197, 199-212, respectively.
17. C Tripp, 'Regional organizations in the Arab Middle East', in L Fawcett & A Hurrell (eds). Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p 296.
18. Joffé, 'The development of the UMA', p 201; and Tripp, 'Regional organizations', p 296.
19. Tripp, 'Regional organizations', p 298. For a recent, much more rose-coloured view, see C R Ryan, 'Jordan and the rise and fall of the Arab Co-operation Council', Middle East Journal, 52 (3), 1998, pp 386-401.
20. Tripp, 'Regional organization', p 288.
21. Y A Sayigh, 'A new framework for complementarity among the Arab economies', in I Ibrahim (ed), Arab Resources. The Transformation of a Society, Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies/ Croom Helm, 1983, p 149;
22. B Korany, 'The old/new Middle East', in L Guazzone (ed). The Middle East in Global Change. The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, p 145. It should be remarked that even in obvious fields of integration, like water sharing, regional co-operation is negligible. The same goes for tourism. It is noteworthy that to visit some Arab countries, other Arab citizens have to have visas, whereas many Europeans and North Americans do not need any.
23. The clearest example is the OCC, considered by most non-Gulf Arabs to be an exclusive club des riches. See, for instance, how Yemen's application for membership has been refused out of hand.
24. See P Aarts & M Tempel, 'Economic integration in the Middle East', JIME Review, 3, 1995 pp 39-49, and references there.
25. For an antidotal opinion, see S E Battles, 'Financial flows and integration in the Middle East', The International Spectator, XXX (3), 1995, pp 57-82;
26. G Joffé 'The economic factor in Mediterranean security', The International Spectator, XXX I (4), 1996, pp 75-87;
27. Z Maoz, 'Regional security in the Middle East: past trends, present realities and future challenges'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 20 (1), 1997, pp 1-45;
28. Y Sayigh, ' "System" breakdown in the Middle East?', Middle Eastern Lectures, Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2, 1997, pp 57-68.
29. G Salamé, 'Torn between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the post-Cold War era'. Middle East Journal, 48 (2), 1994, pp 226-249;
30. M Landgraf, "The impact of the second Gulf War on the Middle Eastern policy of the European Union', Orient, 35 (1), 1994, pp 81-94;
31. G Corm, Le Proche-Orient éclaté. Mirages de paix et blocages identitaires 1990-1996, Paris: La Découverte, 1997.
32. See the numerous commentaries in Al-Ahram Weekly (by Dina Ezzat, Ibrahim Nafie, Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, Mohamed El-Imam, Fawzi Mansour and others). See also Korany, "The old/new Middle East', pp 138-141.
33. This ties in with the idea that capitalists are more likely to be pan-Arabist than are the ruling elites of the territorial stales who would lose many of their privileges in a unified setting. F Jalal, quoted in Ayubi, Overstating the Arab Stale, p 161).
34. M Abdel-Fadil, 'Macroeconomic tendencies and policy options in the Middle East', in Guazzone, The Middle East in Global Change, p 120. Abdel-Fadil rightly remarks that the process of economic growth in the easy years of the oil boom may be viewed as a kind of 'bubble economy', fuelled by the construction boom and the upsurge in trade and financial activities.
35. World Bank, Claiming the Future. Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa, Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995, pp 15, 28.
36. Abdel-Fadil, 'Macroeconomic tendencies', p 120.
37. World Bank, Claiming the Future, pp 15-44.
38. D Tschirgi, 'Introduction', in Tschirgi (ed). Development in the Age of Liberalization. Egypt and Mexico, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996, p 9.
39. More on this, see A Richards & J Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East State Class and Economic Development, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1990, pp 238-261;
40. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, pp 333-339, 383-388;
41. G Nonneman, 'Economic liberalization: the debate', in Nonneman (ed), Political and Economic Liberalization. Dynamics & Linkages in Comparative Perspective, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp 3-43;
42. I Harik, 'Privatization: the issue, the prospects and the fears', in I Harik & D J Sullivan (eds), Privatization and Liberalization in ihe Middle East, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp 1-23; Tschirgi, 'Introduction', p 7-10;
43. T Niblock, 'International and domestic factors in the economic liberalization process in Arab countries', in T Niblock & E Murphy (eds). Economic and Political liberalization in the Middle East, London: Academic Press, 1993, pp 55-87;
44. M Wahba, 'Private and public economic bases: the Egyptian case', in Tschirgi, Development in the Age of Liberalization, pp 73-74;
45. the seminal article by T Biersteker, 'The "triumph" of neoclassical economics in the developing world: policy convergence and bases of governance in the international economic order', in J Rosenau & E-O Czempiel (eds). Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp 102-131.
46. Nonneman, 'Economic liberalization', p 37.
47. See Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, pp 329-332; Harik, 'Privatization', p 16; Niblock, 'International and domestic factors', p 84. For country cases, see Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, pp 339-382;
48. Harik & Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization; Niblock and Murphy, Economic and Political Liberalization; Tschirgi, Development in the Age of Liberalization; and Nonneman, Political and Economic Liberalization, pp 153-225.
49. Harik, 'Privatization', p 16.
50. Harik & Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization; P Stevens, 'The practical record and prospects of privatization programmes in the Arab world', in Niblock & Murphy, Economic and Political Liberalization, pp 114-131;
51. Nonneman, Political and Economic Liberalization, part 3.
52. One might as well add consumers, acting as a 'pressure group', opposing market reforms which usually lead to higher prices of basic commodities.
53. S Richman, review of Harik & Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization, in Middle East Policy, 2 (1), p 142.
54. Stevens, "The practical record', p 129.
55. See among others D Rueschemeyer, E H Stephens & J D Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992);
56. G Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993;
57. L Diamond & M F Platter (eds), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993;
58. E Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism Renewing Historical Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; and, for the Middle East, the seminal work by S Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics State Formation and Development, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
59. Nonneman, 'Patterns of economic liberalization: explanations and modalities', in Nonneman, Political and Economic Liberalization, p 59.
60. Ayubi aptly remarks that 'the connection between economic crisis and political liberalisation is not inevitable. In other historical circumstances economic crisis led either to fascism or to bureaucratic-authoritarianism ... What titled the balance more towards democracy in recent years has been the growing globalisation and the undisputed ideological hegemony of the 'West' following the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. But again, the connection is not automatic here either. The hegemonic discourse sometimes described as the "Washington Consensus" ... is much less ambiguous about economic neoliberalism while remaining quite vague on democracy.' See Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p 402. On this last point, see J Hippler (ed). The Democratisation of Disempowerment. The Problem of Democracy in the Third World, Amsterdam/London: Transnational Institute/Pluto Press, 1995.
61. G Luciani, "The oil rent, the fiscal crisis of the state and democratization', in Gh Salamé (ed), Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, London/New York: IB Tauris, 1994, pp 130-155;
62. G Luciani, 'Resources, revenues and authoritarianism in the Arab world', in R Brynen, B Korany & P Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp 211-212.
63. See Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, pp 396-446;
64. S Heydemann, 'Taxation without representation: authoritarianism and economic liberalization in Syria', in E Goldberg, R Kasaba & J S Migdal (eds), Rules and Rights in the Midle East. Democracy, Law, and Society, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1993;
65. V Permes, "The private sector, economic liberalization, and the prospects for democratization: the case of Syria and some other Arab countries', in Salamé, Democracy without Democrats?, pp 243-269;
66. S Poelling, 'Syria's private sector: economic liberalization and the challenges of the 1990s', in Nonneman, Political and Economic Liberalization, pp 169-179;
67. L Brand, 'Economic and political liberalization in a rentier economy: the case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', in Harik & Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization, pp 167-188;
68. J Leca, 'Democratization in the Arab world: uncertainty, vulnerability and legitimacy. A tentative conceptualization and some hypotheses', in Salamé, Democracy without Democrats?, pp 48-83;
69. A Hermassi, 'Socio-economic change and political implications: the Maghreb', in ibid, pp 227-242; and D Pool, "The links between economic and political liberalization', in Niblock & Murphy, Economic and Political Liberalization, pp 40-54.
70. R Cox, 'Global perestroika', in R Miliband & L Panitch (eds), Socialist Register, London: Merlin Press, 1992, pp 30-31.
71. D Vandewalle, 'At the periphery: North Africa, the European Community and the end of the Cold War', The Maghreb Review, 17 (1-2), 1992, pp 34-35.
72. A Ehteshami & E Murphy, 'Transformation of the corporatist state in the Middle East', Third World Quarterly, 17(4), 1996, pp 753-772
73. R Springborg, 'The Arab bourgeoisie: a revisionist interpretation", Arab Studies Quarterly, IS (1), 1993, pp 26-28.
74. Ibid, p 31.
75. Ibid, p 32. See also Poelling, 'Syria's private sector ...'.
76. Springborg, 'The Arab bourgeoisie', p 32;
77. C M Henry, The Mediterranean Debt Crescent. Money and Power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida, 1996, pp 1-25.
78. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab Slate, p 181.
79. See also H Barakat, The Arab World, Society, Culture, and State, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, pp 73-96;
80. H Sharabi, Neopatriarchy. A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998;
81. S Farsoun, 'Class structure and social change in the Arab world: 1995', in H Sharabi (ed), The Next Arab Decade. Alternative Futures, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1988.
82. J Waterbury, 'Democracy without democrats? The potential for political liberalization in the Middle East', in Salamé, Democracy without Democrats'1., p 27.
83. By entering the private sector the state bourgeoisie is killing two birds with one stone. First it assures itself of lucrative business deals. Second, and more importantly, the state bourgeoisie is now in the position to ensure its incumbency and reproduce itself as a state class. In previous times, ie before turning into this 'entrepreneurial state class', this was impossible: it did not control the means of production-property not being the source of its power-and it had no juridical claim to the positions that were the source of its power. "The exchange of public for private inheritable power of disposable means of production may be the most rational way for this stratum to secure the preservation of an elevated position in the social pyramid.' Perthes, "The private sector', p 262, emphasis added. See also Richards & Waterbury, A Political Economy, pp 214-218.
84. For a graphic description of such a new 'military-mercantile complex', see R Hinnebusch, 'Syria', in Niblock & Murphy, Economic and Political Liberalization, pp 177-202; and Hinnebusch, 'State and civil society in Syria', Middle East Journal, 47 (2), 1993, pp 243-257.
85. Examples abound. See Niblock & Murphy, Economic and Political Liberalization; Ayubi, Over-slating the Arab State, pp 339-382;
86. Harik & Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization. In Tschirgi, Development in the Age of Liberalization, an interesting comparison in made between the liberalisation policies of Egypt and Mexico. For a comparison of Egypt with the 'East Asian experience', see H-J Chang, M Said & Kh Sakr, 'Industrial policy and the role of the state in Egypt: the relevance of the East-Asian experience, paper presented to the conference on 'The Changing Role of the State', Rabat: Economic Research Forum, 1995.
87. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p 389.
88. Leca, 'Democratization in the Arab world', p 71.
89. Perthes, "The private sector', p 263.
90. Further research may (or may not) find parallels with the situation in Mexico where technoburoćrats, or technocrats, adopted international integration and economic liberalisation strategies as the only economic solution for the country's predicament. By emphasising the failure of the old model, they dwarfed the role of the nationalist polilicos who had earlier dominated the economic policy of import-substitution industrialisation. B Hogenboom, 'Mexico. Open regionalism and the politics of a transnationalizing state'. International Journal of Political Economy, 26 (3), 1996, pp 12-31.
91. Abdel-Fadil enumerates: leather products, light chemicals, light engineering goods, electrical products. Abdel-Fadil, 'Macroeconomic tendencies', p 125. This does not necessarily exclude, however, the possibility of keeping some import-substition elements, as the case of the Asian newly industrialised countries has shown. See M Sakbani, 'Comment', in S EL-Najjar (ed), Foreign and Intratrade Policies of Arab Countries, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1992, p 90;
92. P Guerrieri, 'Globalism and regionalism in the world economy and the Middle East', in Guazzone, The Middle East in Global Change, p 163; and Change et al, 'Industrial policy', p 26.
93. Perthes points out that many productive activities need markets of scale that no single country can offer. 'Automobile production, the production of rails and railroad cars, even the production of heavy machinery would make sense if designed for one large Middle Eastern or Arab economic zone. Arab computer (and software) production, regional development of modem solar energy equipment, and water saving technologies for industry and agriculture, to mention but a few possibilities, could all be economically valid undertakings. But only in cooperation could regional states afford the R&D expenses that would be needed to boost their own technology development'. Perthes 'Arab economic cooperation: power versus efficiency', International Politik und Gesellschaft, 3, 1996, p 275. See also Padoan, 'The political economy of regional integration in the Middle East', in Guazzone, Tlie Middle East in Global Change, p 199;
94. P Guerrieri, 'Globalism and regionalism in the world economy and the Middle East', in ibid, pp 163-167;
95. Abdel-Fadil, 'Macroeconomic tendencies', pp 124-126;
96. L Guazzone, 'A map and some hypotheses for the future of the Middle East', in ibid, p 248.
97. R Owen, 'Socio-economic change and political mobilization: the case of Egypt', in Salamé, Democracy without Democrats, pp 193, 197.
98. Guerrieri, 'Globalism and regionalism', p 168. See also Padoan's succinct, though solid analysis of macrocconomic performances and national policies. Padoan, "The political economy', pp 184-194.
99. Battles, 'Financial flows', p 72; Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, pp 159-161;
100. Guerrieri, 'Globalism and regionalism', in Guazzone, Tlie Middle East in Global Change, p 168.
101. Sayigh, ' "System" breakdown', p 63.
102. S Krasner, 'The Middle East and the end of the Cold War', in Guazzone, The Middle East in Global Change, p 207.
103. Since Khatami's election as President (May 1997), the situation in Iran looks different, Iranian politics are definitely, though carefully, changing tack.
104. Guazzone, 'A map and some hypotheses', p 242.
105. Murphy adds: 'The Middle East increasingly may become split, not on the basis of Arabs and Israelis, but on an east-west, Mediterranean-Orient axis.' See E Murphy, "The Arab-Israeli peace process'. Critique. Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East, 9, 1996, pp 89-90.