Jordan and the rise and fall of the Arab Cooperation Council

Middle East Journal

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 386-400

  Ryan, Curtis R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARY WASHINGTON   (United States)

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EID: 0040942652     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. The members of the AMU include Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.
2. The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In contrast to the ACC. both the GCC and the AMU were more geographically centralized organizations, representing distinct subregions of the Arab world.
3. For samples of this discussion see "Arab Cooperation: Getting Together, in Bits," The Economist, 25 February - 3 March 1989, pp. 38-41; Stephen Brookes, "Two New Blocs Amid Shifting Sands," Insight 5 , no. 11, 13-20 March 1989, p. 36; and Alan Cowell, "Arabs Are Forming 2 Economic Blocs," The New York Times, 17 February 1989.
4. For samples of this discussion see "Arab Cooperation: Getting Together, in Bits," The Economist, 25 February - 3 March 1989, pp. 38-41; Stephen Brookes, "Two New Blocs Amid Shifting Sands," Insight 5 , no. 11, 13-20 March 1989, p. 36; and Alan Cowell, "Arabs Are Forming 2 Economic Blocs," The New York Times, 17 February 1989.
5. For samples of this discussion see "Arab Cooperation: Getting Together, in Bits," The Economist, 25 February - 3 March 1989, pp. 38-41; Stephen Brookes, "Two New Blocs Amid Shifting Sands," Insight 5 , no. 11, 13-20 March 1989, p. 36; and Alan Cowell, "Arabs Are Forming 2 Economic Blocs," The New York Times, 17 February 1989.
6. The socio-economic agreements and achievements of the ACC are documented in its one, and only, annual report, Al-Imana al-'Amma li Majlis al-Ta'awun al-'Arabi, Majlis al-Ta'awun al-'Arabi: Nusus al-Itifaqiyyat wa al-Qararat al-Muwaqa'a Khilal al-'Am al-Awwal 1989-1990 (Text of the Agreements and Decisions Signed During the First Year, 1989-1990) (Amman: Government Press, 1990).
7. The ACC was not officially dissolved, but neither was its charter renewed. This does not rule out a reemergence of the ACC in some form in the future, but in the years following the 1991 Gulf War deep strains in Egyptian-Iraqi relations and even Jordanian-Iraqi relations suggest that a full rapprochement between the original four members of the ACC remains a distant possibility at best.
8. Interviews with mid-level Jordanian officials active in ACC affairs, Amman, March and April 1993. The empirical analysis in the article draws on the author's interviews with numerous Jordanian policy-makers and officials and many former prime ministers of Jordan. Most of these ministers agreed to be cited in general but not on a point by point basis. The prime ministers are listed here along with their term as prime minster and the date of the interview: Ahmad al-Lawzi (1971-73), 20 April 1993; Zayd al-Rifa'i (1973-76, 1985-89), 29 March 1993; Ahmad 'Ubaydat (1984-85), 15 April 1993; Mudar Badran (1976-79, 1980-84, 1989-91), 31 March 1993; and Tahir al-Masri (June to November 1991), 2 March 1993. Other key interviews included 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah (former chief of the Royal Hashimite Court, national security advisor, and Jordanian representative to the United Nations), 28 February 1993; Jawad al-'Anani (former minister of supply, of labor, of industry and trade, and current deputy prime minister), 10 April 1993; and Marwan al-Qasim (former foreign minister and chief of the Royal Hashimite Court), 6 April 1993. Most middle and junior level officials at the foreign ministry, parliament, and in various economic ministries, however, elected to remain anonymous and the author has therefore cited them as simply "policy-makers" or "officials" at their own request.
9. For an excellent collection of essays on Arab integration as both a domestic (state-society) and international (state-state) phenomenon, see Giacamo Luciani and Ghassan Salame, eds., The Politics of Arab Integration (London: Croom Helm, 1988).
10. A major work on an external "balance of threats" to explain Middle East alliances is Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
11. The literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy is fairly broad, but for some of the most sophisticated approaches focusing on Arab states specifically, see Fred H. Lawson, "Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: A Domestic Politics Explanation," International Organization 38, no. 3 (Summer 1984), pp. 451-80; and Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 369-95.
12. The literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy is fairly broad, but for some of the most sophisticated approaches focusing on Arab states specifically, see Fred H. Lawson, "Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: A Domestic Politics Explanation," International Organization 38, no. 3 (Summer 1984), pp. 451-80; and Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 369-95.
13. The main work to argue for the primacy of economics, particularly "budget security," in Arab alliance politics is that of Laurie A. Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
14. Quoted in Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 20 (20-27 February 1989), p. A8.
15. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 2 (1989), p. 6. See also, Al-Imana al-'Amma li Majlis al-Ta'awun al-'Arabi, Mithaq al-Majlis al-Ta'awun al-'Arabi (Charter of the Arab Cooperation Council) (Amman: Government Press, 1989).
16. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 2 (1989), p. 6. See also, Al-Imana al-'Amma li Majlis al-Ta'awun al-'Arabi, Mithaq al-Majlis al-Ta'awun al-'Arabi (Charter of the Arab Cooperation Council) (Amman: Government Press, 1989).
17. Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 38 (26 June - 3 July 1989), p. A7.
18. Mohammad Wahby, "The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order," American-Arab Afairs 28 (Spring 1989), p. 66; see also Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making, pp. 230, 235.
19. Mohammad Wahby, "The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order," American-Arab Afairs 28 (Spring 1989), p. 66; see also Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making, pp. 230, 235.
20. Some have seen this as an Iraqi-initiated, as well as dominated, bloc. While it is true that the Iraqis attempted to sway the alliance to their policy aims, this should not obscure the enormous role and very different intentions of the Jordanians in creating the ACC. See the analysis of the purpose and outlook of the ACC by John F. Devlin, "The Purposes and Effect of the Arab Cooperation Council," Geopolitics of Energy (August 1989), pp. 4-7.
21. On ACC awareness of GCC suspicions, see Wahby, "The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order," pp. 61-63.
22. W. Andrew Terrill, "Saddam's Closest Ally: Jordan and the Gulf War," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 9, no. 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 43-54.
23. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 2 (1989), p. 7.
24. Israel had demonstrated its fear of Iraqi intentions as early as 1981 when it bombed the Osiraq Iraqi nuclear reactor. After the formation of the ACC, Israel became especially concerned with growing military cooperation between Iraq and Jordan. See, for example, Gloria Shamis, "Jordan and Iraq Set Up Joint Fighter Squadron," Jerusalem Post, 18 February 1990.
25. Interviews with Jordanian foreign ministry officials and former cabinet ministers, Amman, February and March 1993.
26. Jordanian officials interviewed tended to stress the desire to bring Syria into the ACC. Syrian officials interviewed, however, tended to be skeptical or outright suspicious of Jordanian intentions. Interviews in Amman (foreign ministry) and Damascus (foreign ministry and People's Assembly), February to April 1993.
27. In the view of former Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i (1973-76, 1985-89), this added an unwanted layer of tension to Saudi-Jordanian relations, which only worsened with the onset of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Some Saudi leaders even charged later that the establishment of the ACC had been the first step toward the invasion of Kuwait. Interview with Al-Rifa'i, Amman, 29 March 1993.
28. Wahby, "The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order," p. 62. Commenting on this development, one analysis noted cryptically that "just why a non-aggression treaty should be necessary at this particular juncture - or why, if one is necessary, it should not be equally necessary for, say, Kuwait - is not entirely clear." Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 26 (3-10 April 1989), p. C3.
29. Wahby, "The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order," p. 62. Commenting on this development, one analysis noted cryptically that "just why a non-aggression treaty should be necessary at this particular juncture - or why, if one is necessary, it should not be equally necessary for, say, Kuwait - is not entirely clear." Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 26 (3-10 April 1989), p. C3.
30. Fida Nasrallah, "The ACC and Arab Regional Problems," Middle East International, 25 August 1989, pp. 19-20.
31. Lamis Andoni, "Arab Cooperation Council: Allaying Fears," Middle East International, 17 February 1989, p. 8.
32. See also Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 20 (20-27 February 1989), p. C2. Comparing the openness of the ACC with the exclusivity of the GCC, one Jordanian foreign ministry official dismissed the Gulf organization as "exclusively an oil-producing countries' country club." Interview in Amman, March 1993.
33. Perhaps no Jordanian official emphasized the need to shore up Jordanian-Syrian relations more than former prime minister Al-Rifa'i. Discussion with Al-Rifa'i in Amman, 29 March 1993.
34. Interview with Mudar Badran, Amman, 31 March 1993.
35. Interview with Zayd al-Rifa'i, Amman, 29 March 1993.
36. Syrian officials, however, still regarded the assorted subregional organizations - the ACC, GCC, and AMU - as all counterproductive to real Arab unity, because they subdivided the Arab world. From their view, in short, the three alliances were working backwards. In addition, they made clear that they did not expect the ACC, in particular, to last long. Interview with officials in the Syrian foreign ministry and People's Assembly, March and April 1993.
37. Interviews with Jordanian foreign ministry officials, Amman, March and April 1993.
38. Interviews with Jordanian foreign ministry officials, Amman, March and April 1993.
39. "It's Reckoning Time for Jordan," The Middle East (June 1989), p. 26.
40. Both Islamist and secular leftist political activists, interviewed for this study, tended to use the term "intifada." The leftist Jordanian People's Democratic Party (HASHD) described the unrest as a habba nisaan (April squall) in one of its platform pamphlets. See Hizb al-Sha'b al-Dimuqrati al-Urduni (Jordanian People's Democratic Party) (Amman: Central Publication Authority, 1992), p. 3.
41. Ahmad al-Lawzi, prime minister from 1971-73 and longtime speaker of Jordan's upper house of parliament, argued that liberalization began as early as 1984. Interview with Al-Lawzi in Amman, 20 April 1993. In contrast, the view that liberalization began reluctantly after April 1989 and then only in direct response to the uprising was noted by 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood and speaker of Jordan's lower house of parliament (1990-93). Interview with 'Arabiyyat in Amman, 25 February 1993.
42. Even before the official legalization of political parties, a number of studies appeared in Jordan analyzing the ideological and party spectrum in Jordan. See, for example, Ahmad Abu Khusa, Al-Dimuqratiyya via al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya (Democracy and Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: Shuraka al-Sharq al-Awsat li al-Tiba'a, 1991); Marwan Ahmad Sulayman al-'Abdalat, Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya (Map of Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: Dar al-'Ubra 1992); and Sulayman Suways, "Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun" (A Map of Political Parties in Jordan), Al-Urdun Al-Jadid (1990), pp. 122-41. Beginning in 1993, the New Jordan Research Center also began publishing studies on individual political parties, as part of a series of short books on civil society and political life in Jordan.
43. Even before the official legalization of political parties, a number of studies appeared in Jordan analyzing the ideological and party spectrum in Jordan. See, for example, Ahmad Abu Khusa, Al-Dimuqratiyya via al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya (Democracy and Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: Shuraka al-Sharq al-Awsat li al-Tiba'a, 1991); Marwan Ahmad Sulayman al-'Abdalat, Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya (Map of Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: Dar al-'Ubra 1992); and Sulayman Suways, "Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun" (A Map of Political Parties in Jordan), Al-Urdun Al-Jadid (1990), pp. 122-41. Beginning in 1993, the New Jordan Research Center also began publishing studies on individual political parties, as part of a series of short books on civil society and political life in Jordan.
44. Even before the official legalization of political parties, a number of studies appeared in Jordan analyzing the ideological and party spectrum in Jordan. See, for example, Ahmad Abu Khusa, Al-Dimuqratiyya via al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya (Democracy and Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: Shuraka al-Sharq al-Awsat li al-Tiba'a, 1991); Marwan Ahmad Sulayman al-'Abdalat, Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya (Map of Jordanian Political Parties) (Amman: Dar al-'Ubra 1992); and Sulayman Suways, "Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun" (A Map of Political Parties in Jordan), Al-Urdun Al-Jadid (1990), pp. 122-41. Beginning in 1993, the New Jordan Research Center also began publishing studies on individual political parties, as part of a series of short books on civil society and political life in Jordan.
45. For an analysis of the political and economic aspects of the liberalization program, see Laurie A. Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," in Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan, eds., Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 167-88.
46. Interviews with Jordanian foreign ministry officials, Amman, February and March, 1993.
47. Interviews with Jordanian economists at the Ministry of Industry and Trade and with officials in the Ministry of Planning, Amman, February and March 1993.
48. See also Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making, pp. 234-35, 273, 283-84.
49. See the discussion in Timothy J. Piro, "The Domestic Bases of Jordan's Foreign Policy: State Structures, Domestic Coalitions, and the National Interest." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association. Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, 11-14 November 1993.
50. Ibid., p. 15.
51. Ibid., pp. 13-16.
52. Interviews with officials at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Amman, March 1993.
53. Many current government officials or business people interviewed for this study were former army officers, with strong familial ties both within government and within private and public sector companies, especially construction-related firms.
54. Wahby, "The Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Political Order," p. 61.
55. Max Rodenbeck, "Egypt: Alignments," Middle East International, 17 February 1989, pp. 8-9. For a more detailed discussion of the limits of inter-Arab trade in the competitive, rather than complementary, economies of the region, see Rodney Wilson, "The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or Within the Region?" The Middle East Journal 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 268-87. Wilson notes that the integration of Europe had the additional effect of constraining market access for outside exporters such as the Arab states. The decline in trade flows to Europe, he argues, could be compensated by greater local trade integration, but by the mid-1990s few serious steps had been taken in this direction.
56. Max Rodenbeck, "Egypt: Alignments," Middle East International, 17 February 1989, pp. 8-9. For a more detailed discussion of the limits of inter-Arab trade in the competitive, rather than complementary, economies of the region, see Rodney Wilson, "The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or Within the Region?" The Middle East Journal 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 268-87. Wilson notes that the integration of Europe had the additional effect of constraining market access for outside exporters such as the Arab states. The decline in trade flows to Europe, he argues, could be compensated by greater local trade integration, but by the mid-1990s few serious steps had been taken in this direction.
57. Rodenbeck, "Egypt: Alignments," p. 9.
58. Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 20 (20-27 February 1989), p. A8.
59. This may have been, however, the most optimistic scenario. Interviews at Jordanian foreign ministry, April 1993.
60. Some political elites even speculated on the possibilities of Israel joining in a broad regional customs union if peace were achieved. Interviews with Jordanian government officials, Amman, March and April 1993.
61. See Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment," The Middle East Journal 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 51-70, and Laurie A. Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-81," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 3 (August 1994), pp. 393-413.
62. See Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment," The Middle East Journal 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 51-70, and Laurie A. Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-81," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 3 (August 1994), pp. 393-413.
63. Middle East Economic Survey 32, no. 19 (13-20 February 1989), p. B1.
64. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 1 (1989). p. 1.
65. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 2 (1989), pp. 10-11.
66. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 3 (1989), p. 13.
67. These included Jordan's professional associations for doctors, engineers, lawyers, and business people. See "Its Reckoning Time for Jordan," The Middle East (June 1989), pp. 26-27.
68. One of the leading critics in this regard was member of parliament, and former minister in the Rifa'i government, Dhuqan al-Hindawi. Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: Quarterly Economic Report, no. 1 (1990), pp. 8-11.
69. Interviews with Jordanian foreign ministry officials, Amman, February and March 1993.
70. Interviews with Jordanian government officials, Amman, March 1993.
71. For an analysis of the Gulf crisis and war, see Curtis R. Ryan and David L. Downie, "From Crisis to War: Origins and Aftermath Effects of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Crisis," Southeastern Political Review 21, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 491-510.
72. Interviews with Jordanian foreign ministry officials and former cabinet ministers, March and April 1993. See also, Ben Lynchfield, "Cairo Shies Away From Iraqi Military Alliance," Jerusalem Post, 23 April 1990.
73. Interview with a former Jordanian prime minister, Spring 1993.
74. Interviews in Amman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1993.
75. The Jordanian attempt at moderation and at finding a middle path between Iraq and the US-led coalition was influenced by a number of factors: Jordanian domestic pro-Iraqi pressures, deep economic dependency on Iraq, a genuine fear of a war spilling over into conflict between Iraq and Israel (to be fought in Jordan presumably), and the fear of a permanent rift within the ACC. Interviews with foreign ministry officials, Amman, March and April 1993.
76. These conclusions stand in contrast to those of theorists such as Stephen Walt, who retains the traditional focus on an external balance of threats. They lend empirical support to the work of those scholars who have argued for the importance of domestic politics (such as Barnett and Levy) or economic variables (such as Brand). See Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," pp. 369-95; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making; and Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq," pp. 393-413.
77. These conclusions stand in contrast to those of theorists such as Stephen Walt, who retains the traditional focus on an external balance of threats. They lend empirical support to the work of those scholars who have argued for the importance of domestic politics (such as Barnett and Levy) or economic variables (such as Brand). See Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," pp. 369-95; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making; and Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq," pp. 393-413.
78. These conclusions stand in contrast to those of theorists such as Stephen Walt, who retains the traditional focus on an external balance of threats. They lend empirical support to the work of those scholars who have argued for the importance of domestic politics (such as Barnett and Levy) or economic variables (such as Brand). See Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," pp. 369-95; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making; and Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq," pp. 393-413.
79. These conclusions stand in contrast to those of theorists such as Stephen Walt, who retains the traditional focus on an external balance of threats. They lend empirical support to the work of those scholars who have argued for the importance of domestic politics (such as Barnett and Levy) or economic variables (such as Brand). See Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," pp. 369-95; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making; and Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq," pp. 393-413.
80. See Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 479-510; and Michael N. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly 37 (September 1993), pp. 271-96.
81. See Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 479-510; and Michael N. Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly 37 (September 1993), pp. 271-96.